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Foreword
The post-Crisis decline in the growth rate of the ratio of global trade to GDP has been 
cause for some concern that global trade has peaked, and that we are now reaching a 
new normal in which trade levels will be weak in comparison to about a decade ago.
Whether such a peak in trade was a defining moment in global trade or whether it is a 
cyclical phenomenon is one of the questions this eBook addresses. The contributions 
to this eBook examine four key areas of the study of post-Crisis trade: the determinants 
of the slowdown; issues related to global value chains; East Asian dimensions and 
the ‘China factor’; and policy perspectives. The contributing authors represent top 
academic, policymaker and practitioner thinking from around the world.
CEPR and the Robert Schuman Centre at EUI are grateful to Bernard Hoekman for his 
dedicated efforts in editing this eBook. He has brought together an outstanding group 
of experts in the field, and we are sure this eBook will make a significant contribution 
to current debate on the topic. We would also like to thank Anil Shamdasani and 
Shreya Sinha for working on its publishing and launch processes. CEPR is grateful 
for the support from the European Commission under its ESSEC programme towards 
the funding of its dissemination activities. The Centre acknowledges that this support 
does not constitute an endorsement of the contents of this eBook, which reflects the 
views only of the authors, and that the Commission cannot be held responsible for any 
use which may be made of the information contained therein. CEPR, which takes no 
institutional positions on economic policy matters, is delighted to provide a platform 
for an exchange of views on this critical topic.
Tessa Ogden Brigid Laffan
Deputy Director, CEPR, London Director, Robert Schuman Center, EUI 
Part One
Introduction

3Trade and growth – end of an era?
Bernard Hoekman
EUI and CEPR
Trade growth has been anaemic since 2010. Already before the 2008 Global Crisis 
hit, the rate of growth of the ratio of global trade to GDP had slowed considerably. 
Most recent data show trade values declining. Has global trade peaked? Or is the 
trade slowdown simply a reflection of the state of the world economy and largely a 
cyclical phenomenon? This is the question that is addressed by the contributors to this 
CEPR/EUI eBook. While there is no consensus on the relative importance of cyclical 
versus structural factors, the analyses help to understand the forces that are at play and 
highlight the importance for the world economy looking forward of focusing on trade-
related policies as well as on the macroeconomic policies that are needed to revitalise 
global economic growth prospects.
Introduction
One of the ‘stylised facts’ of the last six decades is that international trade has grown 
faster than global production and income, in contrast to previous time periods, when 
the elasticity of trade with respect to output was much lower (Irwin 2002). Indeed, 
recent history has seen unprecedented high growth rates of global trade relative to 
global income, driven by a mix of technological change and business innovation, policy 
reforms around the globe and the re-integration of China into the world economy.
The ratio between trade and income or output is not a constant. As noted by Douglas 
Irwin in Chapter 1, there have been periods in history when the trade-to-production 
ratio grew rapidly, and periods in which trade and income have moved much more in 
The Global Trade Slowdown: A New Normal?
4
tandem. The period between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s was a major outlier on 
the upside. It spanned two major geo-political developments and one economic one: (i) 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the re-integration of central and eastern European nations 
with western Europe; (ii) the re-integration of China into the global economy, following 
the adoption of an export-oriented growth strategy that culminated with the accession 
of China to the WTO; and (iii) a great expansion in the use of so-called global value 
chains (GVCs) by large manufacturers and retailers, involving the outsourcing of parts 
of the production process to firms located in different countries.
Starting in the early 2000s, the rate of global trade growth slowed relative to income 
growth (first panel of Figure 1). Post-2008, trade growth has been particularly anaemic 
– in line with the very weak GDP growth performance (second panel).  Indeed, the 
most recent data suggest that trade is not even keeping up with global output growth 
and has started to decline: the OECD reported in late May 2015 that total merchandise 
exports and imports, in current US dollars, for the G7 countries and the major emerging 
economies (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa – the ‘BRIICS’) 
fell by 7.1% and 9.5%, respectively, in the 1st quarter of 2015 relative to the previous 
quarter (third panel). Trade is falling across the board, in contrast to the period 
immediately following the 2008 financial crisis in the US and Europe, when trade by 
the BRIICS was relatively dynamic. Exports of the emerging economies fell by 13.5% 
in March 2015 year-on-year (Kynge 2015), with China playing a major role – not 
only has China’s import demand for commodities been falling, but it is also importing 
fewer manufactured goods, with knock-on effects for major OECD countries and other 
Asian economies. Chinese imports (in current US dollars) fell 17% between the 1st 
quarter of 2014 and the 1st quarter of 2015. For the BRIICS as a group the value of 
imports fell 18%; for the G7, imports dropped by 11% (OECD 2015). These negative 
developments follow on from a four-year period in which trade was essentially flat after 
having recovered from the massive drop in 2009 (third panel of Figure 1). While the 
recent numbers are influenced by the appreciation of the US dollar, the basic conclusion 
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remains the same for trade measured in local currencies. Presently, trade is not a driver 
of growth for either industrialised or emerging economies.
Figure 1 Trade-income elasticity, export/GDP ratio and trade growth since 2000 
and 2007
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Slow trade growth has led to worries that the world economy has run into a ‘peak trade’ 
constraint, i.e. the ratio of global trade to GDP has reached a limit (Economist 2014). 
Global trade increased 27-fold between 1950 and 2008, three times more than the 
growth in global GDP. As a result, according to the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database, the trade-to-GDP ratio for the world as a whole rose from roughly 
25% in the 1960s to 60% today. The slow (absence of) growth in trade since 2009 has 
meant no change in this ratio since 2008. If the recent decline in trade is sustained, this 
60% may turn out to be a peak for the world as a whole. This question is addressed in 
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this CEPR/EUI eBook. The contributors try to untangle the various forces that underlie 
the trade slowdown. One important element of any such analysis is an assessment of 
whether the recent situation is mostly the result of macroeconomic forces – basically a 
cyclical phenomenon reflecting weak demand resulting from the need to rebuild balance 
sheets and reduce public sector deficits and debt – or if there are other, more structural 
or longer-term dimensions that are operating in addition to the cyclical drivers and that 
imply that the world economy may have to adjust to a ‘new normal’ for global trade.
Does it matter?
Why should we care if trade grows faster than output?  One reason is because trade is 
a source of demand – exports and imports are associated with economic activities that 
generate employment and income. Net exports are a key channel for crisis-hit economies 
to address deficits and reduce debt. If global demand and thus trade is anaemic, this is 
more difficult to do. Rising openness in recent decades, that is, an increase in the ratio 
of the sum of exports and imports to GDP, implies that economies have become more 
trade sensitive.  High trade ratios also mean greater trade (inter)dependence – trade 
weakness has spillover effects. 
A longer-term reason to care about the growth performance of the trade/GDP ratio is 
that trade is a channel for knowledge transfer (technology flows) and for specialisation 
according to comparative advantage, thereby improving resource allocation and 
supporting higher economic growth and welfare (real incomes) over time.  Openness 
matters for growth. Of course, the degree to which this is the case will differ across 
countries, as it is in part a function of economic size, wealth (per capita incomes) and 
policy, as well as the level of trade/GDP that an economy starts out from. While recent 
policy debates and discussions have centred on the distributional implications within 
countries of the process of globalisation that underpins increasing trade/GDP ratios, the 
rapid growth in trade relative to income has been one channel through which poverty 
rates in developing nations have been reduced and progress made in raising average 
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per capita income levels and human development in many countries, thus reducing 
cross-country inequality. GVCs have played a role in this process, allowing firms to 
specialise in specific tasks and activities that are provided to international markets, 
without having to rely on (i.e. wait for) the development of a diversified industrial base 
in their home market (Baldwin 2011). If the trade slowdown reflects an upper limit 
being reached on the growth of the openness ratio, it has implications for the ability of 
countries to emulate the development strategy that has been used very effectively by 
many economies since the end of World War II.
Explaining the slowdown
Answering the question of whether trade has peaked requires taking account of the 
macroeconomic (cyclical) factors that suppress trade growth – the post-Global Crisis 
recession, the weak consumption and investment demand associated with rebuilding 
balance sheets and reducing debt overhangs, etc. – and then assessing whether this 
in itself explains much or most of the trade slowdown. If not, the question turns to 
what other forces may be at play. The literature in this area has focused in particular 
on the income elasticity of trade as a summary measure of the various drivers of the 
relationship between changes in income (output) and trade, that is, how trade responds 
to (is associated with) any given change in aggregate income (e.g. Gruber et al. 2011, 
Bussiere et al. 2013). As is clear from Figure 1, this elasticity has been declining since 
the mid-2000s, suggesting there is more at work than the (clearly important) short-term 
macroeconomic factors.
A number of the contributions to the eBook – Chapter 3 by Emine Boz, Matthieu Bussière 
and Clément Marsilli; Chapter 4 by Patrice Ollivaud and Cyrille Schwellnus; Chapter 6 
by Byron Gangnes, Alyson Ma and Ari van Assche; and Chapter 8 by Paul Veenendaal, 
Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, Arjan Lejour and Henk Kox – argue that the recent global trade 
dynamics are largely driven by cyclical factors, in line with other analyses (see, for 
example, ECB 2015). Other contributors – including Cristina Constantinescu, Aaditya 
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Mattoo and Michele Ruta (Chapter 2); Guillaume Gaulier, Gianluca Santoni, Daria 
Taglioni and Soledad Zignago (Chapter 5); Hubert Escaith and Sébastien Miroudot 
(Chapter 7); and Matthieu Crozet, Charlotte Emlinger and Sébastien Jean (Chapter 9) 
– and all of the contributors who focus on trade developments in East Asia – Taeho 
Bark (Chapter 10); Koji Ito and Ryuhei Wakasugi (Chapter 11); Willem Thorbecke 
(Chapter 12); Menzie Chinn (Chapter 13); and Jiansuo Pei, Cuihong Yang and Shunli 
Yao (Chapter 14) – argue that the trade-GDP relationship has changed for structural 
reasons, in part by pointing out that the slowdown preceded the Crisis. In the view of 
these analysts, when global economic activity picks up again this will be associated 
with less trade than was observed in recent decades. 
Cyclical explanations
There is general agreement that a major explanation for the lack of trade dynamism that 
has characterised the last four years is weakness in aggregate demand, most notably 
in the Eurozone but also more recently in China. Intra-EU trade accounts for about 
one-third of global trade. The recessionary environment that has prevailed in the EU 
since the Crisis struck therefore has had a disproportionally large impact on global 
trade. In parallel with the slowdown of the Chinese economy, which represents another 
10% of global imports, and the recent decline in trade of emerging economies, it is 
clear that macroeconomic factors have had a major negative impact on trade growth. 
The more interesting question is whether the current macro environment explains most 
of the observed stagnation in trade or if there are other factors at play. Boz et al. and 
Veenendal et al. argue that, on balance, cyclical forces are probably the most important 
factor, while Ollivaud and Schwellnus also make a case that cyclical factors can explain 
most of the slowdown. Ganges et al. note that uncertainty may well be a contributing 
factor, with agents holding off on investment decisions because of uncertainty as to the 
economic situation looking forward. Taglioni and Zavacka (2013) argue uncertainty is 
an important short-run factor associated with the large negative demand shock from the 
EU, but also point to what appears to be a longer-term trend of disinvestment in capital 
Trade and growth – end of an era?
Bernard Hoekman
9
goods that started before the Global Crisis – a trend that contributors to this eBook 
confirm.
Structural factors
There are different potential explanations of a ‘structural’ nature (that is, non-
macroeconomic) that can result in a decline in the income elasticity of trade. One is 
that it reflects a change in the composition of global trade towards products that have a 
lower elasticity. Another is that the slowdown simply reflects the end of the integration 
processes of China and central/eastern Europe – i.e. the high trade growth was largely 
a transitional phenomenon.  A third is that it reflects the limits having been reached 
on the ability of (incentives for) firms to engage in the international fragmentation 
of production that is part and parcel of GVCs. A fourth potential explanation is a rise 
in government support for domestic industries, reducing the incentives for firms and 
households to buy goods and services from foreign suppliers.1
Changes in the composition of global trade
In his chapter, Irwin emphasises that there have been large changes in the composition 
of world trade over time. In tandem with the rise of the share of manufactures in GDP, 
the share of manufactured products rose from some 40% of world trade in the immediate 
post-World War II period to over 80% today. Within manufactures, investment goods 
and durables are more trade-dependent than consumer goods, and are more directly 
linked to the (expected) state of the economy – expenditures on these types of goods can 
1 Some of the factors termed ‘structural’ that are discussed in the contributions have a cyclical or time-bound dimension. 
Thus, an increase in protectionism and government support for domestic firms presumably will be tied to the state 
of economy as well as reflecting the preferences of the government; similarly, if the ongoing recession/slow growth 
environment results in a steeper fall in demand for investment goods than consumption goods, a resumption of economic 
growth will also increase trade growth. The term ‘structural’ is best regarded as shorthand for explanations that are not 
directly linked with the state of the macroeconomy.
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be postponed until it is clear that demand is expanding. Thus a decline in demand for 
such goods may have a disproportionate impact on trade growth. The contributions that 
assess this possible explanation (e.g., Veenendal et al.) suggest that compositional shifts 
play a role in explaining the decline in the trade elasticity and the trade slowdown—part 
of which is cyclical in nature. 
China
All the contributors to the eBook agree that developments in China are important 
both in understanding the large increase in the global income elasticity of trade that 
occurred in the 1990s and the subsequent decline that started in the mid-2000s. This 
can be seen as a transitional factor, in that the (re-)integration of both Europe and China 
with the world are time-bound events that imply high trade growth rates that cannot be 
sustained – once the adjustments associated with what is to a large extent a move from 
autarky have occured, trade will inevitably grow much more in line with income. Of 
particular importance as far as China is concerned is the decision by the government to 
rebalance the economy towards domestic absorption and away from an export-driven 
growth model. As argued by Guillaume Gaulier, Gianluca Santoni, Daria Taglioni and 
Soledad Zignago (Chapter 5), China’s re-integration had a juggernaut effect on the 
volume and structure of world trade. It is not clear whether other regions of the world – 
including other emerging economies such as India, Brazil or Nigeria/South Africa and 
their respective neighbourhoods – could in turn become new trade juggernauts that will 
drive the global trade-to-GDP ratio to a higher level as a result of actions to lower trade 
costs and pursue regional integration of markets. As they note, the world has changed 
with the rise of China; the country will be a serious competitor for such new entrants, 
who will find it more difficult to emulate the export-driven growth strategy that was 
pursued by China and other East Asian economies in recent decades.
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Explanations involving GVC-based production strategies  
Views differ on whether and to what extent the trade slowdown is due to this factor. 
There is general agreement that GVCs were a factor behind the rapid growth of global 
trade relative to income in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s (Bems et al. 2013, 
Yi 2003) and that this helped to explain the collapse in global trade in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2008 Crisis, as well as the rapid recovery in 2009-2010 (Baldwin 
2009). One reason why the adoption of GVCs led to an increase in the trade/GDP ratio 
is because this is an artefact of the way that trade and GDP are measured (Hummels et 
al. 2001, Johnson and Noguera 2012, Koopman et al. 2014). Trade flows are recorded 
on a gross value basis, including the value of the intermediate inputs that are embodied 
in a product. Thus, an input that is shipped from country A to B as part of a GVC is 
measured as an export from A to B; the value of the subsequent export of the processed 
product from B to C (or back to A) will embody the value of the imported input. From 
a value added perspective, this implies there is double-counting. GDP, in contrast, is a 
value added concept: it is the sum of all value added that is produced in an economy, 
including only net exports (exports minus imports). 
The more international production is fragmented across countries, the greater the 
associated gross trade flows relative to total value added. Insofar as at some point in 
time businesses achieve what they perceive as the optimally dispersed use of GVCs, 
the growth of trade associated with this process will slow and increase more in line 
with total output (value added) produced. Indeed, if business managers decide that it 
makes more sense (i.e. it is more profitable) to shorten supply chains or to ‘re-shore’ 
production, the result will be that recorded gross trade flows fall and that the difference 
between the gross value of trade and trade in value added (TiVA) will become less. 
Supply chain specialists predict that in the coming years there will be a move away 
from highly fragmented, globe-spanning supply chains towards a greater reliance on 
regional production networks (Srinivasan et al. 2014, Stank et al. 2014). This may 
also be the result of the adoption of new technologies sch as 3D printing (‘additive 
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manufacturing’). However, in their contribution to this eBook, Gangnes et al. argue 
that to date there is not much evidence of a retreat from GVCs. They also argue that 
there is little evidence for GVC-based trade being more income-sensitive than other 
types of trade. Others disagree. Crozet et al. (Chapter 9), for example, argue that the 
trade slowdown is more pronounced for products where participation in GVCs is more 
prevalent.2
Protectionism 
There is also no agreement regarding another potential explanation for the trade 
slowdown: protectionism. The majority view is that protectionism has not played a 
major role in reducing trade, although many contributors recognise this may be a factor 
at the margin. In their contributions (Chapters 15 and 17), Simon Evenett and Johannes 
Fritz disagree with this position. They argue that even if policy has limited effects for 
the world as a whole (which they do not believe), it may have significant impacts on 
specific (groups of) countries and on specific sectors. More generally, they make the 
important point that many of the policies that appear to be pursued by governments are 
directed towards assisting domestic industries through subsidies or the tax system, as 
opposed to large-scale increases in the average level of border protection. The efforts 
by international agencies to monitor protectionism may be akin to a drunk looking for 
his keys under the lamppost because there is light there. The impacts of different types 
of ‘murky’ policies on specific countries and sectors may be more significant that is 
generally presumed to be the case. 
2 Ferrantino and Taglioni (2014) argue that GVCs have contributed to the global trade slowdown because the goods that 
are produced in GVCs are more sensitive to changes in income than those that are not. 
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A new normal? Not necessarily
There are a number of reasons why trade may well grow faster than income in the 
coming decades and as a result drive the ratio of global trade (exports plus imports) 
to GDP beyond the level at which it currently seems to be stuck – around 60%.  One 
possibility is that we will see further compositional shifts in global trade flows in the 
future, away from manufactures towards services. One reason this might materialise is 
as a result of ongoing and future technological change, the adoption of new international 
business models, and additional trade policy reforms. As stressed by Usman Ahmed, 
Brian Bieron and Hanne Melin (Chapter 18) and Amgad Shehata (Chapter 19), there is 
great potential for trade to grow faster than income looking forward because technology 
is enhancing the ability of small firms to engage in international trade. The stylised fact 
that most trade is done by large firms may change if a mix of technology and policy 
lowers the fixed and variable costs of international transactions enough to allow smaller 
companies to start dealing directly with buyers in foreign countries. The internet, 
digitisation, more efficient logistics, e-payment systems, translation software, and so 
on are all potential drivers of the internationalisation of SMEs.
Another reason – one that is given less attention in the various contributions to the 
eBook (with the partial exception of the chapters by Escaith and Miroudot and by 
Pesce, Karingi and Gebretensaye) – is that in the future trade in services may expand 
significantly faster than trade in goods. Recent efforts by the OECD and the World 
Bank to collect information on the restrictiveness of trade policies for services show 
clearly that barriers to trade in services are often significant.3 In addition to explicit 
discrimination, differences in regulation across markets restrict trade. New vintage trade 
agreements such as the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement or 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may result in a reduction in the 
3 See http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicetrade/aboutData.htm and http://www.oecd.org/tad/services-trade/services-
trade-restrictiveness-index.htm. 
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average level of services trade costs. Unilateral actions by governments to enhance 
competition on services markets as an element of increasing productivity performance 
may also help foster greater trade in services.  
Services are more tradable than generally thought (Gervais and Jensen 2013). But in 
practice, trade in services will often involve FDI or the movement of service providers 
and/or buyers. These ‘modes of supply’ are not well measured. Indeed, sales of services 
by foreign affiliates are not regarded as trade in the national accounts, although they 
are regarded as trade by the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
As countries such as China shift towards greater reliance on domestic absorption, this 
is likely to generate greater demand for services and greater trade in services, including 
via FDI. 
Of course, it may be that progress in liberalising trade in services will not be achieved. 
Indeed, insofar as the trade slowdown is in part due to beggar thy neighbour policies and 
these are extended to services and related policy areas (such as data flows), the world 
may experience slow trade for some time to come. The fact that most policy attention 
has centred on the use of traditional trade policies – tariffs and so-called temporary trade 
barriers such as antidumping (generally not that temporary) and safeguard measures – 
as opposed to other policies that may distort trade much more (subsidies and other 
measures to support domestic firms) is worrisome.
While the global policy picture matters, individual countries that confront high real 
trade costs as a result of national policies, adverse business climates, and so on will 
continue to have the opportunity to use trade as part of a growth strategy. Regions such 
as South Asia and Africa offer great potential for further trade growth (see Chapter 
16 by Ottavia Pesce, Stephen Karingi and Isabelle Gebretensaye), but this is again 
conditional on actions to reduce trade costs and bolster capabilities and supply side 
capacity.  Openness ratios are often already quite high for many African nation. What 
matters is increasing trade in value added by diversifying exports and changing the 
composition of trade.
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At the end of the day, an increasing trade/GDP ratio is a measure of specialisation. 
The fragmentation of production that is reflected in the expansion of GVCs also 
occurs domestically. If on net the global trade/GDP ratio levels off, there may well 
be substantial scope for continued fragmentation and specialisation within countries 
and regions. As argued by Moreira et al. (2013), domestic trade costs matter as much 
as international trade costs; for some countries they may be substantially higher (e.g. 
Indonesia, a very large archipelago). These considerations illustrate the importance of 
continued – indeed stronger – focus on efforts to reduce trade costs broadly defined, 
both domestic and international. 
Conclusion
The contributions to this CEPR/EUI eBook make clear that a combination of cyclical 
and structural factors is negatively impacting the growth performance of global trade. 
The impact of the macroeconomic situation post-2008 Crisis – notably the weakness 
in aggregate demand and within that, demand for durables and investment goods – 
played a major role in the recent trade slowdown and continues to do so. The gradual 
rebalancing of the Chinese economy away from an export-driven model towards greater 
reliance on domestic absorption is an additional factor that comes on top of the weakness 
of the Eurozone, generating additional knock-on effects on other emerging economies.
There is clear evidence that trade growth began to slow down before the 2008 Crisis hit, 
and that the very high growth of global trade relative to GDP was in part a consequence 
of the re-integration of China and central and eastern European countries into the world 
economy, which in turn was facilitated by the rapid growth in GVC participation and 
associated FDI flows. This process, by its nature, was a transitional one, generating 
trade growth rates that inevitably had to taper off once the adjustment process associated 
with re-integration had run its course.  
It is important to differentiate between the ‘China factor’ and ‘diminishing returns to 
GVC strategies’ explanations for slower trade, as GVC growth has been a major feature 
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of China’s trade expansion (as it was for central and eastern Europe). The potential for 
greater use of the ‘GVC technology’ and further specialisation and fragmentation of 
production remains very significant for many developing countries, arguing against 
the conclusion that the world has attained ‘peak trade’. On balance, once the cyclical 
headwinds have abated, it is likely that trade growth will exceed GDP growth once 
again, albeit not as much as during the 1990s given the transitional nature of the trade 
growth attained by former centrally planned economies. 
Much will depend here on the extent to which regions of the world that have lagged 
behind Europe, East Asia and North America manage to increase their participation in 
GVCs and the international fragmentation of production. This depends importantly on 
policies – action by governments to reduce trade costs and to refrain from ‘protectionism’ 
– and on the extent to which international trade in services will expand in the years to 
come. If the ‘so far so good’ assessment of trends in protectionism post-Crisis that has 
been the prevailing view (e.g. Hoekman 2012) needs to be revisited, this will imply 
additional headwinds for trade growth looking forward. There is clearly a need for 
greater effort to monitor and assess the extent to which policies are distorting trade. 
While there is some evidence that the spread of GVCs is one reason why we did not see 
large-scale recourse to traditional protectionism in the immediate post-Crisis period, 
as higher barriers on imports will make the end products produced by the chain less 
competitive (Gawande et al. 2015), governments continue to have strong incentives to 
use other instruments that can have beggar thy neighbour effects – such as subsidies 
of different kinds, including investment incentives and local content requirements (e.g. 
Hufbauer et al. 2013, Hoekman, 2015, Ossa 2015). This is the case independent of 
future developments in the use of GVCs.
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1 World trade and production:  
A long-run view
Douglas A Irwin
Dartmouth College
As the appearance of this eBook indicates, there is renewed interest in the empirical 
relationship between world trade and various measures of world production. Changes 
in the relationship over time between these series could reveal something about changes 
in the composition of trade, the structure of production, and possibly even commercial 
policies.
This chapter aims to set the current discussion in historical context. It will examine the 
aggregate figures on trade and production over the past century as a way of framing the 
study of recent developments. 
There are three readily available primary sources of data on world trade and production 
over the course of the 20th century. A standard source comes from the work of Angus 
Maddison, in particular his book The World Economy published in 2006 by the OECD. 
While his primary focus is presenting consistent measures of real GDP for as many 
countries as possible for as far back in history as possible, he also provides some limited 
information on world trade stretching back to the early 1800s. 
A second source of data is contained in a draft paper from the United Nations Statistical 
Office from 1962. This paper, available on the UN website and compiled by the 
Norwegian economist Jon Ola Norbom, presents data from 1900 to 1960 (Norbom 
1962). These data supersede those presented by the League of Nations in its various 
publications during the interwar period. 
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A third source of data comes from the WTO, which reports data from 1950 in the 
appendix tables to its annual volume International Trade Statistics.1
This chapter presents figures using all three data sources to see what patterns emerge. 
In so doing, we will have a basis for judging whether the current relationship between 
trade and production is comparable to, or vastly different from, historical experience.
The Maddison data
While Maddison provides the best compilation of historical population and GDP data 
available, the foreign trade data are less useful. (Of course, international trade was not 
the primary focus of his efforts.) Many of his world export figures are in current dollar 
terms, which would be inappropriate to compare to real output or real income measures. 
He does present some real or volume measures on a less frequent basis, and in fact most 
of his trade data are not presented systematically on an annual basis. However, Table 
F-3 in Maddison (2006) does present the value of world exports by region at constant 
prices (millions of 1990 dollars) for six benchmark years – 1870, 1913, 1950, 1973, 
1990, and 1998. These can be compared to his world real GDP figures for those same 
years. 
Figure 1 shows the average annual percentage change in world exports and world GDP 
for three periods: 1870-1913, 1913-1950, and 1950-1973. The pattern is consistent with 
standard accounts of these periods. The 1870-1913 period before World War I was 
the first era of globalisation, characterised by relatively open trade and free labour 
and capital mobility between countries (O’Rouke and Williamson 1999). During this 
period, world trade grew slightly faster than world GDP, but not twice as fast.2 The 
turbulent 1913-1950 period was marked by two world wars and the Great Depression. 
Between the two benchmark years, world GDP growth exceeded world export growth, 
1 https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2014_e/its14_appendix_e.htm
2 Lewis (1981) presents annual data on world exports and production of manufactured goods from 1890 to 1913.
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as exports were a casualty of the two wars and the interwar protectionism (Glick and 
Taylor 2010, Irwin 2013). (The 1920s show a more normal relationship, as that decade 
was largely free from conflict or depression.) The 1950-1973 period – the ‘golden age 
of growth’ – saw a rapid recovery of GDP in western Europe, strong growth in the US 
and the rest of the world, and a remarkably rapid increase in world trade. 
Figure 1  Maddison data on world exports and GDP, constant dollars
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Source: Maddison (2006), Table A-a and F-3.
The United Nations data
 The Norbom UN data provide annual estimates of the value, unit value, and quantum 
of world exports (total, manufactured, and others goods), as well as an index of world 
manufacturing production, annually from 1900-1913, 1921-1938, 1948, and 1950-
1960. Unfortunately, data are not presented on world GDP or a more aggregated index 
of production or income that can be compared to the total world export figures. As a 
result, Figure 2 depicts just the average annual growth rates for trade and production 
of manufactured goods, which – as is well known – tends to grow faster than trade in 
other commodities.
The Global Trade Slowdown: A New Normal?
24
The figures exhibit the same pattern as the Maddison data, with a little more refinement 
of the time periods. The two periods stretching from 1900-13 and 1920-29 are similar; 
in each, trade growth is just a percentage point higher than production growth. This 
shows that the interwar period was not uniformly depressed. Growth was rapid in the 
1920s, but terrible in the 1930s during the Great Depression. Although most of the 
world downturn was concentrated in the years from 1929 to 1933, trade had still yet to 
recover to its 1929 peak by 1938, and production was just slightly higher. The post-war 
golden age period does not stand out nearly as much as in the Maddison data. Trade 
growth exceeds production growth and is higher than in the 1920s and pre-1913 period, 
but not by a substantial margin. 
Figure 2 UN data on trade and production of manufactured goods, various periods
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WTO data
The WTO continues to publish annual data, starting in 1950, on the volume of world 
exports and production in its annual International Trade Statistics. These data are 
disaggregated into total, manufactured, fuels and mining, and agricultural. Figure 3 
presents total exports and production, by decade. Two periods stand out. First, world 
exports slowed considerably in the 1980s, not just because of slower production growth; 
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rather, the margin by which exports exceeded production growth narrowed. This has 
sometimes been attributed to protectionism early on in the decade, something that has 
been difficult to demonstrate (Irwin 2002). The 1990s, however, saw a much more 
rapid expansion of exports in comparison to production. This has been attributed to the 
opening up of China, India, and other developing countries to world trade and will be 
explored in some of the chapters in this eBook. The most recent narrowing of the gap 
between production and exports (after 2010) has been a cause for concern and will also 
be studied in other chapters.
Figure 3 Total exports and production, by decade
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To provide a comparison with Figure 2, Figure 4 presents just manufactured exports and 
production. Given that manufactured goods comprise about two-thirds of total world 
trade, it is not surprising that the figure looks similar to Figure 3. The same patterns that 
are evident for total trade are also apparent in manufactured goods trade.
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Figure 4  Manufactured exports and production, by decade
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Source: WTO (2014).
Figure 5 focuses on agricultural exports and production, using the same scale as the 
previous two figures. Growth in this case is much slower than for total exports and 
manufactured goods exports. The 1980s was a particularly bad period for agricultural 
trade and saw the unusual pattern of growth in production exceeding growth in exports. 
However, the same narrowing of the gap between exports and production is evident 
here, particularly after 2010, as in the other figures.
Figure 5 Agricultural exports and production, by decade
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-13 
A
ve
ra
ge
 a
nn
ua
l p
er
ce
nt
 c
ha
ng
e 
Agricultural Exports Agricultural Production 
Source: WTO (2014).
World trade and production: A long-run view
Douglas A Irwin
27
Assessment
The chapters in this eBook will explore the changing relationship between exports and 
production in much more detail than this cursory sketch does. Unfortunately, long-run 
historical data on trade and production are woefully incomplete and not detailed enough 
to provide many useful comparisons to today’s world. (While data on the nominal value 
of trade have long been available, converting these data into a real or quantity basis is 
difficult because of the lack of price indices.) The quality of international trade data has 
improved throughout the course of the post-World War II period. Because trade data in 
recent decades are much richer and more complete than in the past, as the chapters in 
this eBook indicate, a more systematic analysis of the export-production relationship 
can be undertaken.
However, the simple figures presented here tell a fairly consistent and straightforward 
story. Under normal conditions – that is, excluding wars and depressions – trade growth 
exceeds production growth. The margin by which trade grows faster than production, 
however, is not consistent. In previous work (Irwin 2002), I examined trade and 
production trends for a sample of developed countries after 1870. The relationship 
between the two did differ over time. In particular, the elasticity of trade to production 
was much higher in the post-World War II period than it had been in the pre-World War 
I or interwar periods. In addition, the relationship was even stronger after 1985 than it 
had been before. This last point, reflecting the strong growth in trade in the 1990s, was 
clearly evident in Figures 3 and 4, and the analysis indicated that the implied long-run 
elasticity of trade with respect to income was large and historically unprecedented. In 
particular, it marked a significant change from the sluggish trade growth witnessed 
between 1973 and 1985. Observers at that time worried that protectionism in the 1970s 
and early 1980s might have been putting a brake on world trade. Bergsten and Cline 
(1983) argued that the slowdown in trade in the early 1980s was not due to protection but 
should have been expected given the world recession. However, the GATT Secretariat 
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(1985) also indicated that the trade-production relationship had changed after 1973, 
which the analysis of Irwin (2002) confirmed.
As the figures presented here demonstrate, however, the 1990s was an unusual decade 
and not representative of what would happen in the 2000s. Now it appears that the 
trade-production relationship has changed once again, with a marked slowdown in the 
growth of trade. Constantinescu et al. (2015) conclude that the recent slowdown may be 
due to the slowing pace of vertical specialisation rather than greater protectionism or the 
changing composition of trade or GDP. It is more difficult to evaluate these factors in 
terms of their past impact on the relationship, but two factors are clear. First, there have 
been large changes in the composition of world trade over long horizons. After World 
War II, manufactured goods accounted for about 40% of world trade, with agricultural 
goods and raw materials comprising most of the rest. Today, more than 80% of world 
trade is in manufactured goods. This fact probably accounts for the sensitivity of trade 
to production seen during boom periods, as well as sharp downturns such as the sharp 
contraction in world trade in 2009 that continues to receive analysis. 
In addition, outside of the Great Depression, it is very difficult to find a large role 
of trade barriers and protectionism in the trade-income/production relationship. With 
regards to the Great Depression, about half of the decline in world trade between 1929 
and 1932 has been attributed to protectionism (Madsen 2001, Irwin 2013). In the case 
of the sharp decline in world trade in 2009, Kee et al. (2011) find that trade policy 
measures account for only 0.4 percentage points of this decline in trade, or about 2%. 
Higher trade barriers clearly affect trade at the product and industry level, but it is 
difficult to conclude that they have operated to reduce aggregate trade growth outside 
of the 1930s. That said, the reduction of trade barriers in the 1990s, mainly through 
unilateral reforms by developing countries and big regime changes in China and India 
that brought them into world markets, may account for the spurt in world trade growth 
witnessed in the decade.
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While the history must remain somewhat speculative, a fuller accounting of the more 
recent trade-income/production relationship is possible. The chapters that follow will 
give us insight into these developments.
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2 The global trade slowdown
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1 Trade growth after the Crisis
After the recovery from the Global Crisis, trade growth has so far been sluggish. The 
rate of growth of world trade (total trade volumes) slowed to 2.8% in 2012 and 3.4% 
in 2013, from 6.8% in 2011. These growth rates of world trade are well below the pre-
Crisis average of 7% (1987-2007) and are slightly below the growth rate of world GDP 
in real terms, which has hovered around 3% in recent years (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Average growth rates in trade and GDP
Selected periods (percent) 
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8 Total trade volume GDP in constant prices
Note: Total trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
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Latest estimates and preliminary data indicate that the global trade slowdown persisted 
in 2014. Estimates in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook for 2014 confirm this 
trend, with world output growth at 3.3% and trade volumes growing at 3.1%. That 
trade growth in 2014 remains subdued is also corroborated by preliminary data for 
merchandise trade, compiled monthly by CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy 
Analysis. Based on this source, growth rate of merchandise trade was 3.3% in 2014 (see 
the Appendix). 
Trade growth in recent years has been weak in advanced economies, particularly in the 
Eurozone, and moderate in emerging markets and developing economies. Imports in the 
Eurozone declined by 1.4% in 2012 and increased by 0.9% in 2013, with improvements 
towards the later quarters of 2013 (Figure 2). Imports of emerging economies increased 
by 5.5% in 2013, with higher growth concentrated in Asia and Africa. Export growth 
varied more across regions, but follows the pattern of stronger growth in emerging 
and developing economies relative to advanced economies (Figure 3). As for 2014, 
both WEO estimates and CPB preliminary data indicate a slight pick-up in advanced 
economies and continued moderation in emerging markets and developing economies.
Figure 2 Total import volumes (Index, 2005=100)
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
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Figure 3 Total export volumes (Index, 2005=100)
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Note: Total exports is the sum of exports of goods and services.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
2 What caused the trade slowdown?
2.1 Cyclical versus structural determinants
Cyclical factors, notably weak demand in advanced economies, have contributed 
significantly to the global trade slowdown. Historically, the negative effect of a crisis 
on trade performance has not been limited to the crisis period, but has persisted through 
the medium term (Freund 2009, Abiad et al. 2014). The weakness in import demand 
is symptomatic of overall weakness in aggregate demand. Global GDP is about 4.5% 
below what it would have been had post-Crisis growth rates been equivalent to the pre-
Crisis long-term average. Not surprisingly, trade weakness has been most pronounced 
at the epicentre of the crisis – in advanced economies, notably the US and the Eurozone 
where GDP levels are, respectively, 8% and 13% below levels that would be suggested 
by historical average growth rates, resulting in a deviation from trend by over 20% 
in import volumes for both areas (World Bank 2015). With high-income countries 
accounting for over 60% of global imports, their lingering weakness inevitably affects 
the recovery in global trade.  
However, available evidence suggests that cyclical factors, while important, may not 
fully explain the trade slowdown.  A recent study by Boz et al. (2014) assesses the 
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importance of cyclical factors using a model that accounts for both the weakness in 
aggregate demand and Crisis-induced shifts in expenditures toward less import-
intensive components.  The model, focusing only on advanced economies, finds that 
these cyclical factors explain about half of the gap between observed import growth and 
the growth that could have been expected in the absence of the Crisis.
Another reason for the trade slowdown may be changes in the long-run relationship 
between world trade and income. Constantinescu et al. (2015) estimate the relationship 
between world trade and GDP in the last four decades and find that the long-term trade 
elasticity (the association between trade and GDP, which is the measure e
i
 in Box 1) 
rose significantly in the 1990s but declined in the 2000s. For the period 1986-2000, 
dubbed the ‘long 1990s’, a 1% increase in world real GDP was associated with a 2.2% 
increase in the volume of world trade (Figure 4). This elasticity is nearly double that 
of the preceding (1970-1985) and subsequent (2001-2013) years.1 Statistical analysis 
confirms that there was a significant structural break in the trade-income relationship in 
the period 1986-2000 relative to the preceding and subsequent periods.
Structural factors may explain as much as half of the current global trade slowdown. A 
decomposition analysis based on the model estimates of Constantinescu et al. (2015) 
suggests that while short-term determinants (including weak global demand) were 
dominant during the Global Crisis and the first year of the recovery, the contribution of 
these factors has subsided in recent years (see Figure 5). The contribution of the long-
term component to global trade growth over 2012-2013 may explain as much as half of 
the trade slowdown. These results suggest that trade after the Global Crisis is growing 
1 The approach in Constantinescu et al. (2015) follows the methodology in the existing literature (e.g. Irwin 2002 and 
Escaith et al. 2010). Ollivaud and Schwellnus (2015) estimate the same elasticity using a different measure of world 
GDP from Constantinescu et al. (2015) (i.e. GDP at market exchange rates rather than the conventional purchasing power 
parity-based measure). Using the alternative measure, they find long-run elasticities of 1.3, 2.4 and 1.8 for the periods 
1970-85, 1986-2000 and 2001-14, respectively (Table 1 on page 16 of their paper). Even though the final period elasticity 
is a little higher than the estimate presented here, the basic inverted-U pattern remains. Escaith and Miroudot (2015) use 
official exchange rates to compute a measure of long-term elasticity based on 10-year rolling period from 1960-70 to 
2004-2014 and confirm a steep increase in elasticities until about the year 2000 and a steep fall thereafter.   
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more slowly not only because global GDP growth is lower, but also because trade itself 
has become less responsive to GDP.
Figure 4 Estimated Long Run Elasticity of World Trade with Respect to World 
GDP (ei)
1.31
2.18
1.31
1970-1985 1986-2000 2001-2013
Note: Elasticity equals -δ/γ, with estimates derived from ECM specification: dln(imports)t=α + β*dln(gdp)t + γ*ln(imports)
t-1 + δ*ln(gdp)t-1+εt. Imports volume includes goods and services and gdp is in real terms.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations.
Figure 5 Decomposition of world trade growth
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations.
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2.2 The possible structural determinants 
The relationship between trade and income changes over time; a number of factors 
sometimes bring them closer together and sometimes push them farther apart. There are 
several possible explanations for the lower association of trade to GDP:
• Changes in the pace of income convergence across countries and the associate 
impact on trade patterns and growth. Escaith and Miroudot (2015) argue that the 
long-term evolution of world trade-income elasticity observed in the past 25 years 
can be partially explained by the relative evolution of advanced and emerging and 
developing economies. In particular, the faster income convergence observed after 
2000 may explain the rapid expansion of world trade, and the slow-down of this 
Box 1 Trade elasticity
The term ‘elasticity’ is widely used in this chapter.  Economists use elasticity as a 
measure of how responsive an economic variable is to a change in another. Thus, 
income elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of the demand for a good 
to a change in the income of the people demanding the good.  The elasticity is 
quantified as the ratio of the percentage change in one variable (e.g. demand for a 
good) to the percentage change in another variable (e.g. income).  
Usually implicit in the use of elasticity is the notion that one variable (e.g. income) 
has a causal influence on the other (e.g. demand for a good).  Given the complex 
interactions between variables considered in this chapter, the implied causality 
requires strong assumptions and should be viewed with caution.
The elasticity of imports with respect to own GDP (ei) measures how imports of a 
country (or group of countries) change when its (or their) own GDP changes.  The 
underlying idea is that the demand for imported goods and services largely depends 
on the income of the country (or the group of countries), of which GDP is a good 
measure.  We compute this measure at both the global level and the national level. 
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convergence after the 2008-2009 Crisis is likely to have deprived world trade of this 
structural driver. These insights are relevant to the post-Crisis slowdown but do not 
explain the observed lower elasticities after about the year 2000.
• Changes in the composition of world income, such as the relative importance of 
investment and consumption. The changing composition of GDP can explain the 
lower trade growth after the Global Crisis – particularly due to the decline in 
investment, which is the more trade-intensive component of GDP (Boz et al. 2014) 
– but not its historical decline since the early 2000s as the investment share in GDP 
surged before the Crisis.
• Changes in the composition of world trade. Changes in the composition of trade in 
terms of the relative importance of goods and services cannot fully explain the lower 
trade elasticity in the 2000s, because their measured share has been remarkably 
stable in recent years.  Changes in composition along other dimensions, such as 
between durable and non-durable goods, may have contributed to the slowdown of 
trade, as we discuss in Section 4 below.
• Changes in the trade regime, including the rise of protectionism.  Traditional 
protectionism seems to have increased only modestly, though we have relatively 
limited data on the extent of recourse to relatively opaque non-tariff measures. 
The available information suggests that new measures are a combination of trade 
restrictions and trade promotion whose ultimate effect on trade growth is ambiguous 
(Evenett 2014). However, the slower pace of trade liberalisation in the 2000s relative 
to previous period could plausibly have contributed to the lower trade elasticity, as 
we discuss in Section 7 below.
• Changes in the pattern of vertical specialisation.  There is evidence that changes in 
the pace of expansion of global supply chains are playing a role in the trade slow-
down, as we elaborate in Section 3. 
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3 Changes in the pattern of vertical specialisation
The slower pace of expansion of global value chains (GVCs) may be a cause of the 
trade slowdown. There is evidence to suggest that changes in international vertical 
specialisation underlie the slowdown in world trade. The long-run trade elasticity 
increased during the long 1990s as production fragmented internationally into global 
value chains, leading to a rapid surge in parts and components, and decreased in the 
2000s as this process decelerated. Figure 6 illustrates this by comparing the elasticity 
of world trade in value added, i.e. exports net of imported inputs, with trade measured 
in conventional gross terms. Intuitively, if the slower pace of GVC expansion is a 
contributing factor to the trade slowdown, one would expect the gap between the gross 
and value added trade elasticities to close over time, with the former converging to the 
value of the latter. Figure 6 shows broadly this pattern, with the elasticity of gross trade 
to GDP decreasing over time and approaching the lower and more stable estimates of 
the trade elasticity in value added terms.
Figure 6 Long-run world trade elasticities (ei): Value added trade and gross trade, 
seven-year periods
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5 Domestic value added
Gross exports WEO
Note:  The figure depicts 7-year rolling elasticities of gross world trade and domestic value added trade, both with respect 
to world GDP.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
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The changing pattern of trade in China and the US also suggests that the expansion of 
GVCs has slowed down. The share of Chinese imports of parts and components in its 
total exports has declined from its peak in the mid-1990s of 55% to a current share of 
approximately 35%, implying a diminished fragmentation of the production process 
(Figure 7). Further evidence of this change is the substitution of domestic inputs for 
foreign inputs by Chinese firms, which underpins the rise in domestic value added to 
trade (Kee and Tang 2014).2  
Figure 7 China’s imports of intermediates and parts and components as a share of 
exports, 1995-2012 (%) 
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2 The narrowing wage differentials with advanced economies may have also affected the incentives to locate low-skilled 
labour-intensive stages of production in China.  These changes too may in part explain China’s evolving position in 
global value chains.
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The experience of the US mirrors that of China along several dimensions (Figure 8). 
The US was the primary source of the boom in Chinese and other emerging economies’ 
imports of parts and components. At the same time, the US was the major destination 
for their exports of assembled goods. Since 2000, US manufacturing imports as a share 
of GDP have been stable at about 8%, after nearly doubling over the previous decade-
and-a-half.  Hence, the changing patterns of trade in both China and the US suggest 
– though not at this stage conclusively – that global value chains have played a role in 
the rise and subsequent decline in trade elasticities. 
Figure 8 Share of manufacturing imports in GDP and goods imports:  US and China
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Source: UN Comtrade, IMF WEO.
All these changes do not mean that China is turning its back on globalisation. The 
enhanced availability of inputs domestically in China has been linked to foreign direct 
investment in these industries. There may also be a geographical dimension to these 
changes, with China’s coastal regions beginning to source relatively more from the 
Chinese interior, because transport and communication costs have declined more 
sharply with the interior than with the rest of the world. Trade integration may now be 
taking the form of greater internal trade than international trade, which is captured by 
official statistics.
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4 The sectoral pattern of the slowdown 
The slowdown in global trade is concentrated in the manufacturing sector. Figure 9a 
shows that the rapid growth in world trade in volume terms in the long 1990s, and the 
subsequent slowdown in the 2000s, were driven by goods rather than services. Figures 
9b and 9c reveal that within goods, the significant deceleration of trade growth was 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector.  
Figure 9 World trade growth rates
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Source: UN Comtrade (SITC2 classification) for Figure 9c); WTO. 
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This slowdown in manufacturing trade had both cyclical and structural determinants. 
The weakness in demand in recent years has particularly affected import demand for 
durable manufactured goods. A breakdown of the different components of world trade 
elasticity to world GDP suggests that structural factors have also played a role. At the 
world level, the long-run elasticity of manufacturing trade to GDP was 2.6 in the 1990s 
and fell to 0.8 in the 2000s (Table 1). The services trade elasticity and the commodity 
trade elasticity actually increased in the more recent period, possibly because of the 
increasing tradability of services and the growing demand for commodities in emerging 
markets. This pattern confirms that developments within the manufacturing sector are 
key to understanding the global trade slowdown. 
Table 1 Long-run elasticity of imports to GDP (ei), by type of imports
Goods
Country/
region
Period
Total 
imports
Services Total Manufacturing Comodities
World 1986-2000 2.18*** 1.80*** 2.31*** 2.61*** 1.66***
2001-2013 1.31*** 2.18 1.31*** 0.79*** 2.35***
US 1986-2000 3.68 1.68*** 3.49*** 2.75*** 2.41**
2001-2013 1.77*** 1.95*** 1.73*** 1.14*** 3.77**
China 1986-2000 1.54*** 2.24*** 1.44*** 1.20*** 1.26***
2001-2013 1.10*** 1.22*** 1.10*** 0.73*** 1.84***
Note: *** indicates a significance level of 1%, ** of 5% and * of 10%.
Source: IMF WEO and authors’ calculations.
Manufacturing sub-sectors witnessing the largest declines in growth are those with 
greater vertical specialisation. Consistently with the evidence produced in Section 2, 
a disaggregated analysis of the manufacturing sector indicates that the lower pace of 
trade growth is likely to have been driven by changes in global value chains. Figure 10 
shows the relationship between the average growth rates of world trade of industrial 
manufacturing sub-sectors and their degree of international vertical specialisation 
(measured by the share of parts and components in total trade of the sub-sector). 
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Figure 10 Growth rates and degree of vertical specialisation
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Source: UN Comtrade (ISIC2 classification).
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In the 1990s there was a strongly positive relationship between the two, with trade in 
the most vertically specialised sub-sectors seeing much faster rates of growth than in 
sub-sectors where GVCs are less developed.  Then in the 2000s, while trade growth 
fell across the board, the largest declines were in precisely the sub-sectors with higher 
degrees of vertical specialisation, such as the manufacture of radio, televisions and 
communication equipment (-10%) and manufacture of electrical industrial machinery 
(-6%). Smaller drops in world trade growth were recorded in sub-sectors where GVCs 
are less developed, such as manufacture of watches and clocks (-0.7%). 
5 Will the trade slowdown persist?
In the coming years, world trade is projected to grow but not at pre-Crisis levels. As 
the global economy continues to recover, global trade growth can be expected to pick 
up. However, given the still weak recovery projected, the contribution of demand to the 
pick-up in global trade is not likely to be substantial over the short to medium term. 
Moreover, structural factors may also influence trade performance. Table 2 and Figure 11 
present two separate scenarios for world trade using estimates of world trade elasticities 
from a regression analysis for the periods 2000-2013 and 2008-2013, respectively. In 
the first scenario, world trade will grow in the medium term at an average of less than 
5% per year. The latter set of projections portrays a picture with world trade growing at 
only about 2% on average per year. 
Independently of the prevailing scenario, global trade growth over the medium term 
would rise considerably slower than the 7% rate typical of the pre-Crisis expansion. 
But which scenario is more likely? Reaching a firm conclusion on the extent of the 
trade slowdown is difficult at this stage. Formal tests indicate that there is a structural 
break in the pre- and post-Crisis trade-income relationship, lending support to the more 
pessimistic scenario. However, the estimates for 2008-2013 are based on a period that 
may be too short to rule out cyclical factors (albeit a long cycle) and to properly capture 
changes in the long-term association between trade and income.
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Table 2 Out-of-sample forecasts using model elasticities
World imports of goods
Advanced economies’ 
imports of goods
Emerging and developing 
economies’ imports of 
goods
Model forecasts Model forecasts Model forecasts
2000-2014 
elast.
2008-2014 
elast.
2000-2014 
elast.
2008-2014 
elast.
2000-2014 
elast.
2008-2014 
elast.
2015 4.4 1.1 6.7 1.2 4.5 2.6
2016 5.1 1.9 6.0 0.5 6.3 3.0
2017 5.0 5.1 6.7
2018 5.0 4.7 6.9
2019 5.0 4.5 7.1
Note: *** indicates a significance level of 1%, ** of 5% and * of 10%. Model projections beyond 2016 have not been made 
using 2008-2013 elsticities because the latter have been computed using quarterly data which is not available for IMF GDP 
projections beyond 2016. 
Source: IMF WEO, IMF IFS and authors’ calculations
Figure 11 Trade predictions (Index, 2000=100)
50
100
150
200
250
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
Import Volume (merchandise)
Model projections (2000-2013 elasticities)
Model projections (2008-2013 elasticities)
Real GDP
WEO GDP projections
actual values Out-of-sample
forecasts 
Note:  Trade figures are only for goods because the quarterly data used to make projections is only available for goods. 
Model projections beyond 2016 have not been made using 2008-2013 elasticities because the latter have been computed 
using quarterly data which is not available for IMF GDP projections beyond 2016. 
Source: IMF WEO, IMF IFS and authors’ calculations.
The Global Trade Slowdown: A New Normal?
48
6 Does the slowdown matter?
Most economies are more open today than they were in the 1990s, and trade can be 
expected to continue to contribute to countries’ growth.  Figure 12 shows that the ratio 
of imports of goods and services to GDP, a measures of openness to trade, increased 
from less than 20% in the early 1990s to over 30% right before the Crisis for advanced 
countries as well as emerging and developing economies.  After a dip during the Crisis, 
the ratio has returned to the pre-Crisis level in recent years. Thus, the level of openness 
is as high as it has ever been.  In so far as openness per se is associated with dynamic 
benefits, trade will continue to foster growth.
Figure 12 Imports of goods and services, percent of GDP in US dollars:  Advanced 
countries and emerging markets and developing economies, 1970-2013
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
Advanced economies Emerging market and developing economies
Source: IMF WEO
Nevertheless, the global trade slowdown may have implications for countries’ growth 
prospects. There are two main channels through which slower trade growth may 
translate into slower GDP growth. On the demand side, sluggish world imports may 
limit opportunities for individual countries’ exports. On the supply side, slower trade 
diminishes the scope for productivity growth through increasing specialisation and 
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diffusion of technologies. In particular, a slower pace of GVC expansion may imply 
diminishing scope for productivity growth through a more efficient international 
division of labour and knowledge spillovers. A body of microeconometric literature 
links increases in productivity growth at the firm level to various aspects of GVC 
participation, such as imports of parts and components (e.g. Amiti and Konings 2007, 
Goldberg et al. 2010) and knowledge spillovers through the production chain (e.g. Atkin 
et al. 2014).  In general, since a finer international division of labour is isomorphic to 
factor-augmenting technical change (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008), a slower 
pace of its expansion could indicate that world trade is contributing less to global 
growth today than it did in the long 1990s. This issue merits further investigation.
7 What can we do about it?  
Part of the explanation for the slowdown in global trade may be that the benefits of past 
reforms have matured and new reforms have languished. In the 1990s and early 2000s, 
reforms in anticipation of and resulting from WTO membership allowed countries, 
most notably China, to rapidly integrate into the global trading system even as supply 
chains were built in Asia, Europe and North America.  Applied tariffs fell from averages 
of nearly 30% to less than 15% in emerging and developing countries and from 10% to 
less than 5% in industrial countries (Figure 13). 
The liberalisation led to a significant increase in the ratio of imports to GDP in all 
countries, with the ratio significantly higher for developing countries through most of 
the 1990s and early 2000s (Figure 12).  The process of unilateral liberalisation slowed 
down after this period and multilateral negotiations have stalled.  While some major 
regional trade initiatives are in the pipeline today, few have so far had the transformative 
effect of, say, the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 or the reforms in 
Eastern European countries in preparation for their accession to the EU. 
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Figure 13 Average applied tariffs* (percent):  Advanced countries and emerging 
markets and developing economies
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 While the engine of the long 1990s may have in part exhausted its energy, the scope 
for trade integration is still strong. Reforms aimed at reducing trade costs could lead 
to efficiency gains by improving access to markets and expanding global value chains, 
particularly to regions and countries that have missed out on these opportunities in the 
past. Trade costs could be reduced by cutting tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in 
both goods and services, and addressing distortions and inefficiencies in transport and 
logistics. How to advance trade integration is obviously beyond the scope of this short 
chapter, but three areas appear key to tackle the global trade slowdown: i) implement 
targeted unilateral policy actions to address impediments to goods and services trade; ii) 
update the global trade architecture to allow different speeds and depths of integration 
across country groups; and iii) ensure coherence among preferential and multilateral 
efforts.
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3 Recent slowdown in global 
trade: Cyclical or structural?
Emine Boz, Matthieu Bussière and Clément Marsilli1
IMF; Banque de France; Banque de France
Introduction 
Global trade started to slow down markedly in the course of 2011, after it had bounced 
back from the Great Trade Collapse of 2008-2009.2 In 2012 and 2013, the growth rate 
of global trade reached only 3%, against nearly 7% in the pre-Crisis period (2002-
2007) and 6.8% in the period 1985-2007 (Figure 1). A remarkable observation about 
this slowdown is that world trade has actually grown at a slower pace than world GDP 
in these two years, whereas in the pre-Crisis period global trade was growing more 
robustly than world GDP (Figure 2).3 
1 We would like to thank Richard Baldwin, Olivier Blanchard, Chad Bown, Bruno Cabrillac, Christian Durand, Michael 
Ferrantino, Guillaume Gaulier, Thomas Helbling, Philippe Martin, Arnaud Mehl, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Sébastien 
Miroudot, Steve Phillips, Giulia Sestieri, and Daria Taglioni for helpful comments. We also would like to thank Valérie 
Vogel and Marina Rousset for outstanding research assistance. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily represent those of the institutions with which they are affiliated.
2 The Great Trade Collapse refers to the sudden and sharp drop in global trade in the wake of the 2008 Global Crisis; see 
in particular Baldwin (2009) for an early analysis.
3 The exact time of the slowdown is hard to gauge. The year-on-year growth rate of world trade dropped from 7.4% in May 
2011 to 3.7% the following month and remained low thereafter, so one may consider that trade started to decelerate in 
mid-2011. 
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Figure 1 World trade in goods
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Figure 2 Global GDP and trade growth
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This raises the question of the factors behind the global trade slowdown. In particular, 
it is important to properly disentangle the role of cyclical versus structural factors, 
given that they have very different implications for the outlook. If the slowdown is 
merely a reflection of a slowdown in economic activity, which was very weak in recent 
years, then the projected pick up in output growth should result in a rebound of trade 
flows. However, the slowdown in trade could also reflect deeper, structural factors, 
such as a rise in protectionism or a change in global production schemes throughout the 
world. If such factors are at play, the dynamics of global trade and GDP could change 
permanently and rule-of-thumb elasticities commonly used for global forecasts may no 
longer be accurate. 
To address this question, this chapter proceeds in three steps. First, we present some 
key stylised facts on the global trade slowdown. These stylised facts show that the 
trade slowdown was particularly pronounced in advanced economies, especially the 
Eurozone. However, most regions of the world have been affected, including emerging 
market economies (EMEs). The stylised facts also reveal that investment goods have 
been more affected than consumption goods. Second, we use a trade model to gauge 
how much of the slowdown can be explained by cyclical developments. This model, 
outlined in Bussiere et al. (2013), relates real imports to relative import prices and to a 
novel measure of aggregate demand, which weighs the components of GDP according 
to their trade intensity. This model was estimated for a panel of 18 OECD economies 
and was updated through 2014Q2. Results suggest that most of the slowdown can 
be explained by cyclical factors. Third, we turn to ‘structural’ factors often invoked 
in the context of the trade slowdown, such as the role of global production chains, 
protectionism and trade finance. Although the influence of such factors is hard to 
quantify, preliminary evidence suggests that they cannot be ruled out, but that their 
contribution may have been limited.
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1 Key stylised facts
The trade slowdown seems to have a strong regional component. First, advanced 
economies have recorded particularly weak growth trade in volumes of trade (Figure 
3). Second, there are noticeable differences even among groups of countries (Figures 
4). Starting with the advanced economies, Eurozone trade was particularly weak in 
2012, before rebounding somewhat in 2013. Even though most of the slowdown of 
Eurozone trade comes from intra-Eurozone trade (among member countries), extra-
Eurozone trade also contributed negatively to global trade growth. Among the EMEs, 
European EMEs have shown weaker trade than other regions, especially in 2012 (likely 
because of the spillover effects from sluggish Eurozone economic activity) and in 2014, 
perhaps related to the crisis in Russia and Ukraine. 
Figure 3 World trade in goods (volume)
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Figure 4 World trade in goods: Regional patterns (advanced economies and 
EMEs)
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Finally, the decomposition of world trade by sector shows that capital goods have 
contributed very significantly to the slowdown (Figure 5). Indeed, the contribution of 
capital goods to the decrease in the growth rate of global trade is 30% larger than that 
of consumer goods. This is consistent with the mechanism outlined in the following 
section, that is, that the fall in global trade has largely arisen from a fall in investment.
Figure 5 Contributions to world exports of goods by large sectors
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2 Quantifying the role of cyclical factors
We use the results of Bussiere et al. (2013), who estimate import elasticities based on 
various aggregate demand measures: import intensity adjusted demand (IAD), domestic 
demand and GDP. Unlike the more traditional demand terms, IAD gives more weight 
to the import-intensive components of demand, as read from the OECD input-output 
tables. It is formally defined as 
ln(IADt) = ωC,t ln(Ct) + ωG,t ln(Gt) + ωI,t ln(It) + ωX,t ln(Xt)
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where the ωs are the weights capturing the import contents of the corresponding final 
demand expenditures.
Using IAD as the measure of aggregate demand, we estimate the following import 
equation:
Δln(Mc,t) = δc + βDΔln(IADc,t) + βPΔln(Pc,t) + εc,t
where Mc,t , IADc,t and Pc,t denote real imports, aggregate demand and relative 
import prices, respectively, for country c at time t. 
Figure 6 compares the predictions of the IAD model with actual trade volume growth. 
For the 18 advanced countries considered in the estimation, eyeballing the figure 
suggests that the model does a reasonably good job in accounting for the observed 
slowdown in imports. 
To understand better the performance of these models and quantify the portion of the 
slowdown in trade that can be accounted for by cyclical factors, starting in 2012Q1, we 
compute the cumulative import volume growth in the data, that implied by the model, 
and finally what would be implied by assuming the historical average growth rate of 
import volume for 1985-2014 (Figure 7).4 
4 The time period we consider in the calculation of the trend growth is 1985 to 2014Q2; note that this includes the Great 
Trade Collapse during which import volume shrank by 10% in one quarter. Pushing the starting date of the average 
calculation to the mid-1990s does not change our conclusion that about half of the trade slowdown can be explained by 
the model.  
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Figure 6 Import volumes, data and model
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Figure 7 Cumulative import volumes, data, model and linear trend
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We find that applying the historical average growth rate yields a cumulative growth of 
13.2% for 2012Q1-2014Q2. For the same period, the IAD model predicts a cumulative 
real import growth of 8.6%, while the actual observed cumulative growth is 4.6%. Of 
the 8.6 (13.2-4.6) percentage point gap between observed trade growth and that based 
on a linear trend, cyclical factors can account for 4.6 percentage points, which amounts 
to 54% (4.6/8.6=54%), i.e. a little more than half of the observed slowdown.56
3 The role of non-cyclical factors
Non-cyclical factors are harder to quantify and to provide evidence for compared to 
the cyclical factors. Here we mainly discuss trends in global value chains (GVCs) 
and protectionism. The rationale for such ‘structural’ factors is as follows. Since the 
1980s, global trade grew significantly faster than world GDP. One hypothesis for 
this development is that trade liberalisation gave trade a strong boost in the decades 
preceding the Global Crisis, which not only affected direct exports (from one country 
to another) but also contributed to an increase in the fragmentation of production across 
countries. More specifically, goods are not simply built in one country and exported to 
another, but are often produced through more complex value chains, with components 
built in one country, assembled in another and exported to their final destination. Some 
fear that the Global Crisis may have ended this trend, possibly because of a rise in 
protectionism (or a deceleration of the trade liberalisation process), but also because 
producers may have realised that global production chains were too long and inefficient.
5 If we calculate the same statistics starting in mid-2011 instead of 2012, the share of the slowdown explained by the model 
rises to 58%. The model tracks the data fairly well over the last two quarters of 2011. In fact, the model underestimates 
the slowdown mainly during two quarters – the last quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 – especially for a few 
observations, including for 2012Q4 for the US, Germany and Japan and for 2013Q1 for Australia, Netherlands and the 
UK.
6 We have also estimated the trade elasticity using the GDP model for several sub-samples to identify any time variation 
in the value of the elasticity. Our panel regressions suggest that the elasticity estimated for the slowdown period was 
not significantly different from that estimated using the entire sample, but this may be due to the fact that the slowdown 
period is very short and the coefficient not tightly estimated.
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Global value chains
Data on GVCs rely on input-output tables, which come with a long lag.7 The latest 
numbers available in the WIOD database are for 2011, while OECD’s TiVA database 
stops in 2009. Hence, for the recent slowdown, one can only analyse proxy measures 
of GVC trade. 
Following Ferrantino and Taglioni (2014), based on the classification of products to 
intermediate and final by Sturgeon and Memedovic (2010), we approximate GVC trade 
by ‘imported intermediate goods’ in GVC-intensive sectors.8 More specifically, we 
calculate the ratio of intermediate goods imports to final goods exports in the Chinese 
electronics sector using 6-digit level export and import data from the International 
Trade Center. Since electronics constitute about 20% of China’s imports, and China’s 
imports are about 10% of world imports, we are thus capturing about 2% of world 
imports in this exercise. As a result, our results are suggestive rather than definitive. The 
dashed line in Figure 8 shows this proxy measure, which we computed using quarterly 
data up to 2014Q2.
Our second proxy for GVC trade is based on the interpolated and extrapolated version 
of the OECD’s TiVA dataset by Duval et al. (2014). Based on this dataset, the foreign 
value added as a percentage of gross exports for the world and China are shown by the 
solid lines in Figure 8.9 After the monotonic increase in GVC trade at the global level 
starting as far back as the data are available, there was a decline during the Great Trade 
Collapse, as the solid blue line depicts. After the bounce back from the Global Crisis, 
there has been a flattening of GVC trade for the world and for China. The dashed line 
7 For a recent analysis of GVCs see, for instance, Sturgeon and Memedovic (2011), Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013), 
and Gawande et al. (2014).
8 The main shortcoming of this approach is that if an imported intermediate good is used in the production of a final good 
that is consumed domestically, it should not be counted as a GVC. In fact, GVC trade would be a subset of imported 
intermediate goods. To the extent that the domestically consumed final goods and those that are re-exported behave 
similarly, the approximation in terms of growth rates will be good.
9 Note that we are plotting the foreign component of gross exports, so an increase implies an intensification of GVCs.
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– the imported intermediate goods proxy for China’s electronics – tracks reasonably 
well the proxy constructed using Duval et al. (2014) for China and suggests a modest 
decline in GVC trade after around 2012. Overall, these proxies suggest that GVC trade 
has been stable or modestly declining during the global trade slowdown. 
Figure 8 Trends in global value chains 
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The dataset by Duval et al. (2014) makes it possible to compare the dynamics of value 
added exports with those of gross exports at the global level. Such a comparison, 
plotted in Figure 9, reveals that value added exports almost always grew faster than 
gross exports in real terms in the period for which we have data. 2012 and 2013 are 
exceptions to this; in 2012, the growth of value added exports was identical to gross 
export growth, and in 2013, gross exports grew more than value added exports. Even 
though this change in the ranking of value added and gross export growth is noteworthy, 
two years’ data are insufficient to confidently conclude that GVC trade growth is now 
permanently slower. GVC trade seems indeed to be very procyclical (as demonstrated 
during the 2009 trade collapse and the subsequent 2010 rebound), so it is difficult to see 
whether this corresponds to a structural change.   
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Figure 9 Global value added and gross exports
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Protectionism
One leading source of information on protectionism is Global Trade Alert (GTA), an 
independent initiative coordinated by CEPR. GTA maintains a comprehensive database 
of trade measures since 2009 and colour codes each measure as red (almost certainly 
harms a foreign commercial interest), amber (likely to harm a foreign commercial 
interest) or green (trade liberalising or makes national policy more transparent).10 
Figure 10 shows the number of new measures that had already been implemented 
at the time of writing. Overall, based on the figure below, one cannot argue that the 
number of protectionist measures declined in 2014Q2 because of the potential upward 
revisions, but one can comfortably say that during the recent slowdown, the number 
of protectionist measures remained around the levels observed during the Great Trade 
Collapse, or even slightly higher towards the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013. 
10 There are two disadvantages to the GTA data. First, more measures are added to historical numbers as they are discovered, 
so the most recent observations are very likely to be revised upwards significantly. Second, the data include ‘behind-the-
border’ measures in addition to those that are directly targeted at trade.
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Figure 10 Number of new trade measures implemented
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A useful statistic on protectionism from the WTO is the imports covered by import-
restrictive measures divided by total imports. An advantage of this approach over the 
number of measures from GTA is that the WTO takes the announced trade measures 
(only traditional measures) and matches them to disaggregated imports data to get 
a sense of the fraction of imports that get affected. Figure 11 plots the data starting 
from late 2008. Based on these findings, the WTO concludes that trade restrictiveness 
increased only modestly but accumulated over time, as new measures more than 
compensate the removal of old restrictions. 
One of the most useful indicators on protectionism and that has a longer time series and 
good cross-country coverage is the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers Database 
(TTBD), which includes antidumping, global safeguards, China-specific transitional 
safeguard measures and countervailing duties. Based on a trade-weighted measure, this 
indicator shows that the stock of such barriers has increased mildly during the recent 
slowdown. 
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Figure 11 Trade covered by new import-restrictive measures
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Overall, there seems to have been some small pick-up in protectionism during the 
period of the trade slowdown based on the GTA numbers, the trade covered by new 
import-restrictive measures from the WTO, and the TTBD from the World Bank. Given 
the shortcomings of protectionist measures, it is hard to reach a definitive conclusion; 
however, one can comfortably argue that the last 2-3 years was not a period of extensive 
trade liberalisation, which could explain why trade is no longer rising so much faster 
than GDP.11
4 Trade finance
Another potential explanation provided for the Great Trade Collapse was a tightening 
in the availability of trade finance. In order to see if trade finance also played a role 
in the recent trade slowdown, in Figure we report the results of a survey of banks by 
the International Chamber of Commerce. The survey covers up to 298 banks in 127 
countries in the last vintage in 2013. Since the country and bank coverage has been 
11 Trade liberalisation cannot continue forever anyway. In particular, once tariffs have been brought to zero they cannot be 
reduced further – the zero lower bound is a constraint (even though non-tariff measures can always be phased out).
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expanding since the beginning of the survey, it is not ideal for a time series comparison. 
However, the coverage has been expanding to include smaller banks in less developed 
countries where one might expect financing to be tighter. Despite the inclusion of a 
larger number of smaller banks in less developed countries, Figure 12 shows that the 
availability of trade finance has not declined significantly, as evidenced by the more or 
less unchanged percentage of respondents reporting a decrease in its availability. 
Figure 12 Availability of trade finance
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Conclusion
As the analysis presented here underlines the role of cyclical factors among advanced 
economies, global trade should benefit from the projected recovery in these countries. 
Clearly, cyclical factors should disappear once the global recovery progresses further 
and do not call for a particular policy response (beyond what is needed to sustain the 
recovery). Among the non-cyclical factors, we tend to think that only protectionism 
may be a concern if there are further signs in the future that it is on the rise. In contrast, 
GVC trade can be seen as an optimal response to structural changes where policy action 
is harder to justify. 
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4 Does the post-Crisis weakness of 
global trade solely reflect weak 
demand?
Patrice Ollivaud and Cyrille Schwellnus1
OECD
1 Introduction
The anaemic recovery of global trade following the collapse of 2009 raises the question 
of whether this recent trade weakness mainly reflects cyclical factors or signals a 
structural break in the process of globalisation that may have implications for long-
run global GDP growth. While over the two decades that preceded the Global Crisis, 
global trade grew on average at more than twice the rate of purchasing power parity 
(PPP) based global GDP, global trade growth over the period 2008-2014 was slightly 
below this conventional measure of global GDP growth. In other words, the long-term 
elasticity of global trade to GDP appears to have declined from around 2 in the two 
decades preceding the Crisis to around 1 thereafter.
Empirical studies suggest that the collapse of world trade during the Global Crisis of 
2008-2009 mainly reflected a sharp decline in import-intensive components of demand 
such as investment and durable goods consumption, implying that the reversal of 
1 This chapter is an abbreviated version of a working paper, Ollivaud and Schwellnus (2015), which provides additional 
data and analysis. The authors would like to thank Jens Arnold, Sebastian Barnes, Jérôme Brézillon, Thomas Chalaux, 
Jean-Marc Fournier, Catherine Mann, Mauro Pisu, Jean-Luc Schneider and Dave Turner for helpful comments and Inés 
Gómez-Palacio for assistance in preparing the document. This chapter should not be reported as representing the official 
views of the OECD or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed in this chapter are those 
of the authors.
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cyclical composition effects would lead to a rebound of global trade growth.2 However, 
the fact that there may be less scope for further trade liberalisation than over past 
decades – especially in large emerging market economies – and less scope for further 
declines in international trade costs suggests that the recent weakness in global trade 
may in part also reflect longer-term structural changes (Krugman 2013).3
The main conclusion of this chapter is that most of the post-Crisis weakness of global 
trade can be attributed to weak global demand rather than structural changes. Section 
2 argues that global GDP measured in PPP terms overestimates demand addressed 
at exports and shows that most of the deviation of global trade intensity from its 
pre-Crisis trend appears to be driven by trade weakness in the Eurozone. Section 3 
assesses whether there is evidence for a structural decline in the global trade elasticity 
and discusses trends in investment, international production fragmentation and 
protectionism, all of which support the hypothesis that the post-Crisis slowdown in 
global trade growth mainly reflects global demand developments. Section 4 briefly 
discusses the implications of the empirical results for the OECD forecasting process 
and the future evolution of global trade.
2 The relation between global trade and global GDP over 
the past three decades
The apparent long-term elasticity of global trade measured at market exchange rates to 
GDP at purchasing power parities (the ratio of growth rates) remained at around 2 up 
until the Global Crisis of 2008-2009 and started to decline only thereafter, suggesting 
that there is little empirical support for the view that there has been a gradual decline 
over the past 15 years (Figure 1, Panel a). As observed by Constantinescu et al. (2015), 
2 Based on an extensive review of empirical studies Bems et al. (2013) suggest that 65-80% of the trade collapse of 
2009 can be attributed to declines in expenditure and shifts in its composition, with the remaining fall in global trade 
attributable to inventory adjustments and credit shocks.
3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the global crisis triggered an increase in the number of ‘murky’ protectionist measures 
by G20 countries (Evenett 2013).
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the apparent long-term elasticity of global trade to GDP declined from around 2 in the 
1990s around to below 1.5 thereafter, but the decline reflects an abrupt change around 
the onset of the Global Crisis rather than gradual developments over the past 15 years, 
suggesting that it may, at least partly, reflect cyclical developments.
Figure 1 The apparent elasticity of global trade declined in the wake of the Crisis
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook database (November 2014); OECD calculations.
The decline in the apparent global trade-to-GDP elasticity is less pronounced when 
both global trade and GDP are measured at market exchange rates, instead of measuring 
global trade at market exchange rates and global GDP at purchasing power parities, as 
is done by Davies (2013) or Constantinescu et al. 2015) (Figure 1, Panel B). Global 
trade volumes are conventionally measured at market exchange rates, reflecting the 
presumption that arbitrage should limit price differences across countries. It therefore 
seems natural to measure global demand for tradable goods at market exchange rates 
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rather than PPPs; while a country with a low relative price of non-tradable goods may 
have the same real income as a country with a high relative price of non-tradable goods 
even at a lower GDP at market exchange rates, it will nonetheless contribute less to 
global demand for tradable goods. For instance, a country experiencing a large currency 
depreciation may experience only a marginal decline in GDP measured at purchasing 
power parities as the relative price of non-tradable goods to tradable goods declines, 
but reflecting the decline in GDP at market exchange rates, its purchasing power for 
tradable goods would nonetheless decline substantially. Mismeasurement of global 
demand for tradable goods when using global GDP at purchasing power parities can 
introduce a substantial downward bias into estimates of the global trade elasticity, which 
becomes especially pronounced when the growth differential between low-income and 
high-income countries increases or when global GDP growth declines, as was the case 
in the wake of the Global Crisis (Box 1).4
4  The growth differential between G7 countries and the BRICS countries increased from around 4.5 percentage points 
over the period 1986-2007 to 5.5 percentage points over the period 2008-2014, while global growth slowed by around 1 
percentage point (from 3.3% to 2.1% at market exchange rates).
Box 1 Which is the appropriate measure of global GDP in the context of 
global trade analysis?
This box shows that measuring global trade volumes at market exchange rates 
while measuring global GDP at PPPs introduces a bias into estimates of global 
trade elasticities.
For illustrative purposes, consider a global economy consisting of two countries 
with equal and constant import intensities (defined as ratios of national import 
volumes to national GDP volumes in constant national currency). A logical 
requirement is that in this economy the global trade elasticity be 1 irrespective of 
real growth differentials across countries; equal import intensities imply that the 
composition of GDP growth is irrelevant for global trade growth while constant 
import intensities imply that import volumes grow at the same rate as GDP volumes.
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Formally, the global trade elasticity is defined as:
W wM
1 gM
1 + wM
2 gM
2
wY
1 gY
1 + wY
2 gY
2  ,
where superscripts denote countries 1 and 2, gM and gY are growth rates of imports 
and GDP, and wM and wY are shares in global imports and GDP. Note that irrespective 
of the currency of aggregation, the assumption of constant import intensities 
implies that import volumes grow at the same rate as GDP volumes, i.e. gM = gY .
If imports and GDP are aggregated in the same currency – for instance, in US 
dollars at market exchange rates as in this chapter – the assumption of equal import 
intensities across countries implies that country shares in global imports and global 
GDP are identical, i.e. wiM = w
i
Y . In this case, the global trade elasticity indeed 
collapses to 1:
W =
wY
1 gY
1 + wY
2 gY
2
wY
1 gY
1 + wY
2 gY
2
= 1.
By contrast, if imports are aggregated at market exchange rates and GDP is 
aggregated at PPPs, the assumption of equal import intensities across countries no 
longer implies that country shares in global imports and global GDP are identical; 
depending on the direction of the purchasing power correction, a country’s weight 
in global GDP at PPPs may be larger or smaller than its weight in global imports 
at market exchange rates:
W =
wM
1 gY
1 + wM
2 gY
2
wY
1gY
1 + wY
2gY
2 .
Assuming that the purchasing power correction reduces country 1’s share in global 
GDP, i.e. w1Y < w
1
M and w
2
Y < w
2
M , and that GDP growth in country 2 is higher than 
in country 1 (country 1 can be thought of as an advanced economy and country 
2 as an emerging market economy), it follows immediately that the bias (i) is 
negative, (ii) increases in absolute terms with the growth differential between the 
two countries, and (iii) increases in absolute terms as global GDP growth declines.
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Developments in global trade intensity – here defined as the ratio of global trade 
volume to global GDP volume – further support the view that the global trade-to-GDP 
relationship was fairly stable over 1986-2007 (Figure 2, Panel A). Over 2001-2007, 
global trade intensity was close to its pre-Crisis trend (1986-2007), but it started to 
deviate abruptly in 2009. Despite the trade rebound of 2010, global trade intensity 
remains well below its pre-Crisis trend.
Figure 2 Global trade intensity has deviated from its pre-Crisis trend
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The post-Crisis deviation of global trade intensity from its pre-Crisis trend is partly 
driven by the post-Crisis weakness of intra-Eurozone trade. If intra-Eurozone trade – 
which was hit particularly hard by demand weakness in the Eurozone – is excluded from 
the measure of global trade, post-Crisis global trade intensity is only marginally below 
its pre-Crisis trend (Figure 2, Panel B).5 By statistical convention, intra-Eurozone trade 
– which accounts for around 10% of global trade and is similar to intra-national trade 
5  See Ollivaud and Schwellnus (2015, Annex 1) for details on the construction of intra-Eurozone import volumes and data 
on post-Crisis growth in intra-Eurozone import volumes. 
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along several dimensions, as it is not subject to tariffs or currency risk and transport 
costs among geographically proximate countries are low – is included in the measure 
of global trade. Consequently, a shock to Eurozone demand may have a disproportional 
effect on global trade, as it reduces both intra-Eurozone imports among highly integrated 
member countries and imports from outside the currency union. By contrast, a shock 
to US demand reduces both inter-state imports and imports from outside the US, but 
only the reduction in extra-US imports is accounted for in the conventional measure of 
global trade.6 To some extent, the deviation of global trade intensity from its pre-Crisis 
trend therefore appears to reflect a statistical convention – which may reverse once 
demand in Eurozone countries picks up – rather than a structural development.
Annual growth rates of global trade (including intra-Eurozone trade) in the wake of the 
Crisis are well explained by annual growth rates of global GDP, leaving little room for 
structural explanations of global trade weakness (Figure 3). Even for the years 2011-2014 
– which are conventionally viewed as highlighting a structural break in the trade-GDP 
relationship (Davies 2013 , Constantinescu et al. 2015) – annual global trade growth is 
close to the predicted values from the linear regression of trade on GDP growth over the 
pre-Crisis period (1986-2007). A noteworthy feature of the linear trend line in Figure 
3 is that it is consistent with a decline in the apparent elasticity of global trade to GDP 
without assuming a change in the long-term trade-to-GDP relationship; at the average 
GDP growth rate over 1986-2007 of 3.3%, the linear trend line predicts trade growth of 
6.7%, implying an apparent elasticity of 2.1, while at the average GDP growth rate over 
2008-2014 of 2.1%, the equation predicts trade growth of 3.1%, implying an apparent 
6  The share in global GDP of the US is slightly higher than that of the Eurozone (23% versus 18% in 2010), but its share 
in global trade is only around half that of the Eurozone (12.5% versus 24% in 2010). Assuming similar import elasticities 
– which is consistent with the results in Bussière et al. (2013) and Morin and Schwellnus (2014) – the effect on global 
imports of a similar decline in demand across the two zones would be about twice as large for the Eurozone as for the 
US.
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elasticity of 1.5.7 The procyclicality of the apparent global trade elasticity appears to be 
– at least partly – related to the procyclicality of global investment intensity (Ollivaud 
and Schwellnus, 2015). Other possible explanations include the greater procyclicality 
of the goods sector, which constitutes the bulk of trade, relative to the services sector, 
which constitutes the bulk of GDP, and the procyclicality of international production 
fragmentation (Freund 2009).
Figure 3 Post-Crisis trade growth has been close to the rates predicted by GDP 
growth
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Summing up, the decline in the apparent elasticity of global trade to GDP does not 
appear to pre-date the Global Crisis of 2008-2009, suggesting that the abrupt change 
thereafter may at least partly reflect demand developments. The decline in the apparent 
elasticity is partly related to the weakness of intra-Eurozone trade and post-Crisis 
7  The regression of global trade growth on global GDP growth Δln(importst) = α + βΔln(gdpt) + εt corresponds to a short-
run model that does not restrict the long-term elasticity of global trade to GDP. More specifically, if α ≠ 0 the long-term 
elasticity implied by this model Δln(imports)/Δln(gdp) = β + α/Δln(gdp) depends on long-term GDP growth. For the 
coefficients estimated over 1986-2007 (α = -3.5 and β = 3.1), GDP growth of 3.3% (average 1986-2007) implies a long-
term elasticity of 2.1 while GDP growth of 2.1% (average 2008-2014) implies an elasticity of 1.5.
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growth of global trade appears to be well explained by global GDP growth, further 
supporting the hypothesis that the global trade weakness may at least partly reflect 
demand developments.
3 Can weak demand account for the weakness of post-
Crisis global trade growth?
Based on a more formal econometric analysis and the description of recent trends in 
investment, international production fragmentation and protectionism, this section 
further investigates whether post-Crisis trade developments may reflect a structural break 
in the relationship between global trade and GDP, or whether demand developments 
alone are sufficient to explain the post-Crisis global trade weakness. We estimate a 
standard error correction model over different sub-periods to detect structural breaks in 
the long-run trade elasticity. This model suggests that the long-run relationship between 
global trade and GDP was stable over 1986-2007, with a structural break around the 
year 2008. However, the error correction model constrains the apparent trade elasticity 
to be constant irrespective of medium-term GDP growth, which is inconsistent with 
the stylised fact that the apparent elasticity declines in the wake of global downturns. 
Consequently, the error correction model attributes a decline in the apparent elasticity 
to a structural break in the long-run trade elasticity. We show that a less restrictive 
model that does not constrain the long-term elasticity to be constant can account for 
the post-Crisis decline in apparent elasticity and accurately tracks post-Crisis trade 
developments without any structural change in the trade-GDP relation. Details on 
the different methods to assess the stability of the trade-GDP relation are provided in 
Ollivaud and Schwellnus (2015).
3.1 Econometric estimation of the long-term global trade elasticity
We use a standard error correction model framework to estimate the long-term elasticity 
of global trade to GDP over different time periods (Irwin 2002; Constantinescu et 
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al. 2015). This framework assumes that a stable cointegration relationship between 
global trade and GDP exists within sub-periods, but that this relationship may change 
across time periods as exogenous factors such as trends in trade liberalisation, transport 
costs or international production fragmentation change. Following the notation of 
Constantinescu et al. (2015) to facilitate direct comparison of estimation results, the 
estimated equation takes the form:
Δlnmt = α + βΔlnyt + γlnmt-1 + δlnyt-1 + εt (1)
where Δ denotes first differences, mt denotes global import volume and yt global GDP 
volume at time t, α is the regression intercept and εt is the error term. The short-run 
elasticity of global trade to GDP is β while the speed of adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium is -γ. The long-run elasticity of global trade to GDP is given by -δ/γ.
Estimation of equation (1) based on a PPP-based measure of global GDP would imply 
that the long-term global trade elasticity declined to around 1.3 around the year 2000 
(Table 1, Model 1), which would be consistent with the conventional view that the long-
term trade-GDP relationship changed around the turn of the century (Constantinescu et 
al. 2015). According to this view, the years 1986-2000 would appear to be a period of 
exceptionally high trade growth, with an estimated long-term global trade elasticity of 
2.3, while the decline to around 1.3 at the turn of the century would indicate a return to 
the pre-1986 norm.
Based on global GDP at market exchange rates – which is a more accurate gauge of 
global demand for traded goods than global GDP at PPPs – the estimated long-term 
trade elasticity has remained around 2 over the past 15 years (Table 1, Model 2). While 
the estimates suggest a significant decline at the turn of the century, the estimated long-
term elasticity has remained well above the pre-1986 norm.8 Moreover, the estimated 
long-term elasticity has declined only marginally from 2.3 to around 2 once intra-
8  It should be noted that the differences between sub-periods in Table 1 are statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Eurozone flows are excluded from the measure of global trade (Table 1, Model 3). 
Given that estimates of long-run elasticities obtained over short samples such as 2001-
2014 may be affected by cyclical factors and that removing intra-Eurozone flows only 
removes part of the cyclical effects of the Global Crisis, these results cast considerable 
doubt on the hypothesis that the long-run trade elasticity declined around the year 2000.
Table 1 Estimation results for Equation (1) based on annual data 
Long-run elasticity
Model Definition of  long-run elasticity 1970-1985 1986-2000 2001-2014
(1)
Global import volume at 2010 US$ to 
global GDP volume at PPP
1.3*** 2.3*** 1.3***
(2)
Global import volume at 2010 US$ to 
global GDP volume at 2010 US$
1.3*** 2.4*** 1.8***
(3)
Global import volume ex. intra-EZ 
imports at 2010 US$ to global GDP 
volume at 2010 US$
1.3*** 2.3*** 2.0***
Notes: Based on the estimation of the following equation:
dln(imports)t   = α1+β1 * dln(gdp)t * DV1+γ1 * ln(imports)t-1 * DV1+δ1 * ln(gdp)t-1 * DV1+α2+β2 * dln(gdp)t * DV2+γ2  
* ln(imports)t-1 * DV2+δ2 * ln(gdp)t-1 * DV2+α3+β3 * dln(gdp)t * DV3+γ3 * ln(imports)t-1 * DV3+δ3 
* ln(gdp)t-1 * DV3+εt ,
where gdp is global GDP volume; imports is global imports of goods and services; DV1, DV2 and DV3 are dummy variables 
for the periods 1970-1985, 1986-2000 and 2001-2014 respectively; and εt is the error term. The long-term elasticities for the 
sub-periods1970-1985, 1986-2000 and 2001-2014 are given by -δ1/γ1, -δ2/γ2 and -δ3/γ3, respectively. Statistical significance 
is established using a non-linear Wald test. *** indicates a significance level of 1%. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 1996 database; OECD calculations.
The limited decline in the long-term elasticity of global trade to GDP (measured at 
market exchange rates in the remainder of this chapter) over 2001-2014 appears to be 
driven by post-2007 developments rather than structural changes preceding the Crisis 
(Figure 4). The residual of the long-term cointegrating relationship between global 
trade and GDP underlying the error correction model in equation (1) – estimated over 
the period 1970-2014 – is trending down over 1970-85 and trending up over 1986-
2007. The break in the long-run elasticity of global trade to GDP around the late 
1980s partly reflects the acceleration in the process of globalisation, especially trade 
liberalisation in a number of large emerging market economies such as China, India 
and the former Soviet economies, as well as the implementation or deepening of major 
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regional trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the 
Single European Market, which triggered the international fragmentation of production 
chains. Instead of producing predominantly in a single country, multinational firms 
increasingly fragmented the production chain across several countries to take advantage 
of cost differences, implying that value added increasingly crossed borders several times 
before being shipped to the final consumer. The post-2008 deviation of the residuals 
from the pre-Crisis trend reflects the decline in the apparent global trade elasticity in 
the wake of the Crisis, but in the context of the severity and the length of the Crisis the 
limited number of post-Crisis observations suggests caution in interpreting this as a 
structural break.9
Figure 4 The break in the cointegrating relation between trade and GDP coincides 
with the Global Crisis
Residual of the long-term equation underlying equation (1) estimated over 1970-2014
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Note: Residual based on the estimation over 1970-2014 of the long-term equation implicitly underlying the error correction 
model in equation (1): ln(imports)
t
 = α + β * ln(gdp)t + εt . Global import volume and GDP volume at market exchange rates 
are measured in 2010 US dollars.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database (November 2014); OECD calculations.
9  Formal tests for structural breaks detect statistically significant changes in the long-term relationship between global 
trade and GDP in the late 1980s and around the onset of the Global Crisis in 2008-2009 but no change around the year 
2000, suggesting that the break in the global trade elasticity did not pre-date the Crisis (Ollivaud and Schwellnus 2015).
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While it is tempting to interpret the decline in the apparent elasticity and the break in the 
long-term residuals around the Crisis as reflecting a structural slowdown in the process 
of globalisation, the fact that this decline coincides with the onset of the Crisis suggests 
that it may at least partly be driven by demand developments.10 In the very long term 
there is no reason for the global trade elasticity to remain above 1 as the potential for 
further transport cost reductions and trade liberalisation declines (Krugman 2013).11 
However, it appears unlikely that the transition from a long-term elasticity of well 
above 2 to around 1 would occur as abruptly as suggested by Figure 1.
Even at a stable long-run elasticity of global trade to GDP, over short sample periods the 
ratio of global trade growth to global GDP growth – the apparent elasticity – can vary 
for cyclical reasons (Figure 5). Econometric tests typically suggest a stable long-term 
relationship between global trade and GDP from the late 1980s to 2007 (as represented 
by a stable δ/γ in equation 1), but in the wake of global downturns identified by the 
statistical filtering method of Freund (2009) the apparent elasticity was typically well 
below the stable long-term elasticity. Against the background of the severity of the 
Global Crisis, the decline in the apparent elasticity over 2009-2014 does not appear as 
particularly striking.
10  Note that the residuals of the long-term equation and the statistical tests for structural breaks in the long-term 
cointegrating relation between global trade and GDP are based on the long-term equation in (logarithmic) levels which 
assumes a constant apparent global trade elasticity irrespective of global demand growth (Ollivaud and Schwellnus 
2015). The statistical tests therefore mechanically attribute a decline in the apparent global trade elasticity to a change in 
the structural long-term global trade elasticity.
11  Gruber et al. (2011) constrain the long-run global trade elasticity to 1 but allow for an exogenous globalisation trend 
meant to capture the effect of transport cost declines, trade liberalisation or the lengthening of global value chains on the 
global trade growth.
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Figure 5 The ratio of global trade to GDP growth typically declines following 
global downturns
Volumes, market exchange rates
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Note: Global import volume and GDP volume at market exchange rates are measured in 2010 US dollars. Values for 2014 
are partly based on projections in the OECD Economic Outlook (November 2014).
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database (November 2014); OECD calculations.
A model that includes only growth rates of global trade and GDP tracks post-Crisis trade 
developments fairly accurately without assuming any structural break in the parameters 
over the period 1986-2014, suggesting that about 85% of the post-Crisis weakness in 
global trade can be explained by global demand developments.12 By constraining the 
long-term global trade elasticity to be constant even at persistently low GDP growth, 
the error correction model in Equation 1 can account for the post-Crisis decline in the 
apparent elasticity only by assuming a structural break in the long-term elasticity. By 
contrast, the model in growth rates can account for the stylised fact that the global trade 
elasticity declines in the wake of global downturns without assuming any structural 
break in the trade-GDP relation. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the following 
model in growth rates:
Δlnmt = α + β1Δlnmt-1 + β2Δlnyt  + β3Δlnyt-1 + εt (2)
12  Global trade growth declined from 6.9% over 1986-2007 to 2.8% over 2008-2014, with the model estimated over 1986-
2007 explaining 3.5 percentage points of the overall decline.
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where Δ denotes first differences, mt denotes global import volume and yt global GDP 
volume at time t, α is the regression intercept and εt is the error term. Formal tests 
suggest that the parameters of this model are stable over the estimation period 1986-
2014 and the in-sample fit is accurate even for the post-Crisis period (Figure 6).13
Figure 6 In-sample fit of the model in growth rates without structural break
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Note: The predicted value of global import volume growth is based on the estimation of equation (2) over the period 1986-
2014. Values for 2014 are partly based on projections in the OECD Economic Outlook (November 2014). Global import 
volume and GDP volume at market exchange rates are measured in 2010 US dollars.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database (November 2014); OECD calculations.
For the years 2012-2013 and possibly 2014, the model of growth rates slightly over-
predicts global trade growth but the error is well within the model’s error margin and is 
likely to reflect a number of special factors rather than major structural developments. 
The over-prediction for 2012 and 2013, for instance, partly reflects the extraordinary 
demand weakness of the highly trade-intensive Eurozone, for which imports declined 
by 1% in 2012 and grew by only around 1% in 2013. The projected trade weakness 
for 2014 appears to mainly reflect developments in non-OECD Asia, including China, 
rather than Eurozone developments. A structural explanation for the recent trade 
weakness can therefore not be ruled out fully. However, it would be premature to 
13  The detailed estimation results are reported in Ollivaud and Schwellnus (2015).
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conclude from unexpectedly low trade growth in 2014 that there has been a structural 
break in the long-term trade-GDP relationship.14
Estimations based on quarterly data confirm the results based on annual data in the 
sense that the estimated long-term global trade elasticity over the period 2001-2014 
is around 2 and that the limited decline with respect to the 1990s reflects post-Crisis 
developments (Ollivaud and Schwellnus 2015). Although higher-frequency data allow 
a more precise estimation of the dynamics of the trade-GDP relationship, quarterly data 
cannot resolve the fundamental issue that over periods of seven years estimates of the 
long-term elasticity are highly unstable and can be perturbed by cyclical effects. Testing 
the long-run relationship between trade and GDP with 30 quarterly observations is 
conceptually no different from testing it with seven yearly observations (Hakkio and 
Rush 1991). Rather than using quarterly data to estimate the long-term elasticity over 
short sample periods, this chapter therefore applies standard econometric methods to 
test for the existence of a stable cointegration relationship between global trade and GDP 
over the period 1986-2014. These tests suggest that the cointegration relationship was 
broadly stable over 1986-2008, implying that quarterly data also reject the hypothesis 
that the decline in the global trade elasticity pre-dated the Crisis.
Summing up, the econometric analysis suggests that the most likely scenario for global 
trade growth over the next 2-3 years is a rate of about twice that of global GDP growth at 
market exchange rates as cyclical effects fade and GDP growth picks up to around its pre-
Crisis average, as projected by all major international organisations. While the limited 
number of post-Crisis observations precludes a definitive rejection of the hypothesis 
that structural changes in the global trade-GDP relationship may have contributed to the 
recent trade weakness, the econometric analysis rejects the hypothesis that the limited 
decline in the long-term global trade elasticity reflects structural developments pre-
dating the Crisis of 2008-2009 (Constantinescu et al. 2015). Based on a model of growth 
14  The possible over-prediction for 2014 is similar in size to that for 2001, after which trade resumed growth similar to the 
rate predicted by the model of growth rates.
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rates that does not constrain the elasticity of global trade to GDP to be constant, post-
Crisis trade developments are well explained by GDP developments alone, suggesting 
that the decline in the apparent global trade elasticity after 2008 mainly reflects cyclical 
factors rather than a structural break in the process of globalisation.
3.2 Trends in investment, production fragmentation and protectionism
This sub-section assesses whether recent developments in global investment, 
international production fragmentation and protectionism are consistent with the 
results from the econometric analysis. We first analyse whether in the wake of the Crisis 
the composition of global demand shifted away from import-intensive investment, a 
development that may at least partly reverse as the global recovery strengthens over 
the next years. We further analyse whether post-Crisis developments in international 
production fragmentation signal a structural break or whether the slowdown is 
consistent with typical cyclical developments and whether there is any evidence for 
changes in trade protection.
Investment
Global investment has been weak in the wake of the Crisis, suggesting that the shift 
in the composition of global GDP towards less import-intensive components such 
as government consumption or private non-durables consumption has contributed to 
the post-Crisis weakness of global trade. The apparent rebound of global investment 
intensity in the wake of the Crisis has largely been driven by developments in China, 
for which the post-Crisis investment boom largely reflects infrastructure investment 
(OECD 2013) whose import content is low (Figure 7). For the remaining countries, 
investment has been exceptionally weak in the wake of the Crisis, further supporting 
the notion that trade may rebound strongly if investment intensity, especially in OECD 
countries, rebounds.
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Figure 7 The ratio of global investment volume to GDP volume has been weak in 
the wake of the Crisis
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Note: Global investment and GDP volumes measured at market exchange rates.  The value for 2014 is partly based on 
projections in the OECD Economic Outlook (November 2014).
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database (November 2014); OECD calculations.
International production fragmentation
There is no evidence for a slowdown in international production fragmentation – the 
process of slicing up the production process into stages located in different countries 
– in the run-up to the Global Crisis and the decline for 2009 is broadly consistent with 
global GDP developments, suggesting that there is thus far no evidence for a structural 
break. A common measure of international production fragmentation is the ratio of 
gross exports to value added exports, which can be interpreted as the average number of 
border crossings for each unit of imported final good (Fally 2012). This measure started 
to increase along a linear trend in the late 1980s up to 2008, thereby raising gross 
exports and the global trade elasticity. It started to deviate from trend only at the onset 
of the Crisis (Figure 8). Regression analysis suggests that international production 
fragmentation is procyclical in the sense that international production fragmentation 
accelerates when global GDP growth is high and decelerates during global downturns. 
This procyclicality may reflect the fact that during global recessions the composition 
of global trade shifts toward products with shorter value chains (Ferrantino and 
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Taglioni 2014), or the fact that multinational companies postpone investment 
projects related to international outsourcing. Based on the estimated semi-elasticity 
of international production fragmentation to global GDP, post-Crisis developments in 
international production fragmentation are largely explained by GDP developments, 
with international production fragmentation declining in 2009 and rebounding over 
2010-2011 (Figure 8).
Figure 8 The decline in international production fragmentation in 2009 is consistent 
with GDP developments
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t
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Source: OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added (TiVA); Johnson and Noguera (2012).
Protectionism
Increases in protectionism appear to have played at best a marginal role in the 
slowdown of global trade following the Crisis. While circumstantial evidence suggests 
an increase in the number of ‘murky’ protectionist measures taken by G20 governments 
(Evenett 2013) – including subsidies to domestic industries, anti-dumping actions or 
discriminatory regulation – the WTO (2014) concludes that “the share of world trade 
affected by restrictive trade measures is not high” and that the rise in trade-restrictive 
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measures has to be seen in the context of offsetting trade liberalising measures, 
especially in lower-income G20 countries. For instance, the share of world trade 
covered by trade-restrictive measures introduced by G20 countries in 2012 was similar 
to the share covered by trade-liberalising measures (around 1% of world trade).15
4 Implications for projecting trade when GDP projections 
are known
Models linking global trade and GDP are routinely used in the OECD Economics 
Department to assess the consistency of the global trade and GDP projections. The 
results reported in this chapter imply that in the near term, consistency checks should 
be conducted based on the relationship between global trade growth and GDP growth 
since around the late 1980s, as the relationship has been fairly stable thereafter with no 
evidence for a structural break in the equation in growth rates (equation 2) in the wake 
of the Global Crisis.16 Based on the estimation of equation 2 over 1986-2013 that has 
tracked global trade growth fairly accurately over 1990-2013, global GDP projections 
for 2016 of 3.3% at market exchange rates (3.9% at PPPs) in the November 2014 
OECD Economic Outlook imply that global trade growth should pick up to around 7%.
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5 The power of the few in 
determining trade accelerations 
and slowdowns
Guillaume Gaulier, Gianluca Santoni, Daria Taglioni and 
Soledad Zignago1
Banque de France; CEPII; World Bank; Banque de France
1 Introduction
Growth in international trade has decelerated significantly since its sharp recovery 
in 2010. This is evident looking at the logarithmic growth of global trade in goods 
over global industrial output (Figure 1). In our view, and in line with Constantinescu 
et al. (2015) and Subramanian and Kessler (2013), the entry of China in the global 
economy as an exporter of labour-intensive goods and the subsequent re-orientation of 
its production to meet domestic demand played an important role in explaining global 
trade developments, and in particular the trade acceleration (relative to GDP) before the 
Global Crisis and its slowdown in recent years. 
1 The authors would like to thank Richard Baldwin, Matthieu Bussière, Matthieu Crozet, Michael Ferrantino, Bernard 
Hoekman, William Maloney, Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer, Jose Daniel Reyes, and Michele Ruta for useful 
discussions that helped improve the quality of the chapter; and Estelle Martin de Beaucé for excellent research assistance. 
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the authors. They do not 
necessarily represent the views of the Banque de France, the Eurosystem, or of the World Bank Group, or those of the 
Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent, or any of the aforementioned individuals or 
the institutions they are affiliated to.
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Figure 1 Growth of trade to industrial production (ratio of global trade over global 
industrial output), 1990-2014 (log)
-.7
-.6
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: Authors’calculations, using CPB monthly data.
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on an assessment of trade developments 
in the last ten years (2005-2014) using a methodology that allows decomposing growth 
of global trade into demand-side changes, supply-side changes, and changes in the 
extensive margin, i.e. compositional effects due to market orientation and product 
specialisation. Our analysis focuses on growth rates, so we abstract from any time-
constant factors. The methodology, as applied to exports, is discussed in detail in 
Gaulier et al. (2013). Here, we highlight the key features: 
• We use a world matrix of imports and exports, with bilateral trade data at the product 
level (HS-6 digit level of disaggregation). 2
2 The database on trade growth and competitiveness indicators was produced by the authors (see Gaulier et al. 2013). In 
writing this chapter, we expanded the original database that was developed for exports to also cover the import side. Our 
trade growth and competitiveness database provides internationally comparable quarterly information for 228 countries 
and territories – in values, volumes, and prices – on the growth of exports and imports; export and import geographical 
effects; effects due to the product mix and sectoral specialisation in 5,300 HS-6 digit products; and changes that are 
idiosyncratic to the importer or exporter being evaluated. The dataset is updated to 2014q3 and is constructed using 
monthly product-level bilateral trade data available for the period since 2005 at the HS 6-digit level (2002 classification) 
from Trade Map of the International Trade Centre (ITC) (see http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx for further details). 
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• We use quarterly data to better control for the timing of any shocks and we look 
at changes, not only in value, but also in volume and unit value terms, to capture 
differences between nominal and real effects.3
• Export growth decomposition is carried out by means of an econometric shift-share 
analysis, where we identify and estimate the various components via fixed effects.4
• From the decomposition, we obtain measures of ‘adjusted market shares’, which we 
use as a proxy for changes in demand (import decomposition) and supply (export 
decomposition).
• Finally, by distinguishing products by stage of production (consumption, intermedi-
ates, capital goods, and primary), we can also investigate some aspects of the role 
played by the internationalisation of production and global value chains in deter-
mining the trade developments observed over the past ten years.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. We start with a short discussion on trade 
elasticity, in Section 2. Section 3 shows that the recent slowdown is primarily associated 
with a (decelerating) supply shock from China and a (negative) demand shock from the 
Eurozone.5 It also shows how China’s integration and developments in global trade 
in intermediates – a measure that is used to provide a first approximation of global 
value chain (GVC) trade in the literature – may have been sufficient by themselves 
in influencing much of the acceleration/deceleration of global trade observed in our 
sample. Section 4 discusses some hypotheses for how global trade may evolve in the 
future and on the role that possible emerging juggernauts may play. Section 5 presents 
some conclusions and policy implications. 
3 Changes are measured in log first differences, since these preserve additive properties (unlike regular growth rates).
4 In each quarter, import (export) growth in product k from country i to destination j is regressed on origin, product and 
destination fixed effects. The contribution of each dimension is identified by the estimated fixed effects. Depending 
on the trade flows, the country-destination (origin) fixed effect is used as an index of a country’s supply (demand) 
developments. In a gravity model framework, our country fixed effects can be seen as the average, across products, of the 
outward and inward multilateral resistance terms. 
5 See Taglioni and Zavacka (2013) for the role of demand uncertainty in explaining the latter.
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2 Supply and demand shocks in the current trade 
downturn
The gravity equation suggests that in the absence of shocks, trade should have a 
(fundamental) elasticity not higher than 1 (relative to economic activity).6 This empirical 
fact is confirmed by standard gravity models (Disdier and Head 2008, Head and Mayer 
2014). Using the time series plotted in Figure 1, Gaulier (2015) shows that a simple 
time series model with a long-run income elasticity of 1 has better predictive capacities 
over trade developments during the past three decades – including before and since the 
Great Trade Collapse – than a model with larger elasticities.7 The observed acceleration/
deceleration pattern of global trade relative to global GDP must then be attributed to 
reductions in trade costs induced by (trade-biased) technological innovation and trade 
liberalisation, not to changes in the fundamental elasticity of trade to economic activity. 
In this chapter we highlight a third factor that may lead to persistent deviations of the 
(observed) trade elasticity from a value of 1: country-specific supply shocks in large 
trading nations. 
For our analysis we distinguish three main periods: pre-Crisis (which we set equal 
to 2006q1-2008q3); Crisis and rebound (2008q4-2011q2); and post-Crisis (2011q3-
2014q2). The values for each period refer to year-on-year changes measured in log first 
differences.8 To avoid clutter in the exposition, we group impacts across five countries/
regions: the Eurozone, the US, an aggregate for China and Hong Kong, all other 
developed countries, and the rest of the world. 
A drop in the global supply of exports by China in the post-2011 period is the most 
notable change on the supply side. Before the Crisis, China was contributing on 
6 This is true in the absence of permanent technological and/or trade liberalisation innovations. Elasticity should be below 
1 if one accounts for: (i) different (non-homothetic) preferences between countries; and (ii) the fact that less traded 
industries (such as services) expand their share in global demand as income.
7 See, for example elasticities, estimated in Freund (2009) and Lanz et al. (2010).
8 Data-point for 2006q1 measures the log first difference of trade (imports or exports, depending on the flow examined) 
relative to 2005q1.
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average 1.3% to export growth every year (Table 1, first column). After the Crisis, its 
contribution fell to close to zero (0.3%). ‘Adjusted’ market shares follow the same trend. 
These control for compositional changes and can be considered a proxy for supply-
side changes. Before the Crisis China was contributing on average 1.7% export market 
shares annually in adjusted terms (Table 1, column 4); after the Crisis this fell to 0.6% 
(Table 1, column 6). These results are consistent with recent literature documenting a 
reorientation of Chinese production towards its domestic market (Kee and Tang 2012, 
Koopman et al. 2012, Lemoine et al. 2014). 
Table 1 The supply side: Countries’ contributions to changes in exports, measured 
by ‘adjusted’ export market shares (quantities)
Export growth Adjusted market share contribution
Pre-Crisis 
06Q1-08Q3
Crisis & 
rebound 
08Q4-11Q2
Post-Crisis 
11Q3-14Q3
Pre-Crisis 
06Q1-08Q3
Crisis & 
rebound 
08Q4-11Q2
Post-Crisis 
11Q3-14Q3
Eurozone 1.8 -.03 0.4 1.4 0.1 0.4
US 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.1
China & Hong Kong 1.3 0.4 0.3 1.7 0.6 0.6
Other developed 1.1 -0.1 0.3 0.8 -0.5 0.1
Rest of world 0.9 0.7 0.6 1.3 0.6 0.7
World 5.4 0.7 1.8 5.4 0.7 1.8
Notes: Contributions to change in world export market shares and ‘adjusted’ world export market shares, respectively. 
Contributions are measured in quantities. Adjusted world export market shares control for geographical orientation of 
exports and product mix/sectoral specialisation. Countries’ contributions may not sum up to world growth due to rounding.
Source: Authors using data from Trade Map of the International Trade Centre (ITC) (http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx).
On the import side, the contraction in demand from the Eurozone is the single most 
important contributor to cross-country reallocations of demand. This is true both for 
import market shares (Table 2, column 1 vs. 3) and for adjusted import market shares, 
which control for compositional reallocations due to differences in sourcing patterns 
(Table 2, column 4 vs. 6).
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Table 2 The demand side: Countries’ contributions to changes in imports, measured 
by ‘adjusted’ import market shares (quantities)
Import growth Adjusted market share contribution
Pre-Crisis 
06Q1-08Q3
Crisis & 
rebound 
08Q4-11Q2
Post-Crisis 
11Q3-14Q3
Pre-Crisis 
06Q1-08Q3
Crisis & 
rebound 
08Q4-11Q2
Post-Crisis 
11Q3-14Q3
Eurozone 1.5 -0.3 0.0 1.7 -0.5 -0.1
US 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.1
China & Hong Kong 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.8
Other developed 0.8 -0.2 0.1 0.7 -0.1 0.1
Rest of world 2.1 0.5 0.9 2.3 0.7 0.9
World 5.4 0.8 1.8 5.4 0.8 1.8
The recent trade downturn seems therefore to be not only associated with a natural 
phasing out of the impact of lower trade costs worldwide, but also strongly influenced 
by a negative demand shock in the Eurozone and by the reorientation of growth towards 
domestic demand in China. As trade within countries is not recorded, the rebalancing of 
the Chinese growth model translates into a contraction of the elasticity of trade to GDP. 
The mechanics through which this happened for China are discussed next.
3 China, or the ‘large country’ effect in international 
trade
This section focuses on the channels through which the integration of low-cost exports 
from a large country such as China can result in an increase in the elasticity of global 
trade to economic activity (GDP or Industrial Production) proportional to the country’s 
export surplus. It also discusses why an increase in Chinese domestic demand for 
products in which China specialised in can lead to a reduction of this elasticity.
Discussions about the macroeconomic aspects of international trade are often based on 
the ‘small country’ assumption. This implies that even a complete elimination of trade 
for a country would have an imperceptible effect upon world demand and supply for a 
given product, and thus would not affect global trade. But, in reality, a handful of large 
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countries dominate both global imports and global exports. China is big enough to 
suggest that its growth path could have driven the elasticity of trade to GDP to increase, 
and more recently, to fall. This is consistent with the high correlation between world 
trade growth (black line) and China’s export growth (Figure 2, darker bars).  In contrast, 
the relative growth of China’s imports (lighter bars) is either negatively correlated or 
not correlated with global trade. This is consistent with a push from China on world 
trade through supply dynamics rather than a pull from it through demand.
Figure 2 Growth of global trade and growth of China’s adjusted market share
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When China integrated into the global economy, it did so by specialising in goods and 
tasks for which it had a comparative advantage in production (low labour costs) and 
low domestic demand. The mechanism that may have been at play is described below. 
• Trade acceleration phase. The initial supply-side shock of China’s integration led to 
export growth from China, as predicted by Ricardian theories, through specialisation 
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in labour-intensive activities, for which it had a comparative advantage. In parallel, 
rich countries specialised in knowledge and technology intensive activities, moving 
away from labour-intensive activities. With Chinese domestic demand, including 
for its own products, remaining low over a prolonged period of time and a large 
production base compared to the world total, China generated a large export 
surplus that drove down the world price for goods in which it specialised and 
reinforced specialisation patterns based on Ricardian comparative advantages and 
the reallocation of global demand for those products towards Chinese exports (see 
Figure 3 for evidence of a correlation between Chinese market shares and price 
contractions of the Chinese export bundle in different sectors in the pre-Crisis 
period). 
Figure 3 China’s export specialisation and contribution to world import prices and 
volumes of China’s export bundle, 2006q1-2008q3
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world prices of the Chinese export bundle over the same period of time.
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Trade Map of the International Trade Centre (ITC) (http://www.trademap.
org/Index.aspx ).
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• Trade deceleration phase. With the rebalancing of the Chinese growth model to-
wards domestic demand, the downward pressure on global prices of the products in 
which China specialises is lower and so is the rate of reallocation of market shares 
in favour of imports from China (see Figure 4, which shows the phasing out of the 
correlation between Chinese market shares and world prices of its export bundle). 
Looking at the y-axis it appears that over the past decade, China tended to specialise 
in products with a decreasing relative growth of worldwide sales. 
Figure 4 China’s export specialisation and contribution to world import prices and 
volumes of China’s export bundle, 2011q3-2014q3
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imports of Electrical Equipment expanded over the period in prices (x-axis). Hence, the corresponding bubble lies to the 
right in the chart. The chart shows that the pre-Crisis correlation between the size of the bubbles and the contraction of world 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Trade Map of the International Trade Centre (ITC) (http://www.trademap.
org/Index.aspx).
The acceleration/deceleration pattern of global trade was heightened by a contraction in 
the quantity of intermediates trade (an imperfect proxy for GVC trade) and a slowdown 
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in price increases, but the effects of the supply-side shock from China would have 
happened even without the changes in GVC trade that intermediates goods may suggest. 
The contraction of trade in intermediates is quantified in Table 3. It shows the adjusted 
growth rate of industry-specific effects to demand and supply for four categories 
of traded goods using the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification: 
consumption, intermediate goods, capital goods, and primary goods. 
Table 3 Adjusted growth rate by BEC categories, quantities vs. values (%)
QUANTITIES
Consumption 
goods
Intermediate 
goods
Capital  
goods
Primary  
goods
Pre-Crisis 06Q1-08Q3 5.1 6.1 7.8 0.6
Crisis & rebound 08Q4-11Q2 -0.6 1.3 0.6 0.4
Post-Crisis 11Q3-14Q3 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.3
All 06Q1-14Q3 2.1 2.9 3.4 0.8
VALUES
Consumption 
goods
Intermediate 
goods
Capital 
goods
Primare  
goods
Pre-Crisis 06Q1-08Q3 12.8 17.7 13.3 23.3
Crisis & rebound 08Q4-11Q2 0.4 1.5 0.8 -0.8
Post-Crisis 11Q3-14Q3 4.3 2.8 2.8 3.1
All 06Q1-14Q3 5.8 7.3 5.6 8.6
Notes: Contribution of consumption (CONS), intermediate (INT), capital (CAP), and primary (PRIM) goods to export 
growth.
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Trade Map of the International Trade Centre (ITC) (http://www.trademap.
org/Index.aspx).
Keeping in mind the caveat that our measure of GVC trade is based on gross trade 
flows and hence approximates GVC-trade only very imperfectly, we find evidence of a 
change in patterns before and after the Crisis. We report estimates for trade in quantities 
and for trade in values, which include price changes. The top panel of Table 3 focuses 
on quantities – trade in intermediate goods is contracting somewhat in quantity terms. It 
was increasing on average 6.1% per annum before the Crisis, while since 2011q3 it has 
been growing at a much slower pace (1.4% annually on average). Intermediate goods 
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displayed the second highest rate of growth in the pre-Crisis period (behind capital 
goods) but the second lowest rate of growth in the post-Crisis period (nearly on a par 
with primary goods). In value terms, the adjusted growth rate of intermediate goods is 
still positive at 7.3%, but significantly below the pre-Crisis level of 17.7%, suggesting 
that prices for intermediates may have increased. The supply-side shock from China 
comes on top of developments in intermediates or GVC trade, since the figures in Table 
1 (right panel) are net of countries’ specialisation, measured at the individual product 
level.
4 Any new China emerging?
A deeper analysis of the influence of China on global trade suggests some hypotheses 
for how global trade may evolve in the future and as well as insights for policy. 
China’s impact on the supply side goes beyond developments concerning trade in 
intermediates, which our methodology can control for. In the expansionary phase of 
trade growth, the supply-side shock from the integration of China into global trade 
altered the comparative advantage lines of different world locations. Global growth in 
trade was driven by market reallocations and specialisation effects along comparative 
advantages. The recent reorientation of China’s production towards servicing domestic 
demand has reduced some of the competitive pressures on the global market, clearly 
visible through the price dynamics of China’s export bundle. But it has also resulted in 
a moderation of the pace of global trade growth. The contribution to the latter however 
could be considered almost a statistical artefact. It does not reflect a slowdown in 
production, or a build-up of trade barriers, but is rather an ‘accounting’ phenomenon 
due to international trade statistics that do not record trade with itself. 
Going forward, while in principle new accelerations of global trade growth could 
materialise – as countries like India, Russia, Brazil as well as entire regions such as 
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are still largely marginal to the global economy 
– it is unlikely that they would unleash the same acceleration/deceleration patterns as 
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observed in the past two decades. This is primarily because these countries will face 
a different type of competition on global markets than that faced by China in recent 
decades. While China was competing mainly against incumbents with a comparative 
advantage in knowledge-, technology- and skill-intensive activities, new potential trade 
juggernauts would compete on international markets with a country having similar 
comparative advantages to theirs (i.e. labour) and whose presence in global markets is 
pervasive (Figure 5).  
Figure 5 Pervasiveness of China’s exports on global markets, 1995 versus 2013
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Notes: In 1995, the US and Germany reached the largest number of markets with at least 1% of total imports (country*product) 
while China was present (with at least 1% market share) in 41% of the markets supplied by the US and Germany. By 2013, 
the situation flipped: China is the country reaching the largest number of countries – choosing a random product-country 
combination, China is present in it already with at least 1% of the market shares. The second most pervasive exporter, 
Germany, reaches only 71% of China’s product-market coverage and the US only 69%.
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5 Conclusions and policy implications
This chapter presents evidence from the analysis of global trade developments 
in the past ten years, using a matrix of import and export data at the product level, 
with worldwide coverage and controlling for geographical and sectoral composition 
effects. Our analysis suggests the recent trade deceleration is most closely linked to 
two country-specific factors, even after controlling for competing explanations. These 
factors are (i) a reorientation of China’s production towards domestic demand, and 
(ii) the massive destruction of demand in the Eurozone (a phenomenon linked only 
partially to the cycle, see the contribution by Ollivaud and Schwellnus in this eBook). 
Our key findings are the following.  
The trade acceleration observed before the Global Crisis was largely driven by a 
supply-side shock, in which the cost-competitiveness of China’s manufacturing exports 
triggered market reallocation from domestic production in third countries. 
China’s trade growth has phased out in the most recent period due to a combination of 
policy-induced and economic factors. Beyond policy drivers, the trade deceleration is 
largely a normal phenomenon of economic dynamics. In the absence of new shocks, 
growth in the trade-to-GDP ratio is likely to be followed by decelerations. There 
is no reason in steady state to expect a trade elasticity that is greater than 1. When 
this happens, it is due to adjustments to a technology shock or to a sufficiently large 
change in trade costs. Elasticities observed in the 1990s and 2000s should therefore be 
considered exceptional and temporary, unless a sequence of new trade shocks or trade-
biased changes in consumption patterns take place due to further trade liberalisations 
or technological innovation. 
Abstracting from cycle-related shocks, such as subdued demand in the Eurozone, 
trade growth patterns are much more uniform across countries in the 2010s than 
before the Global Crisis. Developments in trade in intermediate goods (an imperfect 
proxy for GVC trade) also seem to support this view. The 1990s and 2000s have seen 
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an unprecedented expansion of trade in intermediates. While before and during the 
Crisis trade in intermediates was more dynamic than trade in consumption goods, 
more recently these two types of trade seem to have inverted patterns, with trade in 
intermediates being more subdued than trade in consumptions goods. The nature and 
drivers of such observed trends in trade in intermediates are beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
Going forward, while in principle new global trade accelerations could be expected, as 
other large countries and regions (e.g. Brazil, Russia, India or Africa) become better 
integrated in global trade, new trade juggernauts confront a different competitive 
environment than China did. The pervasive presence of China on global markets 
suggests less scope for trade based on markedly different comparative advantages and 
specialisation patterns. 
Two final considerations are in order. First, if intra-industry trade becomes more relevant 
in the future, trade policy should broaden its current focus. The integration of China in the 
global economy led the trade policy debate to focus on all those causes of international 
trade generated by differences between countries. Accordingly, it prioritised an agenda 
centred on trade facilitation and trade cost reduction. And this was enough in a world 
of markedly different comparative advantages. Lowering trade costs allowed countries 
to specialise following their comparative advantages. Gains in efficiency took place 
through specialisation and market reallocations. Nevertheless, as theories of intra-
industry trade remind us, non homogeneity of goods is also a source of international 
trade. Competing and succeeding in international markets may increasingly require 
targeting intra-industry trade as well, which in turn entails complementing the trade 
facilitation agenda with supply-side policies aimed at boosting productivity, quality 
and diversification. 
The second consideration concerns the link between China’s role in driving the global 
acceleration and deceleration of trade in the past two decades and global imbalances. 
Further research is warranted into understanding if the record-high global imbalances 
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observed during the years of high trade growth were directly connected to the nature 
of trade creation determined by China’s entry into the global economy – a supply-
driven shock and the subsequent sizeable market reallocations from domestic supply 
to imports.
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1 Introduction
Since an initial rebound from the Great Trade Collapse of 2008-2009, world trade 
growth has been particularly anaemic.  In 2011-2013, the volume of trade expanded 
at an annual rate of 3%, less than half the average of roughly 7% for the period 1985-
2007. For the first time in almost half a century, trade has grown more slowly than the 
global economy. The sub-par rate of trade growth during this period has raised the 
question of whether it is merely a result of the prevailing exceptionally weak demand 
conditions – particularly in Europe – or whether there have been structural changes in 
the trade-income relationship.  The answer has important implications for trade growth 
going forward. 
Cyclical factors may well have played a key role in the trade slowdown. While 
trade growth decelerated in all regions, the greatest slowdown was in the advanced 
countries, and it was particularly marked in the Eurozone in 2012. This may have 
been compounded by the composition of demand growth. Because of weaknesses in 
investment and private consumption, the import intensity of aggregate demand growth 
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was relatively low.  Boz et al. (2014) suggested that this might account for about half of 
the shortfall in trade growth during this period.  
If cyclical weakness is the primary cause of the recent anaemic trade growth, then we 
might expect a rebound to, or near to, previous trend growth rates over time.  However, 
others have argued that the slowdown is much more persistent, reflecting structural 
changes that include the evolving nature of production within global value chains 
(GVCs).  A recent paper by Constantinescu et al. (2015), for example, found that the 
responsiveness of trade to income – the long-run income elasticity of trade – began 
to decline earlier in the 2000s after a sharp rise in the 1990s. They attribute this to a 
slowing down in the pace of international vertical specialisation that started well before 
the Great Recession of 2008-2009.
The discussion of a potential structural trade slowdown in some ways represents the 
flip side of a literature that has explored the apparent rise in trade’s responsiveness 
to income at the end of the 20th century, and the particular role that GVCs may have 
played in this development.  In this chapter, we consider the ways in which GVCs may 
affect the income elasticity of trade and efforts to identify their relative contributions 
to rising elasticities over time.  We then consider what insights this provides regarding 
the recent trade slowdown. 
2 Global value chains and rising income elasticities
Interest in the relationship between trade and income increased in the wake of the Great 
Trade Collapse of 2008-2009. Compared to previous economic downturns, the drop in 
trade was unprecedentedly sudden, severe and synchronised, with world trade declining 
more than 30% in the first quarter of 2008 relative to a year earlier (Baldwin 2009).  The 
main question was whether the unusually large trade response reflected an increase in 
the elasticity of trade to income in comparison to previous periods.
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There is substantial evidence that trade did indeed become more sensitive to income 
growth at the close of the 20th century. Cheung and Guichard (2009) found that the 
long-run income elasticity of world trade almost doubled from 1.3 in the period 1975-
1986 to 2.5 in the period 1986-2008.  Escaith et al. (2010) found a similar increase in 
the income elasticity of trade in the 1990s, but suggested that it had stabilised by the 
early 2000s.  Ceglowski (2014) found evidence of the same pattern in a study of US 
aggregate imports.
Scholars were quick to link the rise in the measured income elasticity of trade to 
the emergence of GVCs. Beginning in the 1980s, trade liberalisation and rapid 
improvements in communication and transportation technologies prompted companies 
in the electronics, automobile, and other industries to slice up their value chains, 
locating the production of various components or tasks internationally according to 
relative cost advantages (for a review, see Van Assche 2012). As this process unfolded, 
the share of total trade that took place within GVCs took off, changing the structure of 
trade relationships. 
The new TiVA dataset compiled by the OECD and WTO makes it possible to articulate 
the place of GVC trade in world trade (De Backer and Miroudot 2014).1 By combining 
input-output data for multiple countries with trade statistics, the dataset allows gross 
exports to be decomposed into three parts (Figure 1):  (1) foreign value added that 
is used to produce a country’s exports (backward linkage); (2) domestic value added 
that is used by a destination country to produce its exports (forward linkage); and (3) 
domestic value added that is directly consumed in the destination country.    
1 An alternative dataset is the European Commission’s WIOD data (Timmer, 2012).
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Figure 1 Gross export decomposition into GVC trade and regular trade  
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used for importing
country's exports
(forward)
Foreign value
added in exports
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Domestic value
added consumed by
importing country
EXPORTER PARTNER
GVC Trade
The first two parts reflect GVC trade, since they represent imported intermediates that 
are used for the production of another country’s exports. The third part is a country’s 
regular value added trade that is not part of GVCs.
How important is GVC trade? Between 1995 and 2008, GVC trade grew at an annualised 
rate of 11% compared to an 8% growth of regular value added trade. As a result, the 
share of GVC trade in total trade grew by more than 10 percentage points from 40% in 
1995 to 52% in 2008, before declining slightly in 2009 (see Figure 2). Clearly, GVC 
production arrangements have become a key element of international trade over the last 
few decades. 
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Figure 2 GVC trade’s share of world exports
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Note: Authors’ calculations using OECD-WTO TiVA data. 
The period of rapid GVC trade growth coincided with an episode of rising income 
elasticities, making it a primary candidate for the structural change in the trade-income 
relationship. In what way might this have occurred? The literature has distinguished 
between three mechanisms: an adoption effect, a composition effect, and a supply chain 
effect. We consider these in turn.
Adoption effect
The first mechanism, which one might call an adoption effect, is simply the observation 
that an acceleration in the speed with which companies slice up their production across 
borders can substantially increase gross trade growth, even if value added production 
growth remains limited. During a transition period in which GVCs become more 
prevalent, this may temporarily raise measured elasticities of gross trade to income.
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Composition effect
GVCs may have further increased the elasticity of trade with respect to income if GVC 
trade is particularly concentrated in durable goods industries.  Trade in durable goods 
tends to have a higher sensitivity to income shocks than non-durables trade (see, among 
others, Ceglowski 2014 and Aziz and Li 2008). In economic downturns, households 
and companies disproportionately delay purchases of durable and capital goods while 
they await clearer evidence that the economic climate is improving. If GVC trade 
primarily expands in durable goods industries, it raises the share of goods with higher 
income elasticity in trade, therefore leading to a sustained increase in the aggregate 
income elasticity.
Supply chain effect
Finally, GVCs may have increased the sensitivity of trade with respect to income if 
characteristics of the production structure make such trade intrinsically more responsive 
to income movements than regular trade. Inventory dynamics within global value chains 
may be one driver that amplifies the volatility of GVC trade to income movements 
(Alessandria et al. 2010, Altomonte et al. 2012). The logic for such a bullwhip effect 
is the following: businesses typically face errors in their sales forecasts against which 
they hedge by accumulating buffer stocks of inventories. When a downstream firm is 
confronted with an unexpected drop in demand, it may attempt to smooth production 
by running down its inventories and suspending new purchases of imported inputs. The 
disproportionate falloff in the imports of inputs can lead to a higher sensitivity of GVC 
trade to foreign income shocks compared to regular trade.
3 Disentangling the effects
There are, then, several possible channels through which GVCs may have contributed 
to a rise in the income elasticity of trade. The challenge is to distinguish between 
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these channels. Aside from transitory adoption effects, is it because GVC trade is 
concentrated in sectors that are more sensitive to external demand fluctuations (the 
composition effect)? Or is it that GVC trade is inherently more elastic than regular trade 
(the supply chain effect)?  Unfortunately, limitations of traditional trade data and newer 
value added trade datasets such as TiVA make it difficult to assess this. Trade data have 
the problem that they do not easily distinguish between GVC trade and regular trade. 
TiVA data suffer from the fact that they operate at a high level of industry aggregation 
and are only available for five non-consecutive years.
In Gangnes et al. (2014), we address the issue by exploiting data from China’s Customs 
Statistics for the years 1992-2011, which distinguish between trade under two distinct 
customs regimes: the processing trade regime and the ordinary trade regime. Under 
processing trade, firms enjoy duty-free importation of inputs that are used in production, 
but face restrictions on selling to the domestic market. As a result, firms use it almost 
exclusively if they rely heavily on imported inputs and export their products, that is, if 
they are part of GVCs. Under ordinary trade, firms face duties on imported inputs but 
can sell their output locally. Firms that export under the ordinary trade regime therefore 
have more extensive domestic value chains.
A review of the data shows that Chinese exports exhibit trends that are similar to 
global trade. First, the share of processing trade (that is, GVC trade) in China’s exports 
increased rapidly in the 1990s before stabilising in the early 2000s. Second, GVCs 
have primarily emerged in durable goods sectors, therefore altering the composition of 
Chinese exports.  As the data in Table 1 indicate, in 2011 processing trade accounted for 
84% of durable goods exports, but only 16% of non-durable goods exports. The rapid 
growth of durable goods processing trade has raised the share of durable goods in total 
trade from 42% in 1995 to 69% in 2011. 
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Table 1 China’s exports, by sector, various years
Share of total 
exports
Annualised 
growth rate
Processing exports 
share
 HS Codes 1995 2011 1995-2011 1995 2011
DURABLES
Machinery, electrical 84-85 18.6 44.3 22.4 28.3 64.2
Misc. manufacturing 90-97 9.6 9.2 15.6 13.7 8.9
Metals 72-83 8.1 7.0 14.9 8.0 2.2
Transportation 86-89 2.7 5.6 21.4 3.6 7.5
Stone and glass 68-71 3.0 2.5 14.7 2.0 1.6
Total durables 68-97 42.0 68.7 19.5 55.6 84.3
NON-DURABLES
Textiles 50-63 24.2 12.7 11.3 20.9 4.9
Non-manufacturing 01-27 13.8 5.0 8.7 3.8 2.3
Chemical & allied industries 28-38 5.7 4.8 14.6 1.7 1.5
Plastics and rubbers 39-40 2.9 3.1 16.5 4.0 3.6
Footwear and headgear 64-67 5.5 2.8 11.1 8.1 1.7
Wood and wood products 44-49 2.2 1.5 13.2 1.2 1.0
Raw hides, skins, leathers & furs 41-43 3.8 1.5 9.2 4.7 0.7
Total non-durables 01-67 68.7 31.3 11.5 44.4 15.7
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 16.0 49.6 46.9
Source: Authors’ calculations using China Customs Statistics data.
Using panel data that vary across industries, customs regimes and years, we estimated a 
standard export-demand model that relates trade volume to foreign income and relative 
prices (real exchange rates), with interaction terms for durable versus non-durable 
goods and for processing versus other trade.2  Consistent with the literature, we find that 
Chinese exports of durables have substantially higher income elasticities than exports 
of non-durable goods exports. The income elasticity for durables is nearly four times 
2 Our model is estimated in growth rates to avoid spurious regression, and it includes lagged terms of left- and right-hand 
side variables, a proxy for productivity growth, and industry or industry-regime fixed effects.  Because the model is 
estimated in growth rates, the fixed effects will capture secular trade growth due, for example, to adoption effects. 
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higher than for non-durables (Table 2, column 2); for non-durables the elasticity to real 
GDP growth is 1.123, for durables it is 1.123 + 3.052= 4.175.
Table 2 Estimated income elasticities (impact), 1995-2009
Independent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Real GDP growth 1.831*** 1.123*** 1.072**
 Durable goods 3.052** 3.608**
 Processing trade 0.096
Notes: The coefficients on real exchange rates, productivity, one-year time lags, cross-interaction terms and fixed effects are 
not shown.  Significance:  ***1% level, **5% level, * 10% level.
Source: Gangnes et al. (2014), p 484.
While these estimates could reflect the fact that durables have a higher income 
elasticity than non-durables, it is also possible that they arise from a supply chain effect 
– processing trade may have an inherently higher income elasticity than regular trade 
and happen to be concentrated in durables industries. The addition of a processing 
trade interaction term allows us to test whether processing trade has a higher income 
elasticity over and above the difference that can be explained by industry composition. 
The evidence suggests that it does not.  Once we adjust for the industrial composition 
of trade, the results do not show that GVC trade has a higher long-run elasticity than 
trade taking place outside of GVCs (column 3).3 
This is not to say that processing trade behaves at all times like ordinary trade. During 
the Great Recession of 2008-2009, for example, there is evidence that processing trade 
was disproportionately affected (Ma and Van Assche, 2011). As is shown in Table 3, 
within HS8-digit industries, the share of processing exports in total exports declined 
significantly from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009. This suggests 
that supply chain effects may appear during periods of particularly severe economic 
disruption.
3 Cross interaction effects of processing on durables and real GDP, not shown here, also failed to show a positive effect.
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Table 3 China’s processing exports as a share of total exports (HS 8-digit level)
Variables
Number of 
observations
Mean Standard error
Share of processing exports in total 
exports, 08Q1
4760 0.31 0.004
Share of processing exports in total 
exports, 09Q1
4760 0.29 0.004
Difference 9520 0.020*** 0.003
Notes: * means significant at 10%; ** means significant at 5%; *** means significant at 1%.
Source: Ma and Van Assche (2011).
In sum, our research on China supports the idea that GVCs may have increased income 
elasticities by facilitating the growth of durable goods trade, but we find little evidence 
that trade within GVCs is inherently more income sensitive than other trade flows 
outside periods of extreme uncertainty.
4 Can GVCs explain a structural trade slowdown?
What can the distinction between alternative GVC effects on trade elasticities tell us 
about the recent trade slowdown? Here, we look for clues in recent trade movements 
and offer a few conjectures.  
If in fact the responsiveness of trade to income growth has dropped in recent years, our 
results for China suggest that the first place to look is to a composition effect – the mix 
of world exports may have shifted towards industries with lower income elasticities 
(either because of short-term cyclical developments or longer-term changes). At first 
glance, the data seem to support this view.  Figure 3 shows that the share of durable 
goods in world trade declined from a high of 58% in 2000 to about 49% in the 2012-
2013 period.
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Figure 3 Share of durable goods in overall trade, 1998-2013 
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A closer examination of the trade composition suggests, however, that this shift is 
largely due to an increase in the trade share of mineral fuels such as oil, which saw 
increasing prices during the pre-Crisis period. Once mineral fuels are excluded, the 
share of durable goods in world exports has remained roughly stable both in the past 
few years and in the period extending back to 2000. So, while the rising shares of lower-
elasticity minerals trade might reduce overall measured trade sensitivity to income, this 
does not appear to reflect a fundamental shift in the composition of non-mineral exports 
away from durables.4 
4 This indication that the durable/non-durable composition has remained relatively stable stands in contrast to the evidence 
from Boz et al. (2014) that the composition of final demand has shifted away from import-intensive goods.  According 
to Bussiere et al. (2013), the latter include investment goods that have relatively high durable good shares.
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Aside from a composition effect, could a lower income elasticity of trade reflect a 
pulling back from GVC production arrangements? Some have argued that such a 
process of ‘reshoring’ may be occurring as firms reconsider exposures and expenses 
associated with far-flung value chains, or because of changing regional cost conditions 
(Boz et al. 2014, Canadian Trade Commissioner 2014). A significant retreat from GVC 
arrangements would reduce measured responsiveness of trade to income temporarily 
through a reverse adoption effect. There might be additional effects on income elasticities 
if, contrary to our evidence for China, the supply chain characteristics of some GVC 
arrangements make related trade inherently more sensitive to income changes. 
Figure 4 Share of intermediate goods in overall trade
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A disproportionate retreat from GVCs, however, is also not evident in the data.  As 
we have discussed in Section 2 above, the share of GVC trade increased significantly 
between 2000 and 2008 before falling back slightly during the Great Recession (Figure 
2). Figure 4 shows that in the most recent period, the share of intermediate goods in 
both non-mineral exports and durable goods exports has remained stable, contrary to 
what one would expect if a disproportionate pull back from GVC arrangements were to 
blame for the drop in income elasticities.  
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Of course, it could be the case that measured elasticities have fallen because of a 
slowdown of the adoption of GVC production arrangements. And indeed the data in 
Figure 2 suggest that some slowing of the rate of GVC trade growth did occur after 
2000. This is therefore a plausible explanation for at least part of the slowing down of 
gross trade growth over the past decade or so.  
Considering the limited evidence for GVC-related explanations, what other structural 
mechanisms might explain the recent trade slowdown? One particularly interesting 
candidate is the effect on trade of heightened uncertainty in the post-recession era, 
which may have negatively affected overall trade. Taglioni and Zavacka (2013) show 
that there is a strong negative relationship between uncertainty and trade, and that this 
relationship is non-linear. When uncertainty is low, a marginal increase in uncertainty 
has little impact on trade. If it passes a threshold, however, it can lead to a significant 
decline in trade, both within and outside of GVCs. The heightened uncertainty is, of 
course, not likely to stay around forever.
5 Conclusion 
Our intent in this chapter has been to evaluate possible explanations for the recent 
trade slowdown in the context of the existing literature on trade impacts of GVCs.  In 
particular, we have reviewed the rationale and evidence for adoption, composition and 
supply chain explanations for the rising trade sensitivity to income over the past few 
decades, and we have asked what the literature might tell us about the recent slowdown. 
So far, there is little evidence that compositional factors besides oil price changes have 
played a significant role, or that there has been a significant pulling back from GVC 
arrangements. There is some evidence that the expansion in GVCs has been levelling 
off, and this may explain part of the decline in the income elasticity of trade.
The fact is that it is probably too soon to be asking the data to tell us much about the 
causes of the trade slowdown.  Studies that document a flattening out or decline of 
income elasticities since the 2000s are intriguing but, as Constantinescu et al. (2015) 
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acknowledge, the unusually deep and widespread nature of the Great Recession may 
complicate the identification of longer-run relationships. Similar issues may confound 
identification among alternative explanations for structural change.  
Changes in the extent or operation of GVCs may yet turn out to be part of the story. 
Whether this will lead to persistent changes in trade behaviour is far from clear. While 
data do suggest that the pace of adoption has tapered off, new waves of adoption could 
yet occur as technology and global integration evolve.  It is certainty too soon to say 
that the trade-income relationship has permanently shifted onto a lower growth path.
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7 World trade and income remain 
exposed to gravity
Hubert Escaith and Sébastien Miroudot1
WTO; OECD
In the years following the signing of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO, 
international trade grew much more rapidly than the world economy. This growth 
took place when the world economy itself was growing much more rapidly than in 
the previous decades in the wake of the internet and IT revolution. The trade-income 
elasticity was at its highest in the late 1995s, when an increase in GDP of 1% was 
associated with an increase in trade of almost 3% (Figure 1).2
To shed some light on the structural factors that explain the past and recent evolution 
of the trade-income elasticity, this chapter relies on the gravity model that is widely 
used in the trade literature. It has been very successful in the empirical analysis of trade 
(Anderson 2011) and has a solid theoretical foundation (Anderson 1979, Anderson and 
van Wincoop 2003). The gravity model establishes a relationship between trade and 
GDP and can provide a useful perspective on the evolution of the income-elasticity of 
trade, besides the short-term fluctuations caused by business cycles.
1 The authors thank Robert Koopman for his comments on earlier drafts; all remaining errors are the sole authors’ 
responsibility. The opinion expressed here are personal and do not represent the position of the OECD or WTO 
secretariat, or their respective members.
2 The year-over-year elasticity was actually even higher, as the results on Figure 1 are smoothed to capture only the long-
term trend. It should be noted that the turning point on Figure 1 depends on the duration of the rolling period. It is not 
meant to indicate a structural break taking place in a specific year. 
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Figure 1 World trade-GDP ratio and trade-income elasticity, 1970-2015 
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By analogy with Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation, the model predicts that trade 
between two countries is proportional to their economic mass and inversely proportional 
to the square of the ‘distance’ separating them. In economic terms, this distance refers 
to all the ‘frictions’ impeding trade, such as transportation costs, transaction costs, 
custom duties and other restrictive trade policy measures, as well as a home bias. The 
geographic distance between two countries is generally well correlated with these trade 
frictions.
For two countries a and b, we can express the gravity equation as:
Xab =
YaYb
Ydab
2 =
sasbY
dab
2
      (1)
where Xab are exports from a to b, Ya is a’s economic size from the supply-side 
perspective (the mass of products supplied at origin a), Yb is b’s market size (the mass 
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of products demanded at destination b), Y is total income and dab is the economic 
distance between a and b (a measure of the trade frictions that impede pure free trade).3
While the gravity models used today in trade analysis are more sophisticated, this 
simple relationship is enough to capture the main forces that can help explain the recent 
evolution of trade, such as the convergence in income between developed and developing 
countries, the reduction in ‘distance’ or the emergence of global value chains.   
1 A frictionless world: The role of the convergence in 
income
Following the notation in Anderson (2011), we define as sa = Ya /Y the share of country 
a in world sales and sb = Yb /Y the share of country b in world spending (equal to 
world sales). Because in a traditional Ricardian model of trade in final goods, total sales 
should equal total final demand, it is usual to approximate Ya and Yb by the respective 
country’s GDP. 4 Using GDP has the additional advantage of providing an identical 
specification when measuring an economy from its supply side and its demand side.
The model does not have to be limited to two countries; we can define as si= Yi /Y the 
share of any country i in world income and generalise the model to N countries.
Equation (1) then becomes:
Xab =
YaYb
Ydab
2 =
sasbY
dab
2
                (2)
3 Statisticians interpret these frictions as the ‘distance’ that separates the trade system from the maximum entropy state 
when trade is determined only by the relative size of the trade partners.
4 It remains an approximation because when trade is measured in gross terms, Ya refers to the sales of country a and Yb 
to the expenditures of country b, both concepts that are also in gross terms, as opposed to GDP which is a value added 
concept. It is only at the global level that total sales = total expenditures = total GDP. If we assume balanced trade, total 
sales are also equal to total expenditures for each country.
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In the absence of any trade friction, goods and services have the same price everywhere 
and consumers in a and in b are expected to buy products in the same proportion 
based on their share of world income (entropy is maximised). We thus obtain a gravity 
equation where distance does not play any role. Exports from a to b are simply:
Xab = sasbY                             (3)
And trade is balanced (exports from a to b are equal to exports from b to a)
Xab = Xba           (4)
From (3) and (4), we can now deduce that the ratio of world trade to GDP (T/Y) in a 
frictionless two-country model is equal to:
 
T
Y
= 2sasb 	  	  
      (5)
With total trade, T, equal to exports of country a  plus exports of country b.
Equation (3) implies that, in the simple gravity model (1), the trade-income elasticity 
equals 1 as long as trade frictions and the respective country shares remain constant.
 Tˆ = Yˆ
˙
	  	            (6)
where T^; Y^ stand for the rate of growth of T and Y.
Equation (3) has several other interesting implications that can help us to better 
understand the relationship between trade and income growth.
1.1 Trade is maximised when economies are of similar size
First, if we assume that trade is balanced, equation (3) implies that trade is maximised 
when the economic size of the two countries is the same. Asymmetries in the size of 
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countries lead to lower levels of trade. With two countries, trade is maximised for sa = 
sb = 0.5.
5
This result also holds for N countries with each country representing a share of 1/N of 
world spending.
We observe (Figure 2) that income convergence has been a major economic driving 
force in the evolution of trade over the past four decades. With the emergence of large 
developing countries as key economic players and the slow growth in the industrialised 
world (particularly in Europe and in Japan), there has been a strong convergence in 
income between 1970 and today.
Figure 2 Coefficient of variation of GDP for selected G20 economies, 1970-2011
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Note: GDP in 2005 US dollars measured at current PPP exchange rate. Convergence also exists, albeit more slowly, when 
GDP is measured at market exchange rates (see Table 1). Whether market exchange rates or PPPs are the best measures 
remains subject to debate. Market exchange rates are the implicit referents in a gravity model, but a microeconomic-based 
theory of consumer preference between traded and non-traded products should rely on purchasing power parities.   
Source: Penn World Tables.
5 This implies in the very hypothetical frictionless case (5) that the trade ratio is also 0.5. This result is consistent with the 
frictionless hypothesis: when entropy is maximised (undifferentiated production, same preferences and no trade friction), 
the prior probabilities of purchasing a home or a foreign product are equal to 0.5 when country sizes are equal.
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The past 15 years were dubbed the ‘Glorious Fifteen’ by The Economist, as income 
per person in the emerging world almost doubled between 2000 and 2009 and the 
average annual rate of growth over that decade was 7.6%, 4.5 percentage points higher 
than the rate seen in rich countries (Economist, 2015). Following the prediction of 
the gravity equation, this convergence in income has generated more trade and the 
share of developing countries in trade has increased. In the past 15 years, the share of 
developing countries in world exports of merchandises rose from 30% to 45%. The 
weight of South-South trade also dramatically increased during this period. While it 
represented less than 40% of South-North merchandise exports in 2000, South-South 
trade is now prevalent with 55% (Table 1). 
Table 1 Developed and developing economies: GDP and North-South trade, 1990-
2015
 US$ trillion Average annual growth rate (%)
 1990 2013
1990-
1995
1995-
2000
2000-
2005
2005-
2010
2010-
2013
GDP
World 22.5 75.6 6.4 1.7 7.1 6.8 3.0
Developed economies 17.1 44.4 6.7 1.5 6.4 3.6 1.5
Developing 
economies
5.4 31.2 5.3 2.2 9.5 14.2 5.4
Trade
World exports 3.4 18.3 8.1 4.6 10.3 7.8 4.2
    North-North 1.9 6.3 5.9 5.2 7.9 3.0 2.6
    South-South 0.3 4.6 15.9 5.3 16.4 15.4 6.7
    North-South 0.5 3.1 11.1 -0.7 10.0 11.9 4.0
    South-North 0.6 3.9 7.7 7.6 11.9 7.8 4.0
Notes: Developing economies including CIS, based on current US dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using official exchange rates.
Source: World Bank and WTO.
As expected from the gravity model, North-South trade has been positively correlated 
with the speed of convergence, although the correlation is low (0.4), even after 
eliminating the Great Trade Collapse of 2008-2009 (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3 North-South rate of convergence and trade growth, 1990-2013
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Source: Authors› elaboration on the basis of World Bank and WTO data.
But this convergence has been slowing down. Since the Global Crisis, growth rates 
across the emerging world have slipped back towards those in advanced economies, 
even if they remain higher when measured either at market exchange rates (Table 1 and 
Figure 3) or in terms of the purchasing power parities released by the World Bank’s 
International Comparison Programme (ICP). With this slowdown in convergence, the 
gravity equation predicts that trade will grow more slowly for a given rate of expansion 
of the world economy.
Box 1 presents the results of a simulation based on a gravity equation calibrated to 
reproduce the economic growth of two groups of countries made up of developed and 
developing economies between 1990 and 2015 and to simulate North-South trade on 
the basis of a simple gravity equation.  This simulation of North-South trade is relatively 
close to what was actually observed for total trade in Figure 1.  While the factors that 
influenced trade are much more complex than suggested by the simple gravity equation 
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used for the simulation, we see that with the successive phases of income divergence 
and income convergence, it reproduces the non-linear evolution of the trade elasticity.
Box 1 Economic convergence and North-South trade: A simple simulation 
exercise 
To illustrate the capacity for income convergence to explain the evolution of trade 
elasticity, a counter-factual simulation was developed, based on actual data on 
North-South trade and GDP between 1990 and 2013 (Table 1).
The starting point is a very simple simulation exercise using the gravity equation 
(1). A world economy growing at a constant 5% annual rate is composed of two 
countries. When those economies are of different size at the initial stage, they are 
made to converge progressively. The convergence cases are benchmarked against a 
situation where the two economies were initially of similar size (Figure 4). 
When both countries are of same size (as in the 50/50 benchmark case of Figure 
4) and trade frictions remain constant, equation (1) results in trade growing at 5% 
because, as expected from equation (6), the trade elasticity is constant and equal 
to 1. Trade growth (and therefore the world trade-GDP elasticity) is higher when 
the difference in initial size is greater (the 70/30 and 80/20 cases in Figure 4). The 
larger the initial gap in year 1 (the 80/20 case), the higher the world trade-income 
elasticity when convergence starts (year 2). When countries converge to a similar 
size (year 20 in Figure 4), the trade-income elasticity falls and converges to the 
steady-state value of 2. 
If the convergence process stops at any time before the sizes are equal, the trade 
growth rate slows down to the benchmark one and elasticity stabilises at 1. 
Therefore, the slowdown in the economic convergence between developing and 
developed economies recorded after the 2008-2009 Crisis may also explain part of 
the decrease in the trade-income elasticity that was observed in this period. 
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Figure 4 Simulation of trade growth for different rates of convergence 
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This case was for illustration only, and the next step involves calibrating the simple 
model in order to simulate the evolution of North-South trade in the past decades. 
The world economy is made of two regions, North (developed economies) and 
South (developing countries). The simulation mimics the evolution of North-
South bilateral trade according to a simple gravity equation, based on the observed 
GDP developments (filtering out short-term fluctuations by applying a Hodrick-
Prescott filter) and calibrated for a constant trade resistance as measured in 2010. 
The results are compared against a benchmark situation where developing and 
developed country GDPs grow smoothly (note that the constant annual rate of 
growth is higher for developing countries due to convergence) from their initial 
1990 value to their final one. 
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Trade can still be expected to continue to grow more rapidly than GDP in the future 
Comparing the simulation with the benchmark (Figure 5) shows the impact of 
the succession of decelerating/accelerating phases of GDP convergence between 
developed and developing countries on North-South trade elasticity. 
Figure 5 North-South trade elasticity and economic convergence 1990-2015: 
Counterfactual simulations
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Up to the year 2000, observed GDP convergence and the simulated North-South 
trade-income elasticity are low and far below the benchmark of monotonous 
convergence. Convergence speeds up after this date and the elasticity overtakes the 
benchmark value in 2003 (a phase of accelerating convergence). This process stops 
with the Global Crisis. Since then, the trade elasticity and income convergence 
have been going down, with the elasticity returning progressively to its benchmark 
value. 
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based on further income convergence. However, it should be noted that what the gravity 
equation suggests is that trade is not maximised when GDP per capita is similar across 
countries, but when countries are of a similar economic size. Depending on their 
respective populations, two countries, a and b, can represent an equal share of world 
spending but have a different GDP per capita. For example, trade can be maximised 
between a large poor country and a small rich country, as long as their overall shares 
in world income are similar. Considering that the most populated countries are found 
in the South, a corollary of this conclusion is that trade may slow down with income 
convergence between developed and developing countries.  The next section presents 
a well-known (Anderson 2011) property of the gravity model that may explain why 
the trade-to-income ratio tends to stabilise once developing countries have reached a 
certain level of total income.
1.2 Small countries are more open to trade
Considering that the Earth is a closed economy, what is measured as international trade 
depends in the end on the number of countries participating in the world economy. 
Their relative openness is also a matter of size, as we shall see. By definition, if we 
denote as j all the partners of a country (i ≠ j), Σjsj = 1 – si. Equation (3), describing the 
frictionless world, can be rewritten for all partners as:
j∑ Xij
Yi
=
j
∑sis jY = 1− si                (7)
Equation (7) implies that the smaller the share of a country in world spending, the 
higher its level of openness.6 Because size is relative, world trade will tend to grow 
more rapidly when global growth is driven by smaller economies; this leverage effect 
diminishes with the convergence in the GDP of the trade partners, as in Figure 4.
6 Incidentally, this result shows that the trade-to-GDP ratio is not a good indicator of openness from a policy perspective, 
as it is determined by structural factors that are independent of policies.
The Global Trade Slowdown: A New Normal?
138
Another implication relates to the number of trade partners. If the world is divided into 
a greater number of countries, there will be more trade independently of any change in 
income, simply due to the fact that smaller economies will have higher openness ratios. 
As a matter of fact, the historical tendency has been for an increase in the number of 
countries, based on the breakdown of colonial empires since the 1950s and the fall of 
the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Today, there are 193 United Nations member states, 
compared with only 51 original members in 1945. When the Soviet Union dissolved 
itself in the early 1990s, the Russian Federation remained with 11 member countries of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, while 14 independent states were established 
from the former Soviet Republics. Other east European countries, such as Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia, split into two or more national entities. More importantly, the 
demise of the Eastern bloc opened its members to international trade, after years of 
administered transactions under planned economy regimes. 
The analysis of the Herfindahl index for geographical trade diversification, where 
a lower value corresponds to a wider geographical diversification of trade partners, 
confirms that trade now takes place with a higher number of partners (Table 2). The 
index dropped by 26% for the entire selection of 133 countries surveyed, by 18% 
for OECD countries and by 36% for non-Latin-American developing countries. The 
diversification process was not uniform and the Latin American region remained largely 
outside this geographical trend (the index fell by only 5%). 
World trade and income remain exposed to gravity
Hubert Escaith and Sébastien Miroudot
139
Table 2 Geographical diversification of trade (Herfindahl index), 1962-2006
HIT 1962-1970 1971-1979 1980-1988 1989-1987 1998-2006
World 0.208 0.168 0.159 0.157 0.154
- OECD 0.151 0.141 0.134 0.132 0.125
- Latin America 0.229 0.205 0.219 0.223 0.217
- Other developing 0.227 0.169 0.149 0.147 0.146
Note: Trade index measured as the average of Herfindahl index for imports (HIM) and exports (HIX). HIT can vary between 
zero and unity with a larger number indicating less diversification.
Source: Adapted from Farshbaf (2012), HIM and HIX indices. 
Figure 6 shows that the Herfindahl index is higher for developing countries, implying 
lower geographical diversification. Developed economies started diversifying their 
trade partners earlier than the developing countries, but the latter rapidly converged in 
the early 2000s. The Global Crisis induced a reverse of this trend, with a reduction in 
the number of trading partners for both groups of countries.
Figure 6 Herfindahl index, developed and developing countries, 1995-2009
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1.3 More specialisation means more trade
By introducing a product dimension into equation (3), it is also possible to deduce that 
the more countries are specialised in the production of specific goods and services, 
the more they will trade. This is a traditional result in Ricardian trade theory, but also 
an implication of the frictionless gravity world. Specialisation means that the share 
of a country in world sales for a given product k becomes more disconnected from its 
share in world spending. If we define as bj = Ej /Y the share of the partner country in 
world spending, as opposed to sj its share in world sales, the difference bj – sj increases 
international trade.
Anderson (2011) points out that world openness in the frictionless world can be 
expressed as:
j∑ i≠ j∑ Xij
Y
= 1− 1
N
− Nrsb var s( )var b( )              (8)
where rbs is the coefficient of correlation between b and s and var denotes the variance. 
As before, the number of countries (1/N) plays a role in world openness and the 
variance of b and s highlights the role of size similarity. But another determinant is the 
correlation between s and b, which is an inverse measure of specialisation (the lower 
the correlation, the higher the specialisation of countries).
The literature has identified a non-monotonic relationship between income levels and 
product diversification (measured, for example, by Herfindahl indexes at the HS6 
level). Cadot et al. (2011) point out that when GDP per capita increases, there is first 
a diversification in exports up to a threshold of US$25,000 PPP; above this income, 
concentration takes place again. This suggests that, as developing countries catch up 
in terms of GDP per capita, one can also expect from equation [8] more trade to be 
induced by the higher specialisation of developing economies.
World trade and income remain exposed to gravity
Hubert Escaith and Sébastien Miroudot
141
2 Can trade frictions explain the shift to lower trade-
income elasticities?
On the basis of the previous section, we can now explain why the trade-to-GDP ratio 
has increased over the past decades. Among those structural factors are the convergence 
in income, the higher number of countries actively participating in trade and the fact 
that they are becoming more specialised once they become more affluent. However, 
we cannot explain some of the short-term variations, and the slowdown in income 
convergence may not fully explain the recent drop in the trade-income elasticity. 
Although short-term fluctuations in the composition of demand are probably to blame, 
as we shall see later, the basic gravity model may still be helpful in understanding the 
recent trade dynamic. In this section, we look at the potential role of ‘distance’, the 
variable that we dropped from equation (1) to look at the frictionless world in Section 1.
The role of trade frictions is intuitive, and the past decades have seen a series of 
technological or institutional advances that have considerably reduced international 
transaction costs. The decisive invention for merchandise trade was the container, 
which can be traced back to the 1960s. Since then, progress in transportation, 
telecommunication and logistics have made trade easier, cheaper and more secure. 
Institutional changes contributed greatly to reducing frictions, with the end of the Cold 
War in the 1980s, the signature of the Uruguay Round in 1995 and the gradual adoption 
by most countries of more open economic policies.
However, it remains quite challenging to measure all of these trade frictions, as they 
cover a variety of costs faced by exporters and importers. One approach suggested by 
the gravity literature is to derive these trade costs from observed trade flows. With the 
help of the gravity equation, some theoretical foundation can be given to these trade 
costs in order to remove some of the ‘noise’ from the data and to provide an empirical 
assessment of dab
2 in equation (1).
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2.1 A slowdown in the overall reduction of trade costs
The North-South simulation in Figure 5 was calibrated using the trade resistance 
observed in 2010 and overestimates by 30% the trade observed in 1990. This indicates 
that trade frictions went down during those two decades. Average MFN tariffs applied 
by WTO members have declined 15% in the past 20 years; developing countries that, in 
general, had much higher tariffs reduced them by 22%. Today, tariffs in the 15%-25% 
range have declined considerably. In addition, sectoral and preferential agreements 
have further reduced the duties charged on international trade. For North-South trade, 
almost 80% of products exported by developing countries to developed countries were 
duty free in 2014, compared to less than 55% in 1995. 7 
Another component of trade resistance is transportation costs.  Figure 7 shows that 
the average cost of transporting merchandises (right-hand scale) has been trending 
down in the past 20 years. This reduction has facilitated trade and most probably 
contributed to the rapid development of international trade in goods. After 2010, this 
trend was interrupted and the average cost rose again. Although it is too soon to know 
if this represents a structural break in the series, the rise in trade costs in the overall 
difficult context of an economic slowdown may have contributed to lower trade-income 
elasticity.
7 Based on preliminary data from ITC, UNCTAD and WTO.
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Figure 7 Transportation services and trade in merchandises, 1980-2013
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For a more formal treatment, let us modify equation (1) to reproduce the so-called 
structural gravity equation (Anderson 2011, Head and Mayer 2014). Assuming identical 
preferences or technologies across countries, the structural gravity equation is:
Xij =
Yi .Yj
Y
tij
Pj .Π i
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1−σ
      (9)
where tij is  the bilateral trade cost between country i and country j, with tij ≥ 1; the 
constant σ is the common elasticity of substitution across varieties of products.
The incidence of this bilateral trade cost on trade depends now on trade costs with other 
partners and is summarised in two ‘multilateral resistance terms’:
Π i( )1−σ =
j
∑ tijPj
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1−σ
Yj
Y
      (10)
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Pj( )1−σ =
i
∑ tijΠ i
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1−σ
Yi
Y
      (11)
Π ki is the outward multilateral resistance and aggregates the incidence of all bilateral 
trade costs borne by the producers in country i. P kj  is the inward multilateral resistance 
and accounts for the incidence of all bilateral trade costs on buyers in country j. These 
two multilateral resistance terms are unfortunately not directly observable.
Building on Head and Ries (2001), Novy (2013) suggests calculating trade ‘costs’ 
(or rather, ‘trade frictions’) in a way that does not require information on multilateral 
resistance. The trick is to multiply gravity equation (9) describing trade flows from i 
to j by the corresponding equation for trade from j to i. What is obtained is a measure 
of bilateral trade costs tij tji relative to domestic trade costs tii tjj. τij  is the geometric 
mean of barriers to trade in both directions and can be interpreted as a tariff equivalent 
summarising all existing trade frictions:
τ ij ≡
tijt ji
tiit jj
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
2
−1=
Xii .X jj
Xij .X ji
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
2 σ −1( )
−1               (12)
This measure was used by Jacks et al. (2011) to study the role of trade costs in explaining 
the growth of trade between 1870 and 2000. It is ‘top down’ in the sense that it infers 
trade frictions from observed patterns of trade and production. It captures the full range 
of cost factors affecting international trade (including unobservable trade costs and the 
‘home bias’, i.e. a preference to consume homemade products, independently of price 
considerations).
Using a dataset of 40 countries representing 85% of world trade and production (the 
World Input-Output Database described in Timmer et al. 2014), Figure 8 provides some 
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information on the recent evolution of trade frictions. They are calculated with the 
formula of equation (12) and expressed as an index where 1995 = 100.8  
Figure 8 confirms that there was an important reduction in trade frictions in the 1990s that 
can be explained both by technological innovations and by important trade agreements 
such as the enlargement of the EU, the signing of the NAFTA and the creation of the 
WTO after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Interestingly, the process stopped at 
the beginning of the 2000s and this break is consistent with what we observed in Figure 
1. There is a second period where trade frictions fall around 2005, with the lowest level 
reached in 2006. Trade frictions then increase (starting before the financial crisis) and 
an important peak is observed in 2008-2009 with the Great Trade Collapse. In 2011, the 
last year in the dataset, trade frictions are just back to their 2005 levels.
It should be kept in mind that this trade frictions index reflects any type of transaction 
cost, including the reluctance of companies to trade in the middle of a financial 
crisis or the ‘home bias’ (such as the trend observed among some consumers to buy 
local products). It cannot be interpreted as a surge in protectionism. Nevertheless, it 
indicates that at the beginning and in the second half of the 2000s, the historical trend 
of decreasing resistance to trade was interrupted, a key factor in explaining the slower 
growth of trade.
8 With such an index, the level of trade frictions does not depend on the value of , the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties of products. This parameter is difficult to measure empirically and depends on the composition of trade (more 
on this in the next section).
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Figure 8 Trade fictions index for all WIOD reporters, 1995-2011 (1995=100)
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Notes: Including goods and services; the geometric mean of bilateral trade frictions among the 40 countries covered in the 
dataset is weighted using the geometric mean of the GDP of the two partners.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WIOD data.
2.2 Goods versus services: A composition effect?
Services were for a long time regarded as ‘non-tradable’ (Broussolle 2014). For example, 
when calculating effective rates of protection in the 1970s, intermediate consumption 
of services was included in sectoral value added as primary factors rather than counted 
as inputs (the ‘Corden formula’). But in fact many services are tradable and there is a 
shift to services in trade consistent with the shift of GDP towards services activities. 
Jensen and Kletzer (2006) have developed an index on the tradability of services based 
on the geographic concentration of services activities in the US. Their results indicate 
that the degree of tradability varies across activities, but that half of services activities 
are potentially tradable.
However, trade resistance for services is much higher than for goods (Miroudot et al. 
2013). Services are generally highly regulated activities and estimates of ad valorem 
equivalents of the barriers faced by foreign service suppliers are generally high (Jafari 
and Tarr 2014). Many tradable services are thus not traded much in practice because 
of barriers. Using the same methodology as for Figure 8, but this time with a separate 
calculation for goods and services, Figure 9 highlights that starting from 1995 (where 
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the index is equal to 100), trade frictions for services are decreasing even less than for 
goods. Only in 2009, with the Global Crisis and the trade collapse, is the level of trade 
frictions the same (meaning that the Crisis had a similar impact on goods and services).
A trade version of Baumol’s cost disease (the argument that by moving towards services 
that are less productive activities, post-industrial economies are condemned to slower 
productivity growth) would be that by shifting their supply base towards services that 
are subject to higher trade frictions, those economies will trade less. It could explain a 
long-term trend towards lower growth rates in trade (as long as trade in costs in services 
are not decreasing).
Figure 9 Trade frictions index for goods and services, 1995-2011 (all WIOD 
reporters, 1995=100)
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Note: The geometric mean of bilateral trade frictions among the 40 countries covered in the dataset is weighted using the 
geometric mean of the GDP of the two partners.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WIOD data.
Services may affect the gravity equation not only through higher trade costs, but also 
through a different elasticity of substitution (the σ in equation 9). At the aggregate level, 
this elasticity of substitution depends on the mix of goods and services consumed and 
whether varieties are more or less substitutable. The impact should be analysed as part 
of a broader set of demand-side effects.
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2.3 Other demand-side effects
As illustrated in Figure 1, the aggregate world trade-GDP elasticity has been higher 
than 1 in the past decades and nearly reached 3 in the mid-1990s. This aggregate 
elasticity results from a complex interaction between the demand for imports (trade-
income elasticity) and the export-GDP multiplier. 
The dynamic of demand for imports depends on many factors. Some are of a short-
term nature, as the relative composition of final demand between private and public 
consumption and fixed investment depends on the business cycle. Those short-term 
effects have been extensively analysed in attempts to explain the Great Trade Collapse 
of 2008-2009 and the sluggish recovery (Ollivaud and Schwellnus 2015).  But other 
demand aspects are of a long-term structural nature. One of these is the evolution of 
national income, and another is the evolution of the purchasing power of this national 
revenue on the international market. When looking at a long-term relationship between 
income and the demand for imported goods, another phenomenon is the composition 
effect between tradable and non-tradable products when household per capita income 
increases. When income rises, Engel’s law indicates that, once basic necessities are 
fulfilled, additional household consumption privileges superior products, in particular 
services like education, health and leisure/cultural activities. With the exception of 
tourism, most of these services are not (easily) tradable. Thus the impact on trade of an 
increase in per capita income is ambiguous. We should expect a high elasticity when 
income is low, but a smaller one when income increases over a threshold. Investment 
will intuitively follow a similar pattern, but for different reasons – low-income countries 
have limited technological capabilities and need to import most of their capital goods; 
this dependency is expected to decrease when the economy develops then stabilise. 
This relationship does not hold for public consumption of imported goods and services, 
which is expected to remain relatively stable across time or increase with the reduction 
of trade frictions (e.g. due to international agreements on public procurement). 
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An assumption in the traditional gravity equation is that preferences are homothetic. 
Consumers may have a higher or lower income, but they consume goods and services in 
the same proportion. This assumption does not hold when looking at trade between rich 
and poor economies. Consumers in poor countries will typically spend a higher share 
of their income on food than consumers in rich countries (Engel’s law). As explained 
by Caron et al. (2014), the prevalence of non-homothetic preferences has an impact 
on aggregate trade-to-GDP ratios through two channels. First, if we assume that high-
income countries have a comparative advantage in income-elastic products (i.e. goods 
and services for which consumption is very sensitive to the level of income), both poor 
and rich countries tend to consume more of their own goods than the gravity model 
would predict under homothetic preferences. Non-homothetic preferences can be one 
explanation for the home bias observed in trade. Second, if trade costs are larger for 
the low income-elasticity products or if trade is more sensitive to trade costs for such 
goods, the trade-to-GDP ratio will tend to be lower for poor countries.
3 The role of global value chains
The emergence of global value chains (GVC) has transformed the traditional way we 
analyse trade, in particular trade-growth-development linkages. The fragmentation of 
manufactured production across international supply chains and the higher incidence 
of foreign inputs in domestic production call also for revising the way we analyse the 
trade-income relationship. Our equation (1) refers implicitly to a world where countries 
export final goods in order to import final goods.
Yet, the emergence of global value chains requires looking at trade from the supply 
side. Importing for producing (either for the domestic market or for exports) or 
exporting inputs that will be further processed and re-exported by the importing country 
is a dominant economic reality in the 21st century. Thanks to GVC trade, China has 
transformed its economy. In 1990 it produced less than 3% of global manufacturing 
output by value; its share now is nearly a quarter. The network of supply chains that 
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criss-cross Southeast Asia makes almost half of the world›s goods (Economist 2015). 
Figure 10 shows, on its vertical axis, the evolution of the vertical specialisation (VS) 
index measured as the proportion of imports in the value of exports.
Figure 10 Export performance and reliance on imported inputs, 1995-2008
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We claim, following Escaith et al. (2010), that GVCs played a considerable role in the 
trade creation that is captured by the sudden rise of the trade elasticity in the 1990s seen 
in Figure 1. When trade is increasingly composed of intermediate products that are 
exchanged within production networks (global value chains), traditional trade statistics 
used to measure trade-income elasticities suffer from a double-counting bias: an input 
imbedded into goods for processing will cross several borders before reaching its final 
destination. In addition, gross exports may not reflect adequately the economic value 
that the exporter created, considering that the commercial valuation retained by customs 
administration includes the value of all the imported parts and components (including 
intermediate services) used in the production of this export. Thus, GVCs inflate the 
accounting value of trade.
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But, more importantly from an economic perspective, GVCs are trade creators, 
especially for developing countries, by promoting bilateral trade in intermediate goods 
and services that would not have been possible in a traditional ‘Ricardian’ model of 
final goods. Globalised firms active in GVC trade are no longer importing inputs for 
assembly for local sales; they are importing inputs that they process and re-export in the 
form of goods, parts, components, and services used in some other part of the world. 
As seen in Figure 10, successful exporters between 1995 and 2008 (those who stand on 
the right-hand side of the horizontal axis) are also economies who increased more their 
reliance on imported inputs, as measured by VS, and stand above the 45° line.
3.1 The spread of GVCs 
Countries’ integration in GVCs increased rapidly between 1995 and 2000, and the pace 
of progress has been slower afterwards (Figure 11). The participation index measures 
the import content of exports (or VS) plus the share of domestic value added exports 
that is further processed by importing countries. Most countries lie below the 45° 
diagonal, evidencing a lower progression during the eight years that followed 2000 than 
during the five years that preceded it. A year-to-year average would even accentuate this 
difference. Most of the economies that stand above the 45° line and are still increasing 
their vertical specialisation linkages in the 2000s are located in Asia, with the exception 
of Denmark, Portugal and Saudi Arabia. 
This slowing-down of GVC expansion is consistent with the results found in Figure 
1, indicating a return of trade elasticity towards its long-term trend after a ‘bubble’ 
between 1995 and 2000. Yet, the end of the bubble is not a sign of de-globalisation 
- Figure 1 showed clearly that if the elasticity is going down, the trade-to-GDP ratio 
returned rapidly to its maximum level after the 2008-2009 Crisis and keeps increasing 
(albeit at a slower pace).  
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Figure 11 GVC participation index, 1995-2008
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The propagation of global value chains is therefore a strong candidate for explaining 
the bubble observed in Figure 1. In order to check more precisely for the influence of 
global value chains in the change in trade elasticity, we introduce a value added version 
of the gravity model.
3.2 Value added gravity
The trade literature has recently put an emphasis on trade in value added. One way to 
measure trade in value added is to decompose gross exports and identify the domestic 
contribution in exports (Koopman et al. 2014). Another approach, followed by Johnson 
and Noguera (2012), consists of measuring bilateral value added trade flows. Starting 
from final consumption in country j, they look at the origin of value added in country 
i, not only through the direct exports between country i and country j but also through 
inputs produced in i and then exported to country k to be further processed and shipped 
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to country j. The same input can also transit through other countries l before reaching j. 
At the end, ‘exports of value added’ account for all the value added generated in country 
i and ending up in final consumption in country j.
In order to understand how trade frictions are affected by global value chains, we can 
use a gravity equation for value added trade, building on the work of Noguera (2012). To 
derive a value added gravity equation, Noguera starts from equations similar to (9), (10) 
and (11), but these equations have to be different for final products and intermediate 
inputs. In a GVC world, inputs are traded and incorporated in the value of exports. 
As a consequence, trade takes place between i and j also through inputs found in final 
exports of country k and through inputs from k further processed in l before reaching j.
The value added gravity equation is then obtained through a first-order log-linear 
Taylor approximation. It expresses the change in bilateral value added trade flows, 
V
^
ij , as a function of changes in economic mass variables (Y
^
), bilateral trade costs (t^ ), 
multilateral resistance terms (Π
^
 and P
^
), and the global input-output structure (with 
parameters sikj and ϕiklj):
Vˆij =
k
sikj[Yˆk + Yˆj + Yˆ + 1( ) tˆkj ˆ k Pˆj( )
+
k l
iklj Yˆk Yˆ + 1( ) tˆkl ˆ k Pˆl( )
  (11)
In the absence of intermediate products, the above equation simplifies into a linear 
version of equation (9), in particular because there is no country k different from i 
(and no country l either). What is different in equation (11) is that bilateral trade is a 
function of the economic mass of all countries k (including country i) and the trade 
costs between these countries k and other countries l through which the inputs can 
transit as part of the global value chain.
The incidence of the economic mass and trade costs (and multilateral resistance terms) 
from these k and l countries depends on the input-output structure of the world economy. 
The first parameter, sikj , indicates the share of value added from country i to country 
j embodied in a country k’s final product to country j. The second parameter, ϕiklj , is 
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the value added from country i embodied in intermediate inputs produced in country 
k which, after travelling through possibly many countries l, are ultimately absorbed as 
final demand in country j, relative to the value added exports from i to j.
Using the WIOD dataset, Figure 12 shows the evolution of sikj  and ϕiklj over time (an 
average across reporters and partners) when countries k and l are different from i and j. 
Over time, the contribution of economic mass variables and trade frictions from third 
countries has increased as determinants of bilateral trade flows.
Figure 12 Value-added gravity parameters, 1995-2011
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Equation (11) is important to understand the role of global value chains in changing 
the relationship between trade and income. In gross terms, there is potentially an 
overestimation of trade (exports or imports) because of the double-counting of inputs. 
This double-counting does not exist in GDP, where only the contribution of net trade 
is measured (X-M). When estimating the gravity equation in value added terms, the 
measure of value added trade is consistent with the definition of GDP as the sum of 
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sectoral value added. What we can learn from the value added gravity equation is 
not that trade frictions are systematically higher in a GVC world, nor that the impact 
of economic mass is higher or lower, but that the determinants of trade go beyond 
bilateral variables. Third countries providing inputs, and the relationship between these 
third countries and other countries through which inputs transit, influence bilateral 
trade flows. The overall impact depends on the coefficients of the global input-output 
structure, but there is no reason to assume that trade frictions are systematically higher 
or lower.
This is consistent with the scenario of a GVC bubble where first companies have 
interpreted the decrease in bilateral trade frictions as an opportunity for lower costs 
through the offshoring of activities and the fragmentation of production, but where 
the complex interactions between trade frictions in various countries that equation 
(11) tentatively describes have may not have always brought the expected economic 
benefits for companies. They have then adjusted their strategies and, after a period of 
adjustment, the trade-income elasticity reverts to its long-term trend.
4 Conclusion 
Contrary to the most pessimistic forecasts, the world economy did not enter a phase 
of de-globalisation after the 2008-2009 Global Crisis and the resulting Great Trade 
Collapse. While the trade-income elasticity has been returning to its pre-1990s long-
term values, the world economy is much more open to trade today than it was 25 years 
ago.  We have shown in this chapter that part of the slowdown in trade can be attributed 
to a slowdown in the rate of economic convergence between developed and developing 
countries, after a phase of high growth differentials from the mid-1990s to the mid-
2000s.
The rise of global value chains was another factor that contributed to this phenomenon. 
GVCs impacted trade through several angles. First, production fragmentation increased 
trade in intermediate goods, leading to a significant amount of double-counting. 
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Second, GVCs created trade opportunities for (small) developing countries that would 
not have existed in a traditional Ricardian trade in final goods. Finally, by boosting the 
industrialisation process of labour-abundant developing countries, GVCs created the 
conditions for the faster economic growth that caused the rapid convergence mentioned 
above.  On a more qualitative note, GVCs were also functional in fostering a greater 
specialisation in product varieties, itself a factor increasing trade among countries with 
similar resource endowments.   
Behind the rise of GVCs is the reduction of trade costs, be they monetary (tariffs, 
transportation), cognitive or administrative (convergence of consumer preferences, 
market intelligence, common industrial norms, trade facilitation, etc.). There was a 
significant reduction in trade frictions in the 1990s, explained both by technological 
innovations and by important trade agreements. 
On the other hand, other factors such as demand-switching worked in the opposite 
direction. With a rise in income, household consumption of services such as housing, 
health and education increases more rapidly than demand for goods (Engel’s law). Most 
of these services are less tradable than merchandise and the trade-in-services frictions 
in a gravity model tend to be higher than for goods.  
After the so-called ‘Glorious Fifteen’ that saw the emergence of large developing 
countries and the appearance of new key players in the world economy, the slowdown 
in trade was to be expected, independently of the 2008-2009 Crisis. Actually, this 
slowdown is mainly due to ‘good reasons’ (a reduced gap in economic size between 
industrialised and emerging countries, higher per capita income and higher demand for 
services). The weight of ‘negative’ factors, such as increased perception of economic 
and geo-political risks, should not be minimised, but it was not a decisive driving factor 
in this slowdown, nor were the so-called ‘re-shoring’ or ‘near-shoring’ movements 
(near-shoring does not affect the trade figures, even if it implies higher resistance to 
trade over long distances).     
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This relative optimism remains conditional on the stability of the macroeconomic 
global environment. As Figure 1 indicated, the trade-income elasticity may fall below 
its long-term value in times of economic stagnation, as was the case in the 1980s’ 
stagflation years. Other factors may also induce a (temporary) reduction of trade in 
commodities: higher self-sufficiency in energy consumption (shale oil, but also new 
energy sources), and the end of the commodity ‘super-cycle’ when China moved away 
from an investment-led economic growth pattern towards a more balanced pattern.
Although in the long run, rising income in the developing countries will induce a shift 
towards less trade-intensive products such as services, there is still a long march ahead 
towards this post-industrialisation frontier for many developing countries. Per capita 
income in emerging countries is still far below the average for industrial countries 
and many developing countries are still far from having fully integrated into the most 
dynamic modalities of world trade, in particular GVCs and services. Those countries 
that are suffering from high trading costs are also the main beneficiaries of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement. By many estimates, trade costs remain quite sizeable. Even for 
a ‘representative rich country’ for example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) have 
estimated that the ad valorem equivalent of trade costs could be as high as 170%. As 
shown by Arvis et al. (2013), customs formalities and trade procedures that result in 
unnecessary delays or complexities to traders constitute an important component of 
these costs. We show that trade resistance declined less in the case of services than 
for goods. Even in developed countries, there are still important barriers to trade in 
services (OECD 2014). The WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation, concluded in Bali 
in December 2013, represents an important milestone for trade frictions by creating an 
international framework for reducing the costs related to custom procedures. An agenda 
to reduce other non-tariff barriers would bring trade closer to its frictionless level.
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8 A value-added trade perspective 
on recent patterns in world trade
Paul Veenendaal, Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, Arjan Lejour and 
Henk Kox
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
The discussion about structural changes in world trade since the Great Trade Collapse 
is mainly based on the development of gross trade per unit of GDP. This is partly 
historical, because the System of National Accounts is based on gross trade.1 From 
an analytical perspective, however, an understanding of structural patterns in world 
trade requires that we go one step deeper. Gross trade concepts involve double-counting 
of trade flows, because imported intermediates used in the production of exports are 
counted again when the the exporter sends his exports across a border (Koopman et al. 
2014). Trade in value added avoids these double-counting issues and accounts only for 
the value added embedded in intermediate input, which allows a better understanding 
of how global value chains (GVCs) operate. Focusing on trade in value added may 
thus reveal the undercurrents of specialisation and competitiveness that shape the 
globalisation pattern.
Our contribution to the debate on the global trade slowdown is to use trade in value-
added statistics to assess the recent trade dynamics. We focus on three claims in the 
recent literature on structural changes in world trade patterns:
• The trade slowdown is structural in nature and not caused by cyclical factors such 
as changes in the composition of GDP over the business cycle.
1 The gross trade concept has its own merit. Gross trade is important for margin services like transport, trade and insurance 
that are often based on the volume and value of total trade. 
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• A structural fall in long-term trade elasticities is caused by a slowdown in foreign 
outsourcing (offshoring). This especially affects trade by the US and China. 
• The fall in world trade elasticity is caused by a combination of regional shifts:
• an increase of the total import share for regions with a low trade elasticity;
• an increase in relative GDP growth of regions with a low trade elasticity; and
• decreased import elasticities in some regions. 
We use data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) project over the period 
1995-2011 (Timmer 2012), wich includes five years of the Global Crisis, if we allow 
for the fact that 2007 demarcated the start of the Crisis in some countries (Laeven and 
Valencia 2012). A limitation with value-added trade statistics is that they are based on 
input-output tables that only become available with a time lag. The most recent value-
added trade statistics are available up to 2011. For the most recent period, we therefore 
use supplementary data from CPB’s World Trade Monitor (WTM) database.
A look at the recent literature
After world trade bounced back from the Great Trade Collapse of 2008–2009, the 
growth of global trade was only 3% in 2012-2013, against an average of 6-7% in 
the preceding 35 years. Recently, various papers have discussed this slowdown, with 
the major point of discussion being whether it is cyclical or structural. Structural 
elements could include a decline in GVC trade, a surge in protectionism, changes in 
the trade composition (services versus goods) or a shift between demand components 
(consumption versus investment). 
Constantinescu et al. (2014, 2015) claim that the decline of GVCs is an important 
explanation for the trade slowdown. They argue that the large trade-to-GDP elasticities 
in the 1990s were due to the increasing fragmentation of production driven primarily by 
the US and China. Since the mid-2000s, the importance of foreign inputs for production 
in China (particularly of US origin) has levelled off, suggesting that the growth of 
international fragmentation of production lines is stalling. While this is a structural 
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factor, the ratio of trade to GDP could still increase if GVC patterns evolve in other 
regions in the world. Ferrantino and Taglioni (2014) approximate GVC trade essentially 
by ‘imported intermediate goods’. They show that a fall in GVC trade may have driven 
the Great Trade Collapse; GVC trade has decreased more than total trade has. However, 
in the last few years the share of GVC in gross world trade has returned to the levels that 
prevailed befored the Great Trade Collapse. Boz et al. (2014) conclude that GVC trade 
cannot be an important driver of the recent slowdown in trade and that regional demand 
factors explain at least half of the slowdown. This is cautiously supported by a paper 
from the European Commission (2015). All papers suggest that increased protectionism 
could also have contributed (albeit marginally) to the slowdown, but because of the 
intrinsic difficulties of measuring protectionism and the lack of recent data, to date no 
paper has been able to draw definitive conclusions on its role. 
Gross and value-added trade
Remarkably, all papers address the slowdown in global trade using the traditional 
statistical data on trade. The literature on trade in value added shows that traditional 
gross trade statistics can present a misleading picture of international trade relations, in 
particular for countries that are highly integrated in global supply chains (Johnson and 
Noguera 2012, Koopman et al. 2014, Lejour et al. 2014). The internationalisation of 
the supply chain into global value chains has led to complex, integrated trade networks, 
which do not show up in traditional trade statistics. The value added composition of 
final exports no longer reflects domestic value added. An important share of value 
added comes from third countries via intermediate inputs. Thus, traditional gross trade 
statistics usually overstate real trade flows and are less suitable to analyse GVC trade. 
When intermediate inputs cross borders more than once (and sometimes they do so 
several times), there is a double-counting issue. Value added previously embedded in 
the intermediate input is counted every time there is a cross-border movement. Francois 
et al. (2013), using GTAP data, show that this type of trade overstatement is larger for 
manufacturing than for commercial services. 
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Global trade slowdown since 2008?
For an up-to-date snapshot of relative trade growth, we use the ratio of the export 
volume over the industrial production volume. Trade intensity measured in this way is a 
gross trade indicator, but it has the advantage that we can use monthly data from CPB’s 
WTM database, which is available up to the first quarter of 2015.2 Figure 1 depicts this 
indicator for the world total and four regions. 
Figure 1 Trade intensity: Merchandise export volume over volume of industrial 
production, 1995-2015QI , by region, monthly indices (2005=100)
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All regions experienced a set-back in their trade intensity ratio in 2008-2009, but 
by 2011 the world average had regained its 2008 level and has stabilised since then. 
This implies that world trade intensity has stagnated in recent years. In emerging 
2 Industrial production volume is weighted, seasonally and working-day adjusted, with reference 2005=100; it does 
not include construction activities. World export volumes are seasonally adjusted, also with reference 2005=100 (cf. 
documentation for the CPB World Trade Monitor (CPB 2015)). The relative trade ratio does not account for services 
trade and it does not inform about changes in the composition of merchandise trade.
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countries, trade intensity has structurally dropped by around 5%, but here again we 
see a stabilisation since 2012. The three other large trade blocs experienced increasing 
trade intensity after 2008. The Eurozone had a small dip in trade intensity, but during 
the last five years its trade intensity consistently rose to a level that is now about 9% 
higher than in 2010.3 The US experienced a 20% fall in trade intensity after the third 
quarter of 2008, but a very quick recovery and further growth up to 2012. Since then, 
the US trade intensity has has been falling mildly.
For a more comprehensive picture, we analyse the trade intensity relative to the gross 
domestic product. We calculate the trade intensity in terms of gross trade and in terms 
of value added trade, using WIOD data.4 These data also include services, which has a 
significantly lower elasticity to trade than manufacturing (Ariu 2014). Since 2008, the 
ratio of world exports growth to global GDP growth has declined compared to the levels 
that prevailed just before the Great Trade Collapse. For ease of comparison, the trade 
intensity indicator of Figure 1 is plotted in each of the four panels. It may approximate 
for the missing GVC indicators for the period 2012-2014.5 
For the world total, the two GDP-related indicators show that trade intensity in 2011 
had not yet returned to the pre-2008 levels. The slowdown is most pronounced and 
persistent for the emerging economies; this holds for all three trade-intensity indicators. 
Note also that in this region the decline had already started before 2008. Both for the 
Eurozone and for the US, the GDP-related indicators display a forceful recovery of 
trade intensity up to 2011. The WTM trade intensity indicator for the Eurozone suggests 
a further growth in the later years, while for the US a stabilisation occurs. 
3 The small 2008-2009 dip in trade intensity is due to the fact that the large dip in exports went along with a similar dip in 
industrial production. This again relates to the open character of the EU economy. 
4 For comparability reasons we use the US dollar values from the original database.
5 Note that the WTM trade intensity indicator of Figure 1 compares merchandise exports with industrial production, which 
is much smaller than the GDP denominator in Figure 2, so that the WTM trade intensity has a higher value. In the panel 
for emerging economies, China has the largest weight. 
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Figure 2 Three indicators for trade intensity by region: Gross exports over GDP, 
value-added exports over GDP, and WTM trade intensity (merchandise 
exports volume over industrial production volume)
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The bars in the four panels of Figure 2 shows the import content of exports, an indicator 
of trade via global value chains. For the US, we only see a recovery of this indicator to 
its 2008 level, whereas in the Eurozone it has grown above this level. In the emerging 
economies and in the world total, the import content of trade appears to have dropped 
to 2005 levels. 
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A fall in long-term trade elasticities?
Using an error-correction model, Constantinescu et al. (2014) find that a fall in the 
long-term trade elasticity explains the global trade slowdown. We have investigated 
whether this holds when looking at value added trade. As a first measure we use a three-
year moving average of the annual elasticities.6 
Figure 3 shows that the gross and value added trade elasticities have the same time 
patterns, although as expected, the gross trade values are generally higher and more 
volatile.7 Global (TOT) elasticities did indeed decrease in the period 1995-2011, with 
a rebound in the final year. This trend, however, disguises very heterogenous regional 
trends. China has a bump-shape pattern. The US trade elasticity fell until 2002, after 
which a steep increase occurred. In Europe, the trends have been quite volatile around 
the 1997 and 2008 crises. 
Figure 4 compares three- and five-year averages for the long-term trade elasticities. 
How we calculate the long-term trade elasticity appears to matter for the Eurozone 
(EZ19) and the EU (EU27). With respect to the three-year averages we see that the 
European trade elasticity is declining, while using five-year averages we observe a 
slight increase in the trade elasticity in Europe. 
6 The annual trade elasticities display high volatility due to large swings during or after international crises (e.g. 1997 
and 2008-2010). Most papers therefore use multi-year averages to smooth the series, but the selection and length of the 
estimation period also affects the pattern.
7 In what follows we only present the value added values, but both measures show very similar patterns. 
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Figure 3 Annual trade elasticities with respect to GDP, three-year moving averages, 
value added trade (top panel) and gross trade (bottom panel), 1995-2011
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Notes: EZ19 are the Eurozone members and TOT is the world. Some values for the EZ and EU exceed the lower and higher 
boundaries in the graph. 
Source: Own calculations using the WIOD database.
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Figure 4 Elasticities of value-added exports with respect to GDP, three-year 
averages (top panel) and five-year averages (bottom panel)
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Source: Own calculations using the WIOD database.
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In general, we obtain similar results for the world (TOT) as those in the studies by 
Constantinescu et al. (2014) and the European Commission (2015). However, in our 
results the US trade elasticity is clearly increasing, while the EC study identifies a 
falling pattern.8 
Is the fall in world trade elasticity caused by a combination 
of regional changes?
Figure 5 shows that the shares in total value-added trade have been steadily decreasing 
for the Eurozone (EZ19), the EU (EU27) and the US, while they are increasing for 
China and the rest of the world (ROW). Since the latter two regions have lower trade 
elasticities (cf. Figure 4), the composition changes in world trade may have a negative 
impact on world trade elasticities. 
Figure 5 Regional shares of total world value-added trade 
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Source: Own calculations using the WIOD database.
8 The difference cannot be explained by the fact that the European Commission (2015) study uses WEO data for PPP-
adjusted GDP. Our results were confirmed when we used the same WEO data or the World Trade Monitor data.
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Is the trade slowdown structural or cyclical?
Constantinescu et al. (2014, p. 25) argue that the decreasing long-term trade elasticity 
is due to structural rather than cyclical factors. However, we find evidence that cyclical 
changes in the composition of final demand are responsible for at least a substantial 
part of the trade slowdown. This has to do with the varying composition of GDP 
over the business cycle – in the downswing the share of consumption is higher than 
in the upswing. This has consequences for international trade because –as shown in 
Figure 6 – consumption generates considerably less final and intermediate imports than 
investment.9
Figure 6 Share of final and intermediary imports in domestic investment and in 
domestic consumption , world average,  1995-2011 
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9 Per unit, domestic investments require more trade than domestic consumption. Imports for domestic investment tend to 
be more in the form of final imports (such as ships, trains, machines and airplanes). Note that these lumpy final imports 
in their turn are product bundles based on often complex global value chains before they reach their final destination. 
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Figure 7 Imports for domestic consumption (top panel) and imports for domestic 
investments (bottom panel), 1995-2011
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Source: Own calculations using WIOD database. 
Using WIOD data on trade in value-added, we have also calculated these indicators for 
three major trade regions over the period 1995-2011. The results are depicted in Figure 
7. In all three trade areas, the cumulative import requirements per unit of domestic 
investment are consistently larger than those for consumption.10 Figure 8 further shows 
that the ratio of domestic investment over GDP indeed went down during the last 
10 Figure 7 shows that the import requirements per unit of domestic investment in East Asia almost doubled during the 
observation period (1995-2011).
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crisis in all regions, starting with the NAFTA region in 2006, the EU in 2008 and East 
Asia in 2011. All other things being equal, the falling investment shares during the 
recession years after 2008 must in itself be responsible for a substantial part of the trade 
slowdown.11 
Figure 8 Ratio of domestic investment over GDP, 1995-2011
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Source: Own calculations using WIOD database. 
So, contrary to Constantinescu et al. (2014) but in line with Boz et al. (2014), we 
conclude that the trade slowdown is at least partly of a cyclical nature. Once the 
investment share in GDP increases again, the trade elasticity will presumably go up as 
well.12
The cyclical analysis requires that we also consider the import contents of domestic 
exports. The globalisation process of the past 15 years has led to falling domestic value-
added shares in both intermediate exports and final output exports. This has occurred in 
11 This conclusion assumes that nothing happens with other domestic final demand categories (i.e. government demand and 
exports). We deal with the trade intensity of exports later on.
12 As a sideline we note that Figure 6 shows that the share of intermediate imports per unit of domestic consumption 
has risen more over the past 15 years than for domestic investment. This would imply that the cyclical impact of GDP 
composition on trade elasticities has become smaller over time.
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all regions, as Figure 9 shows. The Great Trade Collapse of 2008-2009 was a hiccup in 
the secular trend towards more foreign content in exports. However, the figure shows 
that at least in Europe and East Asia, the trend towards falling domestic contents is 
continuing. The steepness of the curves suggest that it is only a matter of time before 
new heights in foreign value-added shares could be reached. This would be a sign of 
further developments in GVC trade.
Figure 9 Domestic value-added share of intermediate exports (left) and domestic 
value-added share in final output exports (right), by region, 1995-2011
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From the value added trade data, we can conclude that vertical specialisation has largely 
recovered from the Great Recession, particularly in Europe. For the NAFTA region, 
for final exports in East Asia and for the rest of the world, restoration of the previous 
trend seems to be more hesitant. Future data will reveal whether the slowdown of the 
global vertical specialisation process in these regions is structural rather than cyclical. 
The more recent data (Figure 1) hint towards a cyclical interpretation, at least for the 
NAFTA region. 
Conclusions
We have focused on three claims in the recent literature on structural changes in world 
trade patterns.
• We conclude that world trade elasticity has fallen due to a combination of regional 
and cyclical changes during the Global Crisis. One cyclical factor is the lower 
cumulative trade intensity of consumer goods compared to investment goods.
• Using value added trade data, we find no evidence for a structural trade slowdown. 
In contrast, foreign value added shares in final exports in Europe and East Asia are 
trending towards new peaks.
• The regional changes are caused by an increase of the total import share for regions 
with a low trade elasticity and decreased import elasticities in some regions. 
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9 On the gravity of world trade’s 
slowdown
Matthieu Crozet, Charlotte Emlinger, Sébastien Jean
University Paris Sud and CEPII; CEPII; CEPII
As time elapses, it is becoming increasingly clear that the trend in world trade growth is 
below what it used to be before the 2008-2009 Global Crisis. The shaky trade outcomes 
resulting from the Crisis, with a deep fall in 2009 and a subsequent rebound, do not 
make it easy to characterise any underlying structural trend. Still, yearly rates of growth 
in volume in the order of magnitude of 2% to 3%, as consistently observed for world 
trade since 2012, are in stark contrast to the 7.7% average growth registered over the 
period 2002-2007. Even the recent slow pace of GDP growth falls short of explaining 
this trend. While the volume of world trade frequently grew twice as fast as world GDP 
before the Crisis, its growth has been comparable, and often lower, in the recent period. 
Macroeconomic approaches have been favoured so far in analysing these recent trends, 
which seems logical given the questions surrounding the cyclical nature of observed 
outcomes. Yet, trade flows are set at the product level, between pairs of countries. 
Accordingly, a disaggregated analysis may be helpful to better understand the extent to 
which these outcomes are in line with structural determinants, whether specific patterns 
emerged across partners and sectors, and whether significant composition effects were 
at play.
Since the development of global value chains (GVCs) was a defining feature of the 
rapid development of world trade before the Crisis, it is also natural to wonder whether 
this phenomenon may be part of the explanation, as already hinted at by Ferrantino 
and Taglioni (2014) and Constantinescu et al. (2014). Both analyses show that the rise 
The Global Trade Slowdown: A New Normal?
180
of GVCs, which had driven the growth of world trade during the 1990s and the 2000s, 
has stopped playing this role since the 2008-2009 Crisis. However, such country-level 
trade analyses may be blurred by composition effects, especially in a period when 
countries’ export capacities and import demands have experienced contrasting changes. 
In what follows, we focus instead on bilateral trade flows at the sector level. A gravity 
equation is used to provide a benchmark for bilateral trade relationships and their 
sector-level behaviour in response to specific shocks. Deviations from this benchmark 
are then used to interpret the recent slowdown, including the possible role played by 
GVC participation. Before putting this methodology into practice, we first glance at 
empirical evidence on the recent trade slowdown, in relation to GVC participation.
1 Bilateral trade and participation in GVCs: A first glance
Increasingly, products are transformed in one country before being exported to 
another where they undergo another transformation, often followed by another export 
and transformation stage. The corresponding development of GVCs transformed 
international trade over the last quarter of a century. For exports of a given country in 
a specific sector, GVC participation can be reflected either through the use of foreign 
inputs in its exports (backward participation) or the use of its exports as imported inputs 
incorporated in another country’s exports (forward participation). Following inter alia 
Koopman et al. (2014), the OECD has built an index measuring GVC participation 
along these two dimensions (Backer and Miroudot 2013). In view of putting trade 
outcomes into perspective, we used this index’s values from 2008, the last year before 
the Crisis seriously disrupted trade flows, to classify bilateral trade flows at the sector 
level into three categories. GVC participation is considered ‘high’ if both the exporter 
and the importer exhibit a GVC participation index in this sector above the world 
median,1 as ‘intermediate’ if only one of them is above the median, and ‘low’ otherwise. 
1 The world median is computed based on all country-sector participation index values, for all sectors. 
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Computing trade growth separately for these three categories gives striking results – in 
almost all cases until 2008, trade growth turned out to be larger for flows with high 
or intermediate GVC participation than for those with low participation (Figure 1). 
However, the reverse is observed for the last two available years (2012 and 2013).
Figure 1 Trade growth by level of GVC participation
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on BACI (CEPII) and OECD dataset on GVCs (Backer and Miroudot 2013).
Suggestive as this is, these stylised facts may also reflect a composition effect if unrelated 
sector- or country-specific trends happen to be correlated with GVC participation. To 
shed further light on the relationship between GVC participation and trade growth, we 
thus estimate a very general gravity equation of the form: 
ΔlnXijkt = Θijt + ψkt + λ1intermGVCijk + λ2highGVCijk + uijkt (1)
where Xijkt refers to exports in value from country i to country j of product k during 
year t; Θijt represents a set of yearly country-pair fixed effects taking into account any 
change in country i’s supply capacity, in country j’s demand, or in bilateral trade costs 
between these two countries; ψkt refers to a set of year-sector fixed effects accounting 
for sector-specific shocks, for instance of a technological nature; and uijkt is an error 
term. The influence of GVC participation is assessed using the above-described 
characterisation, based on the OECD index. In practice, a dummy variable is used to 
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denote intermediate GVC participation (as opposed to low participation, the default), 
and another for high GVC participation. As an alternative, the logarithm of the index 
of GVC participation for the corresponding trade flow is used as a cardinal variable 
(ln(GVCijk)).2 The estimation results, shown in Table 1, suggest that while GVCs used 
to boost significantly trade growth before the Crisis, this effect vanished after 2008. 
While this very general specification leaves many questions unanswered, these results 
are consistent with GVCs playing a role in the recent trade slowdown.
Table 1 Relationship between participation in GVCs and year-on-year growth of 
bilateral trade
Period: 1996-2008  Period: 2009-2011 Period: 2012-2013
Intermediate GVC  (dummy) 0.002             0.003             -0.002             
                (0.86)             (0.90)             (-0.52)             
High GVC  (dummy) 0.006***             -0.003             -0.001             
                (2.64)             (-0.61)             (-0.15)             
GVC participation index (ln)             0.003***             -0.001             0.002
                            (5.97)             (-1.12)             (1.30)
Constant        0.090*** 0.102*** 0.009*** 0.005 -0.011*** -0.007*
                (65.00) (62.24) (2.91) (1.61) (-3.09) (-1.83)
R-squared       0.20 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.15 0.15
N               169,013 167,999 39,003 38,769 26,002 25,846
Notes: ***: significance level = 1%; * : 10% level. T-Students in parenthesis (standard errors are clustered at the country 
pair-sector level). Estimations are carried out at the sector level, and weighted by the number of non-zero, product-level trade 
flows with each sector (on average over the estimation period). All regressions include sector-year and origin-destination-year 
fixed effects. The sample includes the 80 largest countries by trade value in 2008, with EU countries considered individually.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on BACI (CEPII) and OECD dataset on GVCs (Backer and Miroudot 2013).
2 A gravity-based analysis of trade growth
Achieving a better understanding of recent developments requires an analysis of trade 
determinants, for which a gravity equation is the most convenient way to proceed. The 
2  In practice, the product of each partner’s OECD GVC participation index in sector k is used to compute this bilateral, 
sector-specific index.
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traditional gravity equation can rest on a variety of structural models (for a review, see 
Head and Mayer 2014). Some versions include specific conclusions as to the trade-
to-income ratio at the world level. Anderson (2011), for instance, emphasises that in 
a simple framework where trade frictions are assumed away, “the world is more open 
the more similar in size and the more specialised the countries are”. However, more 
complex set-ups do not provide straightforward conclusions as to the level of, or the 
change in, the world’s openness ratio.3 While there is no reason to conclude that it 
should systematically increase with income level, nor can it be established that this 
ratio should be constant, for several reasons. One is that export supply factors may 
not be exactly proportional to output or GDP, for instance because of changes in the 
proportion of exporting firms, or because of the changing share of tradable products 
in total output.4 Another noteworthy reason is that import demand is not bound to be 
proportional to income either. 
Our objective here is not to identify the parameters of a given structural model, but 
rather to address practical questions about recent trade outcomes. Accordingly, we rely 
upon a rather general version of the gravity equation: 
lnXijkt = aijk + bklnSikt + cklnMjkt + dkZijkt + ekt + uijkt (2) 
where Xijkt refers, again, to exports in value from country i to country j of product k 
during year t, Sikt is an indicator of country i’s supply capacity in sector k, and Mjkt is an 
indicator of country j’s demand in sector k. Z refers to additional variables which may 
influence trade flows, such as the existence of a free trade agreement. a, b, c, d and e 
(with respective indices) are parameters to be estimated. This standard form assumes 
any determinant of trade specific to country-pair (i, j) in sector k to be constant over time. 
3 See, for instance, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) and Eaton et al. (2011) for analyses of the determinants of global trade 
growth based on bilateral data and gravity equations. 
4 As a matter of fact, the openness ratio differs significantly across countries, so that slower growth in the most open 
countries might also slow down world trade disproportionately. It might also be the case that a subset of bilateral trade 
flows accounted for a disproportionate share of the trade slowdown.
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Dealing with recent years implies severe data limitations when attempting to measure 
sector-wise supply and demand capacities, since even output or value added figures by 
sector are usually not available for a large set of countries before two to three years. We 
thus use economy-wide variables and measure supply capacity as manufacturing GDP, 
and demand through GDP. 
Importantly, this specification also includes year fixed effects, capturing any time-
varying factor influencing world trade uniformly – the ‘gravitational un-constant’, as 
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) put it. Little attention is often granted to these effects, 
beyond controlling them so as to avoid interfering with other terms in the equation. This 
is not enough in the present case, as changes in worldwide determinants of international 
trade may explain the recent slowdown. The exact nature of these year-specific effects 
depends upon the underlying structural model, and its determinants are not well 
known. They include slow-motion determinants, such as transaction costs and weighted 
averages of real income growth in world income, but also price levels, which evolve far 
more quickly, as well as, in most models, the value of world income. Given the limited 
number of degrees of freedom in the data used to identify the form of this ‘gravitational 
un-constant’, we rely upon a parsimonious modelling, where only the world GDP in 
value and its deflator5 are taken into account: 
ekt = a'k + b'k ln(p.t) + c'k ln(y.t) + vkt (3)
where vkt is an error term, and a', b' and c' are parameters to be estimated. These two 
equations jointly provide a framework to analyse trade determinants at the bilateral 
level, over time. However, a difficulty when relying on this framework to analyse recent 
developments is that the gravity equation is generally thought of as describing the 
5 For the sake of consistency, this deflator is expressed in current dollars, obtained with market exchange rates. We added 
to this specification a Herfindahl index of GDP concentration across the world, to echo the above-mentioned argument 
about the positive impact of the similarity of country sizes on the level of world trade. The argument was supported by 
our estimates, but it did not add much to the goodness of fit, while increasing the model’s degrees of freedom in a context 
where only a limited number of observations are available. For this reason, it is not shown in the results presented here. 
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structural determinants of trade, as opposed to its cyclical variability. In addition, time 
to ship as well as contractual relationships may impose additional delays on trade, so 
that changes in determinants may influence trade with a lag (e.g. Leibovici and Waugh 
2015). 
We therefore extend the estimation framework using an error-correction model (ECM) 
specification, based on equations (2) and (3). The corresponding estimating equations 
are: 
ΔlnXijkt = αijk + βkΔln Sikt + γklnMjkt (4) + δkln Sikt–1 + ξkMjkt–1 + ζkΔZijkt + χkZikt–1 + ηklnXijkt–1 + ϵkt + υijkt
ϵkt = α'k + β'k ln(p.t) + γ'k ln(y.t) + β'k ln(p.t–1) + γ'kln(y.t–1) + υ't (5)
with notations similar to those used before. With this model, the short-term elasticity 
of exports to supply capacity (i.e. to manufacturing GDP in this case) is βk and the 
long-term elasticity is –δk/ηk. Similarly, γk  and –ξk/ηk are the elasticities with regards 
to demand capacity (i.e. GDP). Short- and long-run elasticities of world trade to world 
GDP and to its deflator can also be calculated based on (5). Since it is a priori better 
suited to coping with the kind of short-term variations at stake here, we use this latter 
specification in what follows. 
To analyse the recent slowdown, we estimate this two-stage model over the period 
1996-2008. Eight sectors are considered, a classification guided by our willingness to 
use the above-mentioned OECD’s indicator of participation in GVCs. Sector-specific 
elasticities resulting from these estimates are shown by sector in Table 1.6 For most 
sectors and on average, the sum of estimated elasticities with respect to exporters’ 
and importers’ GDP is close to 1 in the short term, but well beyond this level in the 
long term (1.71 on average), meaning that GDP growth differentials across sectors 
and countries are reflected more than proportionately in trade flows. In addition, the 
6 More detailed results are available upon request.
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gravitational un-constant also varies with the world GDP value and with its deflator. 
Accordingly, the implied elasticity of world trade (in value) with respect to world GDP 
(in value) is conditional upon changes in the world GDP deflator. Over the estimation 
period, the world GDP deflator increased at a rate equal to 45% of the growth rate of 
world GDP in value.7 For the sake of illustration, let us assume that this proportion 
between the growth rates of world GDP value and the deflator holds, and let us consider 
the hypothetical case where the world economy grows in value in a uniform way (i.e. 
each country’s GDP and manufacturing GDP’s value grow at the same rate as world 
GDP). In such a case, the elasticity of trade with respect to GDP would be the sum 
of the elasticities with respect to exporters’ manufacturing GDP, to importers’ GDP 
and to world GDP, plus 45% of the elasticity with respect to the world GDP deflator. 
In the short term, this conditional trade-to-GDP elasticity is estimated to equal 1.48 
(0.31+0.78+1.01-0.45*1.38); in the long term, it is 1.72. 
Whether at the disaggregate level or at the worldwide level, these estimates show that, 
throughout the estimating period, the norm has not been for trade to grow in line with 
world GDP, but rather as a multiple of the GDP growth rate. This result is obtained 
controlling for the entry into force of new FTAs (estimated to increase trade by 3% in 
the short term and 22% in the long term). Different explanations may be put forward 
for this trend, such as declining transport and transaction costs, or pro-trade policies 
aimed at supporting exports but also frequently at easing imports, at a time when the 
potential benefits from participation in GVCs were increasingly obvious for a number 
of developing countries (Baldwin 2012). However, adding a linear time trend to the 
estimations above does not alter the results significantly, suggesting that this trade-
income nexus is more than a coincidence, even though disentangling the corresponding 
main channels and mechanisms is outside the scope of this chapter. 
7 The average world GDP yearly growth rate was 5.8%, compared with 2.6% for world GDP deflator. The ratio between 
these growth rates remained similar over the period 2008-2013, at 51%. 
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Table 2 Estimated pre-Crisis elasticities of trade
Elasticity wrt exporter's 
manuf. GDP
Elasticity wrt importer's 
GDP
Conditional, total trade-to-
GDP elasticity
Short term Long term Short term Long term Short term Long term
Food 0.24 0.45 0.66 0.76 0.01 1.49
Textile 0.23 0.60 0.72 0.69 1.15 0.67
Wood-Paper 0.20 0.78 0.77 0.94 2.02 1.33
Chemicals 0.31 0.77 0.46 0.56 0.49 1.79
Metals 0.19 0.83 0.78 0.89 2.95 2.41
Machinery 0.48 1.17 0.79 0.93 1.27 1.94
Transport 0.39 0.95 1.24 1.12 2.02 2.20
Electrical-
Optical
0.43 1.22 0.85 0.95 1.93 1.85
Average 0.31 0.85 0.78 0.86 1.48 1.72
Note: Two-stage estimates, based on (4) and (5), for the period 1996-2008. All variables are expressed in value. The sample 
includes the 80 largest countries by trade value in 2008. Estimations are carried out at the sector level (eight sectors, see 
Figure 4), and weighted by the number of non-zero, product-level trade flows with each sector (on average over the estimation 
period). The conditional, total elasticity is computed according to assumptions described in the text.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on BACI (CEPII), GeoDist (CEPII), WDI (World Bank) and OECD dataset on GVCs 
(Backer and Miroudot 2013).
3 Post-Crisis outcomes fall short of predictions based on 
the pre-Crisis trade model
Comparable elasticity estimations for the Crisis and post-Crisis periods would lack 
robustness, given the limited number of observations available. Instead, we use out-
of-sample predictions to analyse whether a structural break may have occurred. Based 
on observed changes in GDP and in its deflator (at the country and world level, and 
for manufacturing in the case of exporters), these predictions are carried out for the 
second-stage estimation of the yearly gravitational un-constant, and then to first-stage 
estimates, based on predicted yearly fixed effects. These predictions are made at the 
sector level, by country-pair (predicted and observed values of trade growth at the 
individual flow level exhibit a correlation coefficient of 56% before 2008, and 36% 
afterwards). To illustrate how this model fits with trade outcomes observed after 2008, 
predictions and observations were then aggregated. 
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At the world level, our model predicts an average yearly growth of trade in value of 
8.1% over the period 2012-2013. This is significantly less than the model’s average 
yearly prediction for 2002-2008 (10.6%), but slightly more than for the period 1996-
2008 (6.7%). The dollar value of world trade actually stagnated in 2012-2013, in 
stark contrast to its average actual yearly growth over 2002-2008 (11.5%), and even 
between 1996 and 2008 (8.5%). Accordingly, the slowdown in world trade is far from 
being explained by its determinants. According to our pre-Crisis model, slower growth 
explains a decline of 2.5 points in the yearly growth rate in value compared to the 
immediate pre-Crisis period, when the total decline amounted to 11.5 points. 
Disaggregation by country shows that observed trade growth fell short of what the 
model predicted in most countries. This is the case for 18 of the 20 largest countries 
(counting the Eurozone as one), Mexico and India being the only exceptions. The six 
largest trading countries all exhibit a negative prediction-to-realisation gap (Figure 2). 
The most striking feature is probably the very large gap observed for China – growth 
was as much as 15 percentage points lower than predicted by our model, while the 
opposite held for the country in the early 2000s, with observed trade growth then 
substantially outperforming model predictions. This result presumably reflects the 
ongoing rebalancing of the Chinese economy towards domestic consumption, and 
more generally the ongoing structural change of Chinese foreign trade, in which normal 
exports by Chinese companies are now the most dynamic component, while processing 
trade by foreign companies is significantly slowing down (e.g. Lemoine et al. 2015). 
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Figure 2 Observed and predicted yearly growth rates of trade in value, by country
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Note: The solid lighter line represents the observed yearly growth rate of trade in value (computed as the mean between 
import and export growth rates). The darker dashed line represents the predicted growth rate, according to our model. The 
vertical line materialises the year 2008, the last used in the estimation sample. The first six countries are shown (taking the 
Eurozone as a single country), ranked by decreasing importance in world trade in value in 2013. Annual growth rates are 
computed as log-differences in value.
The prediction-to-realisation gaps also differ significantly across sectors, with the poor 
trade growth for metals, machinery and electrical and optical equipments standing out 
compared to the model’s predictions (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3 Observed and predicted yearly growth rates of trade in value, by sector
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Note: See Figure 2.
In order to analyse the potential relationship with GVCs, we then aggregate the figures 
separately for three categories of trade flows, defined by level of participation in GVCs 
according to the above-described typology. For years 2012 and 2013, our main subject 
of interest here, the gap between predicted and observed trade growth differs strikingly 
across these three categories (Figure 4). While the model does a pretty good job of 
predicting trade values for flows with low participation in GVCs, it strongly over-
predicts trade growth when participation in GVCs is intermediate or high, by 5.5% 
and 9.7% on average over these two years, respectively. Put differently, observed trade 
growth in 2012 and 2013 appears to be in line with its structural determinants for 
flows with low GVC participation, but it was consistently lower than might have been 
expected in other cases, especially when GVC participation was high. This result is all 
the more striking given that flows with intermediate or high GVC participation tended 
to exhibit higher-than-predicted trade growth before the Crisis, especially between 
2002 and 2007, while the opposite was true for trade flows with low GVC participation. 
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Figure 4 Observed and predicted yearly growth rates of world trade in value, by 
level of GVC participation 
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Note: see Figure 3.
 
To assess whether these differences are significant, we carry out econometric estimations 
of the determinants of this gap between predicted and observed trade growth, at the 
individual country pair-sector level. The results show that GVC participation indeed led 
to lower observed trade growth compared to what could be expected based on the above-
estimated model (Table 3). For 2012-2013, the yearly gap was estimated to be -5.6% 
for intermediate GVC participation and -9.9% for high GVC participation (column 
2). This contrasts with the years from 1996 to 2008, when low GVC participation was 
associated with below-predicted trade growth and no significant deviation was found 
for intermediate or high GVC participation. Using a cardinal index instead of dummies 
to characterise GVC participation (columns 4 and 7) confirms this correlation, since 
higher GVC participation is associated with more negative gaps.
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Protectionist measures might also contribute to this slowdown. While no detailed, 
consistent evaluation of the potential trade-restrictiveness impact of such measures is 
available, Evenett (2014) tracks their use since the Crisis period. Dummies signalling 
the existence of at least one such new measure are thus included in all our estimates, 
without resulting in any significant correlation after the Crisis.8 While this cannot be 
considered as a proof of the innocuousness of these measures, no hint is found of their 
impact being significant.
Country-specific developments might have played a significant role in these outcomes. 
Two such developments stand out – the above-mentioned rebalancing of the Chinese 
economy, and the Eurozone Crisis. Accordingly, a robustness check is carried out using 
dummies to control for potentially specific trends for imports or exports of each of 
these areas (columns 3 and 5). The conclusions about the correlation between the trade 
slowdown and GVC participation are not substantially altered.9 
8 The positive correlation found before the Crisis may be interpreted as a signed of endogeneity, protectionist measures 
being more abundant in sectors where imports were previously most dynamic.
9 Finding a positive effect for Eurozone exports might come as a surprise. What that means is not that Eurozone exports 
grew more rapidly than others exports did, but only that they decelerated less than might have been expected based on 
the poor GDP growth record of Eurozone countries. Symmetric remarks hold for China where, despite its dynamism 
compared to other countries, trade growth did not match what could have been expected based on the country’s growth.
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4 Concluding remarks
Using a gravity model allows casual observations about the recent trade slowdown 
to be put into perspective, with a benchmark analysis of its structural determinants. 
Our analysis shows that trade growth since 2012 indeed fell short of what a pre-Crisis 
structural model of trade growth would have predicted. Lower GDP growth compared 
to the pre-Crisis period thus explains part, but not all, of the recent trade slowdown. 
Further examination shows that this structural change is not evenly shared. Compared 
to what might have been expected based on GDP growth rates, the slowdown was 
especially severe for Chinese imports, and worldwide in metal products, machinery 
and electrical and optical equipments. More generally, the slowdown proved more 
pronounced for trade flows where participation in GVCs was more widespread. 
Beyond the rebalancing and structural change of the Chinese economy, the recent trade 
slowdown thus seems to reflect an inflexion in the development of GVCs. While the 
underlying determinants remain to be identified, a few elements of interpretation can 
be put forward. First, financial stress may have increased the uncertainty associated 
with foreign trade relationships, for example through more difficult access to trade 
finance or through decreased confidence in the financial health of trading partners. 
Second, the Crisis period, as well as specific events such as the Japanese earthquake 
and the Thai flooding in 2011, may have led a number of firms to reconsider the cost 
of finely splitting their value chains across countries. In addition, it is likely that the 
development of GVCs has been facing declining returns, as the low-hanging fruit had 
already been picked before the Crisis. Although we could not find any significant hint 
of their influence based on available measures, protectionist policies may also be part 
of the explanation, to the extent that processing trade is likely to be disproportionately 
sensitive to transaction costs. 
The recent slowdown may therefore mark the end of an era where the spread of GVCs 
significantly boosted world trade. GVCs are now widespread, meaning that less scope 
exists for their future development. The slowdown also underlines the sensitivity of 
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world trade and of associated efficiency gains to transaction costs and to uncertainty, 
which calls for renewed attention to the need to make trade rules and trading conditions 
as transparent and fair as possible. 
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10 The relationship between trade 
and economic growth and a 
slowdown of exports in Korea
Taeho Bark
Seoul National University
1 Introduction
The world economy, which has been in recession since the 2008 Global Crisis, is 
showing signs of a slight recovery, with a recent strengthening of the US economy. 
However, world trade, which in the past grew faster than world output, still remains 
stagnant. In particular, the contribution of world trade to the world output growth has 
been declining since 2010. Some trade economists are cautiously arguing that the 
relationship between world trade and world output growth is changing. 
Various studies are in progress to analyse this lag in world trade (e.g. Constantinescu et 
al. 2015). There seem to be two major factors that are attributed to the recent stagnation 
in the world trade growth. First, there is a rather general understanding that the trade 
slowdown is a cyclical phenomenon. Such an extended recession in the world economy 
is naturally causing contracted trade flows. Second, a structural argument considers 
the role of major trading nations such as China in world trade. China, the world’s 
largest trading nation, is now trying to focus more on its domestic market than on 
processing trade. In addition, Chinese enterprises are trying to produce intermediate 
goods (materials, parts and components) domestically instead of importing them. The 
negative impacts of the changes taking place in China on its imports from trading 
partners seem to be contributing at least in part to the recent slow growth of world 
The Global Trade Slowdown: A New Normal?
200
trade. It would be difficult to clearly distinguish the effects of these two factors. Rather, 
the slowdown in the growth of world trade is likely to be the result of the combined 
influences of both factors. 
This chapter investigates the recent developments in the relationship between trade and 
economic growth and the export performance of Korea. As Korea’s economic growth 
has been highly dependent on exports for the last half century, the chapter examines 
whether there have been changes in the contribution of exports to Korea’s economic 
growth. It also analyses the recent slowdown of Korea’s exports, separating the causes 
into cyclical and structural factors.
2 Evolution of the relationship between exports and 
economic growth in Korea
As shown in Figure 1, exports drove Korea’s economic growth in the 1990s and until 
the beginning of 2010s. As one can infer from the fact that the growth of exports fell 
more than economic growth did in 2001 and 2009, Korea has definitely been depending 
on exports for its economic growth. However, something different can be observed 
since 2012. Exports have been shrinking, or growing at a very low rate, even as the 
economy has continued to grow at modest rate. This clearly suggests that exports are 
no longer driving economic growth in Korea. 
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Figure 1 Annual growth rates of exports and the GDP of Korea, 1990-2014
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Figure 2 illustrates how the contribution of exports to economic growth in Korea has 
declined rapidly since 2012. The same phenomenon is observed in the world economy. 
The decreasing income elasticity of world trade could also be interpreted as a similar 
phenomenon (Constantinescu et al. 2015). What, then, could be the reason for the recent 
decline in the contribution of exports to economic growth in Korea? The fundamental 
reason for the slowdown in Korea’s export growth is the reduced demand for imports 
from Korea’s major trading partners, most of which are still facing difficulties in making 
a full economic recovery from the Global Crisis.
Figure 2 Contribution of exports to GDP growth in Korea, 1990-2014
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Source: Bank of Korea.
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3 Slowdown of Korea’s exports
Figure 3 shows that Korea’s average annual growth rate of exports of 5.3% since 
2010 is a significant decline compared to rates of 11.9% in the 2000s and 9.2% in the 
1990s. In addition, there are some differences in Korea’s export performance across 
its major export markets. Figures 4A and 4B show that Korean exports to the US and 
the EU have increased since 2012, while its exports to Japan and China stagnated 
during the same period. The performance of Korea’s exports to the US and the EU 
seems to rely on business fluctuations in the respective economies. In particular, 
Korea’s exports to the US have accelerated since the US economy began to recover 
and the KORUS FTA has been implemented faithfully (since March 2012). 
In contrast, the growth of Korea’s exports to China has slowed noticeably since 2011, 
and the export volume actually decreased in 2014.1 Similarly, Korea’s exports to Japan 
have declined drastically since 2012.2
Figure 3 Average annual export growth rates in Korea, 1990-2014
9.2% 
11.9% 
5.3% 
1990-1999 2000-2008 2010-2014 
Source: Author’s calculations using Bank of Korea data.
1 The recent slowdown of Korea’s exports to China can be attributed to various factors, including slow growth of the 
Chinese economy, industrial restructuring in China and the increased focus on the domestic market by the Chinese 
government (IIT 2014a).
2 The decrease in Korea’s exports to Japan since 2012 may be the result of a combination of factors such as a weak yen and 
increased intra-firm trade between parent companies in Japan and their overseas subsidiaries established through FDIs 
(IIT 2014d). 
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Figure 4a Annual growth rates of Korea’s exports to the US and the EU, 2000-2014
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Source: KITA.
Figure 4b Annual growth rates of Korea’s exports to China and Japan, 2000-2014
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The Institute for International Trade (IIT)3 has found signs of a decoupling of China’s 
exports to the world and Korea’s exports to China in 2014 (IIT 2014c). Until recently, 
China’s exports to the world were positively correlated with its imports from Korea. 
China used to import large volumes of intermediate goods from Korea, which were 
then processed to manufacture final products for its exports. These intermediate goods 
3 The Institute for International Trade (IIT) is the internal research unit of the KITA, Korea.
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included petrochemical as well as petroleum products, display, machinery and plastic 
products, and computer parts. 
Looking at 2014, however, the statistics show that while China’s exports to the world 
are increasing, Korea’s exports of these major intermediate goods to China have 
decreased. This phenomenon can be seen mainly as a result of China’s recent industrial 
restructuring – China’s industrial upgrading may be causing import substitution of 
intermediate goods, which is leading to a decrease in Korea’s exports of these goods to 
China. Recently, even Korean firms operating in China have been reducing their imports 
of Korean intermediate goods, and are probably substituting imports from Korea with 
goods produced in China (ITT 2014c). This may be another reason why the increase in 
China’s overall exports is not increasing China’s imports from Korea. 
IIT also argues that a structural change in Korea’s exports to Japan is taking place (ITT 
2014d). It is well known that Japanese firms are increasingly investing in China and 
the ASEAN region, especially after the Fukushima accident in 2011. These overseas 
subsidiaries of Japanese firms are producing intermediate goods (advanced materials, 
parts and components) locally and sending them back to Japan. This is causing a 
decrease in Korea’s exports of intermediate goods to Japan. IIT’s analysis has revealed 
that this phenomenon is more conspicuous in transportation machineries, electrical and 
electronic products, machineries, steel and metals, and foodstuffs (ITT 2014d). Figure 
5 shows that Korea’s share in Japan’s imports of manufactured goods has declined since 
2012, while the share of imports from the ASEAN region is increasing.
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Figure 5 Shares of major trading partners in Japan’s imports of manufactured 
goods, 2000-2014
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Source: Author’s calculations using UN Comtrade data.
4 Conclusion
The role of trade in the Korean economy seems to have changed in recent years, and 
several features of this can be identified. First, the contribution of exports to economic 
growth has been constantly decreasing and exports have not been the driving force 
behind economic growth since 2012. Also, the growth rate of exports is on a declining 
trend and there are certain regions where Korean exports are stagnating or even 
decreasing. The performance of Korea’s exports to major trading partners shows that 
there is a strong cyclical effect for the US and EU markets. 
However, with regards to the performance of its exports to China and Japan, structural 
effects seem to dominate. The domestic production of intermediate goods by Chinese 
companies is causing Korea’s exports to China to fall. At the same time, Japanese 
manufacturing firms are producing intermediate goods locally in their overseas 
subsidiaries established through foreign direct investment in China and the ASEAN 
The Global Trade Slowdown: A New Normal?
206
region. Japanese imports from the country’s overseas subsidiaries are causing a decrease 
in Korea’s exports of intermediate goods to Japan. 
With the expansion of global value chains (GVCs), world trade growth has been 
strengthened. However, recent structural changes in large trading countries such as 
China and Japan seem to be weakening this effect and consequently slowing down 
the growth of world trade. It is still difficult to generalise from this new phenomenon, 
which has been observed over only a rather short period. Whether this trend continues 
in the future should be closely monitored.
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1 Introduction
In the 1990s, the volume of world trade grew twice as fast as world GDP. Many 
economists asserted that the reason for this lay in the cross-border dispersion of 
component production and the worldwide development of value chains, which changed 
the structure of trade and dramatically increased the volume (Jones and Kierzkowski 
2001). However, this disparity in growth rates did not last long; between 2009 and 2012 
the growth rate of world trade declined to only 2.3%, which was a full 1% below the 
GDP growth rate. It should be noted, though, that after the 1990s there were dramatic 
cross-country variations in trade growth rates. Furthermore, the global evolution of 
value chains (which are thought to have increased trade) may also have varied widely 
by region. During this time, Japanese firms fragmented their production processes by 
working with other East Asian countries, particularly China. This expansion of global 
value chains (GVC) prompted a substitution of foreign goods for exports as well as a 
substitution of offshore outsourcing for domestic procurements, which greatly impacted 
Japan’s trade. This study endeavours to compare Japan’s trade dynamics with those of 
the rest of the world and to show how they are being affected by the rapid change in 
firms’ export and import strategies.
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2 Changes in Japan’s Trade: Estimation with an ECM
Escaith et al. (2010) and Constantinescu et al. (2014) explored the relationship between 
income and trade volume with error correction models (ECMs), the estimation of which 
revealed both the short- and long-term elasticities between the variables as well as the 
error term’s speed of adjustment. The ECM estimated by Constantinescu et al. (2014) 
shows that the long-term elasticity of world trade to GDP fell from over 2 in the 1990s 
to less than 1 after the Global Crisis in 2008, implying that world trade declined in the 
2000s.
Countries’ trade elasticities may vary, however, if they reflect the different degrees of 
production fragmentation within those nations. In the Japanese manufacturing industry 
in particular, numerous firms have moved their production plants to other Asian 
countries (mostly ASEAN countries and China). The fragmentation of Japanese firms’ 
manufacturing has changed the nation’s trade structure: (i) intermediate goods were 
exported to countries in which Japanese firms processed and assembled final goods; 
and (ii) the export of final goods made in Japan was partly replaced by goods made in 
other Asian countries. Due to this structural change, the relationship between trade and 
income in Japan may not be the same as in the rest of the world.
Using the method set forth by Constantinescu et al. (2014), we empirically examine 
the relationship between trade and income in Japan by estimating their elasticity. The 
equation we use to do this can be written as follows:
Δlnxt = α + βΔlnyt + γlnxt–1 + δlnyt–1 + εt ,
where xt denotes either exports or imports and yt denotes either world GDP 
(excluding Japan) or Japan’s GDP. β and -γ are the short-term elasticity of 
trade to GDP and the speed of adjustment, respectively. δ/γ represents the 
long-term elasticity of trade to GDP. 
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In order to compare Japan with the rest of the world, we estimate the equation twice and 
thereby obtain both the global trade elasticity and Japan’s export and import elasticities. 
Furthermore, we also divide our observation period into two sub-periods – 1988-2000 
and 2001-2010 – in order to examine the historical changes in elasticities. The annual 
trade data are from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry’s (RIETI) 
Trade Industry Database (RIETI-TID)1 and the GDP data are from the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook Database. Due to limitations in the data, we use nominal figures.2 
It should also be noted that we exclude primary goods, such as crude oil, from the 
estimation.
Table 1 presents the estimated short- and long-term export and import elasticities of 
world trade. It reveals that in both periods, the long-term elasticity exceeded 1 for 
both exports and imports, and that in the second period, both elasticities (1.141 for 
exports and 1.147 for imports) fell below their level of the first period (1.999 and 
2.272, respectively). The results of our estimation, which are based on trade values and 
nominal GDP, are similar to those of Constantinescu et al. (2014), which are based on 
trade volume and real income. 
Table 2 shows the estimated short- and long-term elasticities of Japanese exports 
(column 1) and imports (column 2). We find that the long-term export elasticity was 
0.896 in the first period and 0.735 in the second period, indicating a decline. Japan’s 
long-term import elasticity, on the other hand, was consistently greater than 1 and 
showed an increasing trend, growing from 1.200 in the first period to 1.833 in the 
second. 
1 RIETI-TID covers all traded commodities and classifies the trade data according to each production stage (http://www.
rieti.go.jp/en/projects/rieti-tid/index.html). 
2 Constantinescu et al. (2014) estimated their ECM using quarterly data, but the IMF does not report such figures, and as 
a result, we were forced to use annual data. 
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Our estimation results reveal a sharp contrast between Japan’s trade elasticities and 
those of the rest of the world – not only is the elasticity of Japan’s exports lower than 
that of the world, but its import elasticity is higher, even rising in the second period. 
This strongly suggests that Japan’s trade structure has changed drastically after the 
2000s. 
3 Globalisation of Japanese firms and change in Japan’s 
trade structure
3.1 Exports versus overseas production
It is widely accepted that firms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity and that 
only the most productive export.3 It has also been theoretically and empirically 
demonstrated that firms with higher productivity are inclined to produce their goods in 
foreign nations rather than exporting them (Helpman et al. 2004). Furthermore, many 
empirical studies have confirmed that more productive Japanese firms have made this 
very transition by developing their production plants in foreign countries (Wakasugi et 
al. 2014). Consequently, this recent globalisation of Japanese firms may have lowered 
the country’s export elasticity. 
Figure 1 shows the ratio of sales by foreign subsidiaries to exports among Japanese 
manufacturing firms in 2003 and 2012. The figures were calculated using data from 
the Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities by the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI).4 During this period, Japanese firms continuously developed their 
foreign production by replacing their exports, thereby raising the aforementioned ratio 
by 8%. However, special attention should be paid to the interregional variations in these 
ratios; on one hand, the ratio of sales by overseas subsidiaries in China (excluding Hong 
3 See Melitz (2003) for a theoretical analysis and Bernard and Jensen (2004) for an empirical examination. 
4 The Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities is a comprehensive survey of Japanese manufacturing firms’ foreign 
business activities. The survey includes data on the exports and foreign sales of firms that manufacture their goods 
overseas.
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Kong) and ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) to 
exports grew rapidly, but on the other hand, the shift from overseas production in the 
US and Europe cannot be observed.     
Figure 1 Ratio of Japanese firms’ foreign subsidiaries’ sales to exports
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from METI’s Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities.
The difference in the ratio of foreign sales to exports among OECD and Asian countries 
reflects not only their economic growth but also a rapid expansion in Asian countries’ 
production capacities. Asian countries grew both economically and as an export platform 
for developed countries. The Japanese manufacturing sector’s shift from exporting to 
overseas production in Asia (especially in China), which intensified the triangular trade 
between Japan, other Asian countries and the West, is thought to have contributed to 
Japan’s comparatively low export elasticity. 
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3.2 Offshore outsourcing and imports
In the 2000s, Japanese firms rapidly developed their supply chains to Asian countries 
and outsourced parts of their production processes.5 Table 3 shows the ratio of Japanese 
firms’ foreign to domestic procurements, which is calculated with data from METI’s 
Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. In order to find the quantity 
of intermediate goods purchased by Japanese firms, we divided the sources by the 
domestic and overseas suppliers. We find that since 1997, the firms have increased 
their purchases of foreign intermediate goods while decreasing their domestic 
purchases, resulting in a structural change in imports.6 The ratio of domestic to overseas 
procurements (reported in column 1 of Table 3) increased, and in particular, the share of 
intermediates from Asia rose dramatically from 48% to 59% (column 2). These figures 
suggest that the procurement of intermediate goods from Asian countries, which was 
caused by the expansion in offshore outsourcing, was a significant factor in Japan’s 
increasing import elasticity in the 2000s (presented in Section 2).           
Table 3 Japanese firms’ foreign and domestic procurement 
(1) (2)
Foreign/Domestic Fraction of Asia
1997–2000 0.142 0.479 
2000–2005 0.159 0.548 
2006–2012 0.186 0.590 
Note: Figures exclude imports from the Middle East.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from METI’s Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities.
5 See Tomiura (2007) and Wakasugi et al. (2010) for more information on Japan’s offshore outsourcing.
6 Middle East countries (i.e. Japan’s main suppliers of crude oil) are excluded. 
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4 Gross trade and trade in value added 
Up to this point, we have utilised gross trade data that were based on customs statistics. 
It should be noted, however, that the prevailing global production process (i.e. global 
value chains) boosts gross trade by moving intermediate and final goods between 
production processes that are fragmented across borders. The Trade in Value Added 
(TiVA) database was developed by the OECD and WTO in 2013 to address this issue; 
this database calculates value added to trade goods and attributes it to the countries that 
generated the value.7 In order to illustrate the difference between these trade figures, 
let us examine a hypothetical case. Suppose that a firm producing goods domestically 
moves part of its production plant to a foreign country; if the firm exports intermediate 
goods, such as parts and components, to the foreign factory and then imports the final 
goods, gross imports will be greater than the value added because the international 
shipping is calculated as an import.8 In contrast, if the entire production process remains 
within the firm’s home country, then the figures will be equal.9 A comparison of gross 
trade and TiVA indicates that trade has increased.
Table 4 displays the difference in the ratio of Japan’s gross trade and TiVA with various 
countries from 1995 to 2009. The upper panel (A) and the lower panel (B) present the 
ratio of gross export to value added embodied by foreign final demand and the ratio of 
gross import to foreign value added embodied by Japan’s final demand, respectively. 
7 In March 2013, the OECD and WTO jointly produced the TiVA database, which is derived from OECD Input Output 
Tables linked together using the Bilateral Trade Database for goods by industry and end-use category and estimates of 
bilateral trade flows for services. 
8 Since 2000, some researchers have noted that the discrepancy between gross trade and TiVA may be caused by the 
fragmentation of production and vertical trading chains. Hummels et al. (2001) and Yi (2003) insist that production 
processes have increasingly come to involve a sequential, vertical trading chain that stretches across many countries, with 
each country specialising in a particular stage of a good's production sequence. In addition, Bems et al. (2011) point out 
that “growth in vertical specialisation accounts for 30% of the growth in OECD countries’ exports.”
9 As the expansion of GVCs slows, their trade-boosting effect diminishes due to the substitution of local production for 
exports. Constantinescu et al. (2014) cite the decreasing share of intermediate goods among imports as one of the reasons 
for the fall in world import elasticity. 
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With regard to the US and EU, the discrepancy in the two ratios is small (i.e. close to 1), 
and in several years TiVA even exceeded gross exports because the value added figure 
(embodied by the US’s and EU’s final demands) accounted for both direct and indirect 
exports of value added by Japan. On the other hand, both the upper and the lower 
panels reveal that Japan’s gross trade with China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the ASEAN 
countries, and Korea largely exceeded its value added. One of the major contributing 
factors to this discrepancy was the return trade of intermediate goods, which expanded 
the vertical trade between Japan and the other Asian countries.
However, recently there has been a significant change in the return trade in Asia; the 
discrepancy between gross trade and TiVA expanded until 2005, when actually it began 
to shrink. Although it is certain that the fall in Japanese export elasticity and rise in 
Japanese import elasticity were caused by the expansion of Japanese firms’ GVCs, it 
does not entirely account for this trend. If the rapid shift of production processes from 
Japan to other Asian countries raised the local production of intermediate goods (which 
would have replaced Japan’s exports of intermediates and increased Japan’s imports 
of value added goods), it would have further reduced the gap between gross trade 
and TiVA. Consequently, this reduction foreshadowed the changes in Japan’s trade 
structure (the larger the scale of firms’ overseas production, the greater the changes to 
the structure). 
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5 Conclusion
Japanese firms have fragmented their production processes by opening subsidiaries 
throughout other East Asian countries (especially China), thereby enlarging their 
GVCs. The rapid increases in foreign direct investment, the offshore outsourcing of 
Japanese manufacturing firms, and overseas production accelerated this fragmentation 
and distinguished Japan’s trade structure from those of Western countries. Although 
world trade appears to have stagnated in recent years, Japanese trade has enjoyed a 
perceptible upswing. 
The results of our ECM estimation revealed that Japan had lower export and higher 
import elasticities than the rest of the world. In this study, we also investigated the 
changes in Japan’s trade structure and concluded that the development of overseas 
production replaced Japan’s exports while outsourcing boosted Japanese imports. We 
also found that the expansion of vertical trade between Japan and other Asian countries 
generated the growth in Japan’s gross trade and thereby the early discrepancy between 
gross trade and TiVA, which fell as the other countries became more developed and 
expanded their production capacities. This structural change in Japan’s trade during the 
2000s sheds light on the recent reduction in world gross trade, although TiVA may not 
have decreased on a global scale. 
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Introduction
Constantinescu et al. (2015), in important work, investigate the relationship between 
world trade and world GDP.  They report that over the period 1986-2000, a 1% increase 
in world real GDP was associated with a 2.2% increase in the volume of world trade. 
This elasticity is nearly twice as large as the elasticities they find for the periods 1970-
1985 and 2001-2013. This chapter seeks to shed light on this changing relationship 
using evidence from Asian value chains.  Many other explanations for the recent trade 
slowdown, such as weak trade finance or factors outside of Asia, are left for other 
authors to investigate.  The discussion below suggests that trade within the crucial value 
chain for the electronics industry in East Asia is unlikely to grow as rapidly going 
forward.
Lessons from the East Asian electronics industry
The date 1986 highlighted by Constantinescu et al. (2015) is familiar to students of East 
Asian supply chains.  Following the 1985 Plaza Accord, the Japanese yen appreciated 
by 60% relative to the US dollar.  Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) lost 
price competitiveness and began in 1986 to transfer factories to other Asian economies. 
They continued to produce sophisticated parts and components domestically, and 
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exported these to lower-wage countries for assembly.  MNCs in other countries soon 
followed this pattern, and trade in intermediate goods within the region surged.
The date 2001 is also familiar to students of Asian value chains.  This year marked 
China’s WTO accession.  It is widely believed that joining the WTO gave foreign 
investors confidence that China would sustain an FDI-friendly environment through 
fair and coherent enforcement of the relevant laws and regulations (e.g. Chen 2008). 
FDI flooded into the country, and China became the final assembly point for regional 
value chains.  Whereas before China’s WTO accession, intermediate goods crisscrossed 
the region, with value being added in several countries, in recent years more and more 
production has been concentrated in industrial clusters within China.  
These patterns are clear in the electronics industry.  Since the 1980s, the leading 
product category exported between East Asian economies has been electronic parts and 
components (EP&C) such as electronic integrated circuits and semiconductor devices.1 
Figure 1a shows EP&C exports from East Asia to ASEAN supply chain countries 
(Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), China, Japan and the newly industrialised 
economies (NIEs) of South Korea and Taiwan.  Immediately after the Plaza Accord, 
Japanese MNCs sought to cut costs by relocating labour-intensive activities to South 
Korea and Taiwan.  They continued to produce sophisticated parts and components in 
Japan and exported these to the NIEs.  Figure 1a shows a rapid increase in EP&C flowing 
to South Korea and Taiwan after 1986.  However, as wages increased in the NIEs and as 
their exchange rates appreciated, MNCs increasingly established production modules 
in ASEAN supply chain countries and shipped intermediate goods there (Yoshitomi 
2003).  Figure 1a indicates that parts and components flows from East Asia to Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand surged in the 1990s.  China’s WTO accession in 2001 then 
gave foreign investors confidence that China would respect the rule of law.  Figure 1a 
1 East Asia here includes China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand.  Electronic parts and components correspond to the HS classification numbers 8540-8542.
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shows that EP&C flows from East Asia to China then increased by a factor of ten after 
2001.    
Figure 1a. The value of electronics parts and components exports from East Asia to 
individual countries and regions
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Notes: Electronic Parts and Components correspond to the HS classification numbers 8540-8542. East Asia includes China, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
Source: CEPII-CHELEM database. 
Figure 1b. The value of final electronics goods from East Asian countries and regions 
to the rest of the world.
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Notes: Final electronics goods correspond to the SITC classification numbers 75 and 761-4. ASEAN includes Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand.  The NIEs include South Korea and Taiwan.
Source: CEPII-CHELEM database.
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While EP&C represents the most exported product category within East Asia, final 
electronics goods such as computers and mobile phones represent the most exported 
product category from East Asia to the rest of the world.2  Figure 1b presents data on 
final electronics goods exports from East Asian countries and regions to the rest of the 
world.  The figure indicates that after 2000, China’s exports multiplied many times 
and reached $500 billion in 2012.  This value dwarfs the surge in electronics parts and 
components imports into China, which equalled $110 billion in 2012. 
Figure 1 thus suggests that China’s exports have grown more rapidly than China’s 
imports.  Figure 2 plots China’s exports relative to rest of the world GDP and China’s 
imports relative to Chinese GDP.  The figure indicates that China’s exports continue to 
grow rapidly relative to GDP while China’s import-to-GDP ratio has been shrinking 
since 2005.  
Figure 2. Chinese exports relative to rest of the world GDP (right scale) and Chinese 
imports relative to Chinese GDP (left scale).
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Note: The figure presents exports and imports from China’s two primary customs regimes (ordinary trade and processing 
trade).
Sources: China Customs Statistics and CEPII-CHELEM database.
2 East Asia is defined as in footnote 1.  Final electronics goods correspond to the SITC classification numbers 75 and 761-
4.
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EP&C is the largest import category into China and the most traded category among 
East Asian countries.  To shed light on why China’s imports relative to GDP in Figure 2 
are shrinking and on how regional value chains are evolving, Figure 3 presents data on 
the exports of these intermediate goods from East Asian economies that are upstream 
from China.  The data start in 1992, because this is when data on a price deflator 
for EP&C become available.3  The figure shows that East Asian electronic parts and 
components exports increased rapidly relative to world GDP from 1992 until 2000. 
They then decreased relative to GDP between 2001 and 2014.
Figure 3. Electronics parts and components exports from upstream East Asian 
economies
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Notes and sources: Electronic parts and components correspond to the HS classification numbers 8540-8542.  East Asian 
economies that are upstream from China include Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
Data on the value of exports between 1992-2012 from upstream economies to the world are measured in US dollars.  They 
are obtained from the CEPII-CHELEM database.  For 2012 through 2014, all available data on exports from HS categories 
8540-8542 by upstream East Asian countries data in US dollars are collected from the CEIC database.  These data are used 
to calculate growth rates between 2012 and 2014 for electronic parts and components exports from upstream countries, and 
the growth rates are applied to the CEPII-CHELEM data from 2012 to impute values for 2013 and 2014.  Volume data are 
obtained by deflating the value data using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics import price index for electronic integrated 
circuits and micro assemblies and parts thereof.  Similar volume data are obtained when the value data are deflated using the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics import price index for semiconductor devices, light-emitting diodes, mounted piezoelectric 
crystals, and parts thereof. Data relative to world GDP are obtained by dividing the value of electronics parts and components 
exports measured in U.S. dollars by the value of world GDP also measured in US dollars.  World GDP data are obtained from 
the CEPII-CHELEM database.  
3 See the notes and sources listed in Table 3 for detailed descriptions of the data used.
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In volume terms, however, Figure 3 shows that East Asian EP&C exports have increased 
(logarithmically) by more than 150% since 2001.  This surge in the volume of exports 
is not reflected in value terms or relative to GDP because the prices of semiconductors 
and integrated circuits and other inputs into computers and mobile phones keep falling. 
Price competition in this sector is cutthroat, and suppliers face continual pressure from 
branded manufacturers to produce inputs at lower cost.  
Can we expect the pricing pressure on electronic components suppliers to ease in the 
future?  Low-cost vendors such as Lenovo, Xiaomi and ASUS are capturing increasing 
shares of the world market for smartphones, tablets and computers.  For instance, the 
International Data Corporation (IDC) finds that Lenovo and Xiaomi were the third and 
fourth leading suppliers of smartphones to the world in 2014Q3.4  IDC also reports 
that consumer electronics makers are increasing their focus on emerging markets. 
Consumers in emerging markets, with lower average income and wealth relative to 
consumers in advanced economies, tend to be sensitive to price.  Thus price competition 
is likely to remain intense, implying that manufacturers of final goods are likely to 
continue demanding price concessions from suppliers.
Will China’s final electronics goods exports continue to grow as rapidly?  For computers 
(SITC category 752), the value of China’s exports to the US increased by a factor of 38 
between 1996 and 2013 and the share of total US imports coming from China increased 
from 4% to 66%.  For phones (SITC category 764), the value of China’s exports to the 
US increased by a factor of 32 between 1996 and 2013 and the share of imports coming 
from China increased from 11% to 57%.5  It is unlikely that the US market will continue 
increasing imports from China at this rate.  Other advanced economies such as Europe 
and Japan are stagnant, and this will limit China’s ability to continue increasing exports 
to these locations.  While emerging markets such as India have the capacity to absorb 
more electronics goods, consumers in these markets tend to demand goods that are at 
4 Detailed data are available at www.idc.com.
5 These data come from the US Census Bureau website (www.census.gov).
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lower price points within each category. Going forward it therefore seems unlikely that 
the value of final electronics exports from China or their ratio to rest of the world’s GDP 
can continue to grow as rapidly as they have up until 2014.
From the consumer’s point of view, these trends are positive.  If the prices of electronics 
parts and components continue to fall, this will reduce the prices they pay for  mobile 
phones and tablet computers.  If demand in the rest of the world for final electronics 
goods does not keep growing rapidly, branded manufacturers will redirect their output 
to consumers in China.  China’s consumption relative to GDP remains far lower than the 
corresponding values for other countries at similar levels of development.  Thus moving 
away from exporting final goods and producing for the domestic market instead would 
be beneficial to China. 
Conclusion
Constantinescu et al. (2015) find that the response of world trade to world GDP 
was nearly twice as great during the period 1986-2000 as it was during the periods 
1970-1985 and 2001-2013.  This chapter has considered how trends in the East Asian 
electronics industry have contributed to this pattern.  
Production fragmentation began in earnest in the region following the 1985 Plaza 
Accord.  Japanese multinationals, confronted with a 60% appreciation of the yen, 
relocated labour-intensive production to lower-wage countries.  Intricate production 
networks soon developed in the region, with firms producing intermediate goods, 
such as hard disk drives, using inputs from other firms and countries and shipping the 
intermediate goods to other firms or countries for assembly into final goods and re-
export.  The Plaza Accord was thus followed by a large increase in exports between East 
Asian countries.  After China joined the WTO, however, more and more production in 
the region became centred within industrial clusters in China.  China’s WTO accession 
was therefore followed by a slowing of export growth in the region.
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China’s exports of final electronics goods have continued to grow rapidly relative to 
GDP, while its imports of EP&C and other goods relative to GDP have stagnated.  One 
reason for this is that the prices of EP&C continue to tumble.  Intense competition in 
this sector forces suppliers to slash prices.
Going forward, it is likely that both China’s imports of parts and components and also 
its exports of final electronics goods will not keep growing as rapidly as they have done 
relative to GDP.  To the extent that this implies lower prices for electronics goods and 
more final goods flowing to Chinese consumers, it will be a welcome development for 
the global economy.
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13 China’s trade flows: Some 
conjectures
Menzie D Chinn1
University of Wisconsin
1 Introduction
China has been one of the key players in the growth of world trade over the past 20 
years, with the volume and value of its exports taking on a dramatically heightened role 
in the decade before the Great Recession. During that period, export volume growth 
repeatedly hit 20%, far outstripping growth of the world economy. Chinese import 
growth was similarly rapid, although it exceeded Chinese growth by a smaller margin.
One key reason for this rapid growth, particularly in exports, was the liberalisation 
of trade – reinforced by China’s accession to the WTO – such that China was able to 
exploit its comparative advantage. However, this is unlikely to be the sole explanation, 
given the sheer speed of growth. Other factors include, first, the fact that measures of 
gross trade flows are unlikely to be representative of trade in value added, given the 
rapid development of an East Asian global value chain centred on Chin; and second, 
the growth experienced thus far is transitional - at some point, China will no longer be 
able to continue taking a larger and larger share of world exports.
1 Paper prepared for Prospects for Trade Growth, edited by Bernard Hoekman (VoxEU). I thank Yin-Wong Cheung and 
Xingwang Qian for allowing me to draw on joint work, Shaghil Ahmed for providing data, and Arthur Kroeber, Xingwang 
Qian and Willem Thorbecke for providing comments. All remaining errors are solely the author’s responsibility.
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What are the prospects for China’s trade with the rest of the world? This is perhaps 
one of the central questions of international economic relations. In some ways, it is 
a question that is hardly amenable to rigorous assessment, precisely because of the 
numerous imponderables: Will world economic output revert to the pre-Global Crisis 
trend? Will Chinese policymakers be able to re-orient the economy toward a more 
sustainable, domestic-demand driven growth model? Will the process of production 
fragmentation, as exemplified by the development of global value chains, continue 
unabated? In addition, how will the answers to each of these questions bear on the issue 
at different horizons? 
In order to analyse the question, I break it down into several parts. The first is to consider 
the short-term dynamics of Chinese trade – namely, how Chinese exports and imports 
respond to income and relative price factors. This seems a fairly prosaic approach; 
however, there has long been a view that Chinese trade flows behave in an odd way. 
The longer-term issues pertain to the ability of the Chinese economy to adjust to greater 
reliance on domestic-oriented sources of aggregate demand. To the extent that they 
can, this will draw resources away from the export sector. In addition, the ongoing 
process of rising labour costs will make China’s position as a low-cost producer of 
manufactured goods less dominant.
To illustrate the difficulties in explaining China’s trade, consider simple depictions of 
China’s trade flows. First, examine exports; at a first approximation, one would think 
of Chinese exports as a direct function of world demand, proxied perhaps by GDP. 
However, as shown by Figure 1, export growth has far outstripped world GDP growth.
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Figure 1 Log Chinese real goods exports (darker) and rest-of-world real GDP 
(lighter)
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Notes: Both in logs, normalised to 1998=0. Rest-of-world GDP is export-weighted.  
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2014), personal communication from Shaghil Ahmed, and author’s 
calculations.
Since 1998, Chinese exports have grown by over 200% (in log terms) while the rest of 
world GDP (weighted by exports) has grown only by about 40%. Clearly, if gross exports 
represent exported value added, this is a trend that cannot be sustained indefinitely. It 
is hard to imagine the trend being sustained even if there is a large share of imported 
content in exports. That conjecture is supported by the fact that the differential between 
export growth and rest-of-world growth has been declining over time. 
The trend shown in Figure 2 is consistent with the growth differential shrinking by about 
1 percentage point every three years. Hence, even if the rest of the world maintains its 
pace – which seems unlikely in the next few years – it appears unlikely that Chinese 
gross exports will continue to grow at the same rate.
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Figure 2 Year-on-year growth differential between Chinese goods exports and rest-
of-world real GDP growth (darker), and linear trend GDP (lighter)  
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2014), Shaghil Ahmed, and author’s calculations.
Figure 3 Log Chinese real goods imports (darker) and Chinese real GDP (lighter)
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2014), and author’s calculations. 
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Chinese imports have grown by about the same amount, but much more in line with 
Chinese GDP. The former has grown by about 150%, while imports have grown by 
about 220% over the same time period (Figure 3).
Over this time (1998-2014), the real value of the Chinese yuan has varied substantially, 
with some impact on the relative amounts of exports versus imports. This is shown in 
Figure 4.
Figure 4 Log of ratio of Chinese real goods exports divided by imports (darker) and 
log real value of Chinese yuan, 2010=0 (lighter)  
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2014), IMF International Financial Statistics and author’s calculations.
Casual inspection of the figure highlights the fact that the mid-2000s were marked by 
the expected relationship: the depreciation of the yuan on a trade-weighted basis was 
associated with an increase in exports relative to imports. However, a slightly deeper 
examination reveals that the appreciation of the Chinese currency since 2010 has also 
been associated with an increase in the export-to-import ratio. This is hard to reconcile 
with conventional interpretations of the trade balance-real exchange rate relationship in 
a partial equilibrium framework.
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I argue that the explanation for the seemingly anomalous behaviour of Chinese trade 
flows resides not necessarily in an appeal to a general equilibrium approach, but to 
disaggregating the data, proper accounting for the role of imported intermediate goods 
in Chinese exports, as well as better measuring of the real exchange rate. I address the 
first two points in the next two sections.
2 Modelling Chinese trade in a partial equilibrium 
framework
Several hypotheses have been forwarded in the literature for why Chinese trade flows 
appear to have behaved in an anomalous fashion. First, the large amount of processing 
trade obscures the usual effects; when a large share of the imported goods is used 
in exports, the usual activity variables, such as GDP, might not be appropriate. In 
addition, exchange rates might have a muted effect if the share of domestic value added 
in Chinese exports is small. There is some indication that this is true, although the effect 
probably peaked in the mid-2000s.
Second, with a rapidly changing economic structure and different import intensities, 
aggregate import elasticities might exhibit instability. A similar argument could 
be applied to a changing structure of trade; different types of trade might respond 
differently to exchange rates. Once again, stable aggregate elasticity estimates might be 
difficult to obtain in such instances.
Cheung et al. (2012) offer the most recent examination of Chinese aggregate trade.2 In 
their study of Chinese trade over the period 1993-2010, they account for the oft-cited 
characteristic of the Chinese economy is its position in the global production chain 
in an ad hoc fashion. Since China plays an important role in the final phrase of the 
2 On this subject, see also Wang and Ji (2006), Garcia-Herrero and Koivu (2007), Marquez and Schindler (2007), Aziz and 
Li (2008), Ahmed (2009) and Cheung et al. (2010), Thorbecke and Smith (2010), and Thorbecke (2015). Cheung et al. 
(forthcoming) examine US-China trade behaviour.
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international production process, its trade flows might not be responsive to exchange 
rate changes. Specifically, an appreciation raises the relative price of exports, but lowers 
the price of inputs. The appreciation thus only affects the value added component of 
Chinese exports, and the net effect of a CNY appreciation on global imbalances could 
be ambiguous.
They model Chinese exports and imports, respectively:
ext = β0 + β1yt* + β2rt, + β3zt, + u1,t , (1)
and
imt = γ0 + γ1yt  + γ2rt  + γ3 wt + u2,t ,   (2)
where y is an activity variable, r is the real value of the RMB, and z is a supply-side 
variable. The variable w is a shift variable accounting for other factors that might 
increase import demand.3 
Table 1 presents the results for aggregate exports and imports, estimated using dynamic 
OLS (Stock and Watson 1993). The key take-away from the table is that the estimates 
of income elasticities are very sensitive to the specification. In column 1, the most 
literal interpretation is examined; the real value of the Chinese yuan is expressed so 
that an increase represents an appreciation. The exchange rate enters with a strongly 
and significantly negative coefficient. In addition, rest of the world economic activity 
registers strongly positive, with a coefficient of around 1.4. This is true even though 
they augment the specification with a linear time trend. Had one omitted the trend, the 
coefficient on foreign output would have been around 2.2.
3 Real values of trade flows are the key difficulty confronting researchers. Specific deflators are only available for recent 
years, so generally one has to resort to proxies. Cheung et al. (2012) focus on results based upon Hong Kong re-
import and re-export unit value indices, although similar results are obtained using alternative deflators. The IMF’s trade 
weighted CPI-deflated index is used as the exchange rate variable. Chinese GDP is used as the home activity variable, 
while the export-weighted real GDP in the rest of the world is used for y*. For z, Cheung et al. (2012) rely upon several 
proxy variables, including the stock of fixed asset investment, and relative productivity.
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Table 1 Aggregate flows, normalised by the Hong Kong re-export unit value index
Exports Exports Imports Imports
[1] [2] [3] [4]
GDP 1.433*** 5.648***
 (0.51) (0.61)
GDP* 3.184** -3.005**
(1.51) (1.14)
REER -1.575*** -0.906*** -2.034*** 1.111**
 (0.17) (0.23) (0.29) (0.48)
CRgrw -0.159
 (0.38)
WTO -0.642***
 (0.08)
WTO*Trend 0.024***
 (0.00)
Exports 0.980***
(0.17)
Trend 0.040*** -0.005 -0.033 0.068***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
RSME 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04
Obs. 63 64 33 33
Leads-lags 1, 2 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1, 1
Notes:  The table reports the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) with the aggregate trade data. All regressions include 
quarterly dummies. The pair of numbers given in the row labelled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of 
lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS regression.  Robust errors are in parentheses 
underneath coefficient estimates.  ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Coefficients 
for constant and quarterly dummies not reported.
In some sense, when one thinks of the tremendous growth in Chinese exports, only a 
small amount is being driven by the measured correlation with the world’s income, and 
the rest is a trend increase in Chinese exports, perhaps due to China increasing its share 
of world exports, as well as the increasing export intensity of the world economy. That 
trend works out to a secular 16% annual growth over the sample period. This basic 
result is not sensitive to the inclusion of some obvious stationary covariates, including, 
for instance, the growth rate of credit. 
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A cautionary note is provided by the allowance for structural breaks. One particular 
break seems especially plausible, namely China’s accession to the WTO. On a priori 
grounds, as well as suggestive statistical test results, we augment the regression with 
a dummy variable for WTO accession, and allow for a differential trend in the post-
WTO period.4 These results reported in column 2 indicate that the overall time trend 
was proxying for a trend in the post-WTO period. The income coefficient is now 
substantially higher. 
Cheung et al. (2012) are unable to obtain reasonable estimates for imports over 
a comparable sample. Hence, they truncate the sample to begin in the post-WTO 
accession period. In the basic specification (column 3), increases in Chinese GDP are 
associated with an increase in imports, with a particularly high elasticity of 3.2. Counter 
to expectations, an appreciated Chinese yuan induces a decrease in imports. 
Given how much of Chinese imports are used as inputs for export, assuming that 
Chinese imports are driven solely by demand from domestic Chinese households 
and firms is inappropriate. One ad hoc way to account for the vertical specialisation 
phenomenon is to include exports as an independent variable. As shown in column 
4, exports enter in with the expected sign (and a near unit elasticity). Unfortunately, 
the perverse coefficient on income is statistically significant, and the time trend now 
becomes statistically significant, probably due to the multicollinearity between GDP 
and the trend. However, they do obtain a positive and statistically and economically 
significant coefficient on the real exchange rate. 
3 Disaggregating trade flows
Aggregation might be inappropriate if the components of trade flows behave in 
substantially different ways. The data allows one to investigate differential behaviour 
4 The WTO accession dummy is set to equal 1 at 2002Q1 and thereafter.
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along categories of goods used for processing versus for end consumption, or between 
manufactured versus non-manufactured goods, or between goods exported or imported 
by firms of different ownership.
One of the peculiarities of the Chinese system is that the Chinese customs agency 
categorises exports and imports into those goods that are to be used for processing 
purposes and those to be used as ordinary exports or imports. For instance, processing 
imports are usually for manufacturing finished products in China for (re-)exporting, 
and these imports are usually subjected to more favourable tariff rates. In contrast, 
processing exports are exports that are used by the imported country for processing 
and assembly. With this information, one can examine the data at a more disaggregated 
level. 
Ordinary export results are on the left-hand side, while processing export results are 
on the right-hand side in Table 2. The common result is that for both types of exports, 
the value of the yuan enters in with the right sign and statistical significance. One 
large difference is the fact that ordinary exports do not exhibit a statistically significant 
sensitivity to rest of the world GDP (unless a post-WTO trend is included). In contrast, 
processing exports always exhibit income elasticities in excess of unity.
Next, we investigate whether the corresponding disaggregation yields results more in 
accord with priors for imports (see Table 3). The answer is mixed. For ordinary imports, 
the income elasticity is positive but not statistically significant, while the exchange rate 
has the wrong effect. If one includes exports (which is not well motivated for ordinary 
imports), the results are largely uninformative as well, since no economic variable 
enters with significance.
For processing imports, both income and the real exchange rate enter significantly, 
but the latter enters with the wrong sign. Including exports results in properly signed 
coefficients for the exchange rate and export variables. Income now enters with 
a negative, and significant, sign. This result signals the collinearity of many of the 
variables. 
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Table 2 Exports of ordinary and processing trade, normalised by by the Hong 
Kong re-export unit value index 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
 Ordinary Ordinary Ordinary Processing Processing Processing
GDP 0.422 0.478 4.809*** 3.592*** 3.640*** 6.878***
 (0.78) (0.81) (0.73) (0.61) (0.61) (0.77)
REER -1.864*** -1.869*** -1.319*** -1.199*** -1.203*** -0.875***
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
CRgrw 0.226 -0.055 0.195 -0.084
 (0.62) (0.53) (0.55) (0.44)
WTO -0.764*** -0.598***
 (0.10) (0.13)
WTO*Trend 0.027*** 0.022***
 (0.00) (0.00)
Trend 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.000 0.024*** 0.024*** -0.014*
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Q1 -0.176*** -0.175*** -0.185*** -0.226*** -0.225*** -0.218***
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Q2 -0.036 -0.031 -0.033 -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.111***
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Q3 0.003 0.006 -0.006 -0.041 -0.038 -0.018
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Constant 17.660*** 17.671*** 15.380*** 14.786*** 14.795*** 13.510***
 (1.17) (1.19) (1.17) (1.03) (1.05) (1.03)
RMSE 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06
Obs. 64 64 64 64 64 63
Leads-lags 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 2
Notes:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (1) with the ordinary and processing export data. The pair of 
numbers given in the row labelled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced 
cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS regression.  Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coefficient 
estimates.  ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Coefficients for constant and 
quarterly dummies not reported.
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Table 3 Imports of ordinary and processing trade, normalised by the Hong Kong 
re-export to China unit value index
[1] [2] [3] [4]
 Ordinary Ordinary Processing Processing
GDP 2.960 -0.101 3.591*** -2.259**
 (2.02) (2.37) (1.13) (0.80)
REER -0.962** 0.376 -3.101*** 0.787*
 (0.41) (0.89) (0.26) (0.45)
Export 0.255 1.264***
 (0.33) (0.14)
Trend -0.026 0.033 -0.051* 0.033**
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
RMSE 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.02
Obs. 33 33 33 33
Leads-lags 1, 1 1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1, 1 
Notes:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (2) with the post-WTO ordinary and processing import data. 
The pair of numbers given in the row labelled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-
differenced cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS regression.  Robust errors are in parentheses underneath 
coefficient estimates.  ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.  Coefficients for 
constant and quarterly dummies not reported.
In terms of the manufactures versus overall distinction, not much difference arises 
on the export side. To the extent that most goods exports are now manufactured, this 
result is unsurprising. On the import side differences arise, but nothing of a particularly 
systematic nature. 
The pattern of ownership has interesting ramifications for trade behaviour. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) held a commanding role in 
the economy. By 2010, private firms had taken on a much bigger role. At this level 
of disaggregation, export elasticities are generally more in accord with priors, with 
SOE exports exhibiting the lowest income elasticity, foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) 
exports a higher elasticity, and private firm exports the very highest. Price elasticities 
exhibit the same pattern. This set of results also suggests that overall aggregation is at 
least partly to explain for the difficulty in obtaining sensible results.
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The corresponding results for imports are less promising. The estimated income elasticity 
is positive, unless the exports variable is included. The exchange rate coefficient has the 
wrong sign, and has the correct sign only for SOEs and FIEs when exports are included. 
For both SOEs and FIEs, exports show up as particularly important. The elasticity of 
imports with respect to exports is least marked for private enterprises.  
Chinese imports in general remain difficult to explain. One possible reason for this 
outcome is the fact that that the CPI deflated real exchange rate does not fully reflect the 
price of Chinese tradable output, as it includes a large non-tradable component (Chinn 
2006). In order to account for productivity trends, Cheung et al. (2012) adopt an ad hoc 
approach, including a proxy variable, namely, Chinese GDP per capita relative to US 
output per man hour in the non-farm business sector (Table 4). 
The inclusion of the relative productivity variable yields substantially improved results 
(Table 5). The exchange rate now has the correct sign for all aggregates and components 
of imports, and is statistically significant in all cases but one. Higher Chinese relative 
productivity decreases imports as well, which makes sense, as higher productivity is 
consistent with greater competitiveness. In some sense, the competitiveness variable 
explains even more of Chinese import behaviour than the conventional variables, as the 
associated coefficient is significant in all cases but one.
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4 Value added versus gross trade, again
In the studies discussed above, China’s role as the final stage of the regional global 
value chain is addressed indirectly – that is, the distinction between gross exports and 
exports of value added have not been directly addressed. Yet, it is widely known that 
the relative price of value added likely differs substantially from the relative price 
of gross goods (and even more so from the relative price of broad bundles of goods 
and services). For instance, Bems and Johnson (2012) report Chinese value added in 
manufactured exports to be 39% in 2004; most anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
value added component has increased over time, although only modestly (Figure 5). 
Figure 5 Share of domestic value added in total exports. 
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Nonetheless, the importance of the distinction is highlighted in Bems and Johnson’s 
(2012) comparison of the value added and CPI deflated real exchange rates (Figure 6).
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Figure 6 Log real value of Chinese yuan, value added (darker) and CPI deflated 
(lighter). 
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There are at least two ways of directly tackling the fact that the export of value added 
differs substantially from the gross value of exported goods. The more appropriate route 
would be to directly estimate the amount of value added traded, and link those values to 
the relevant activity variables. However, merely measuring the amount of value added 
that is traded is an involved task, as demonstrated in Bems and Johnson (2012) and 
Patel et al. (2014). Estimates of the elasticity of trade in value added with respect to the 
relative price of value added are yet to be calculated. 
If one were concerned about measuring the sensitivity of gross flows with respect to 
income and the real exchange rates correctly, a more expedient approach is to include 
a control for determinants of the cost of production. Thorbecke (2011) undertakes 
exactly this task. He finds that an integrated real exchange rate variable (one taking into 
account exchange rates of the countries supplying intermediate inputs into the Chinese 
production process) yields a higher (in absolute value) price elasticity; and allowing 
for separate Chinese exchange rates and Chinese supplier exchange rates also provides 
more sensible estimates.  One implication is that a Chinese yuan appreciation has a 
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different impact than a Chinese yuan appreciation accompanied by changes in China’s 
exchange rate with supplier country currencies.5 One could interpret the recent advent 
of balanced ordinary goods, and the persistently positive processed goods balance, as 
being due to the differential behaviour of China’s exchange rate vis à vis the export 
destination countries, and vis à vis the supplier countries.
Directly related to the question at hand, it is of note that the sensitivity of Chinese gross 
exports to the rest of the world’s economic activity is not particularly sensitive to the 
specific exchange rate variable used (it is sensitive, however, to the treatment of time 
trends). A few studies have attempted to address the role of global value chains in the 
recent slowdown in gross trade flows. Gangnes et al. (2014) examine China’s trade, 
disaggregated by industry. They exploit the Chinese tariff system, which categorises 
imports as processing or ordinary. They find that there is a composition effect in the 
pattern of Chinese exports (durable goods are more income sensitive), while there is no 
apparent processing goods effect. Unfortunately, the sample examined spans the period 
1995-2009, hence omitting the last five years of the trade slowdown.
Ferrantino and Taglioni (2014) show that through 2013Q1, the growth rate of trade 
associated with global value chains decelerated more rapidly than that associated 
with non-GVC trade. However, the post-recession rebound in GVC-associated trade 
was also larger. Hence, it is hard to say whether there has been a systematically faster 
deceleration in GVC-related trade growth. 
As for the trend in the development of global value chains, it seems unlikely to exhibit a 
drastic reversal. Amador and Cabral (2014) document the fact that vertical specialisation 
continued even as energy prices rose. With energy prices lower, and likely to stay low 
for some time, the process of production fragmentation is very likely to continue. 
5 In practice, this effect might be muted in the future. Chinn (2014) provides evidence that the currencies of the countries 
most intimately involved in the regional global value chain have tended to stabilise their currencies against the yuan since 
the end of the Great Recession.
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I have not addressed other important questions, including the composition of Chinese 
exports. There is some concern that the manufactured share of exports has not changed 
substantially since 2008 (Batson 2013,6 2015). This is worrisome, given the presumption 
that a greater manufactured export share would represent a movement up the value 
chain, a key ingredient in attaining income convergence, if the example of earlier newly 
industrialising economies such as Korea is any guide.
5 Summing up
The bulk of the discussion has treated the main questions related to Chinese trade, 
and more particularly exports, as a function of world conditions, regardless of whether 
one is concerned with gross exports or exports of value added. That is, the demand for 
exports ultimately determines the amount of exports. However, this need not be the 
case, and in fact domestic demand could draw some of the goods and services away 
from the export market. 
A key question, thus far side-stepped, then becomes relevant.  Are the Chinese 
authorities are able to navigate the Chinese economy toward a more domestically 
oriented, consumption-based growth model? If this were to occur, Chinese export 
growth would be more likely to decelerate more rapidly than suggested by the earlier 
discussion, as a greater consumption share suggests an export sector that is smaller than 
would have otherwise occurred.
To date, there is some evidence that a greater share of output has been devoted to 
household consumption; the 2013 share stands at 36.2%, up from a low of 34.9% in 
2010. Similarly, total consumption (government and household) has risen from 48.2% 
to 49.8%. However, in both cases these shares are down from levels of about 47% 
6 China’s New Silk Road diplomacy, and moves to development a China-funded infrastructure investment bank, can be 
thought of as a means of maintaining exports of manufactured goods. See Batson (2015) for additional discussion.
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and 62%, respectively, in 2000.7 In this context, progress toward rebalancing has been 
limited so far.
Is there a means to assess quantitatively the impact of reform on the current account, 
going forward? Ito and Volz (2013) use estimates from a cross-country analysis 
to assess the impact of reforms aimed at rebalancing the Chinese economy.8 They 
conclude that with drastic domestic financial reform, the current account balance, 
national saving rate, and investment would be lower than in the baseline by 0.7, 2.5, 
and 1.7 percentage points, respectively. Lower saving is consistent with more imports, 
as is lower investment. Other measures, such as increased health care provisioning, also 
have a negative impact on the current account.9 
Success in steering the economy toward greater consumption orientation requires a 
greater labour share of income, and hence likely a higher average wage rate. That trend 
is already showing up, as discussed in Li et al. (2012), and placing greater pressure on 
maintaining productivity growth to protect the competitiveness of Chinese exporters. 
Estimates of the impact on competitiveness are hard to come by; Ceglowski and Golub 
(2012) estimate that Chinese relative unit labour costs evaluated at PPP terms are either 
33% or 69% of US levels as of 2009-2008. There is tremendous uncertainty surrounding 
the direction and magnitude of these trends, and yet they could prove to be as important 
as the demand conditions that have been the focus of earlier discussions. 
Assuming current trends, it seems plausible that Chinese export growth will continue to 
decelerate, so that the growth gap between exports and export-weighted rest-of-world 
GDP will shrink by about a third of a percentage point a year, perhaps faster if pro-
7 See IMF (2014), Figure 3. Figures refer to expenditure basis. On the production side, the industry/services split has 
shifted toward the latter: 47/43 in favour of industry in 2011, to 42/48 in favour of services in 2014. For a discussion of 
how greater services orientation can lead to much greater employment (and implicitly to a greater labour income share), 
see Feenstra and Hong (2010).
8 The approach is based on Chinn and Prasad (2003), and Chinn et al. (2014). 
9 Healthcare spending is included as a policy determinant of current account balances in the IMF’s External Balance 
Assessment (EBA); see Phillips et al. (2013).  
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consumption reforms are forcefully implemented.10 Variation in the real value of the 
yuan will have some impact, but it is difficult to see how anything but a much more 
rapid appreciation will force a large deviation from this trajectory. 
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14 Trade impact of China’s 
transition to the ‘new normal’
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1 The ‘new normal’ and structural reform
China is now in transition from a fast growing economy driven largely by investment 
and export to a new growth model with domestic demand and innovation as the new 
growth engines. This new growth model may come with a lower growth rate, and is 
often dubbed the ‘new normal’. It will define China’s growth trajectory for decades 
to come. To fulfill this transition, the Chinese economy needs to be rebalanced from 
an over-reliance on export and investment to more innovation and more domestic 
consumption.
Trade adjustment is a key part of this transition. A distinct feature of China’s foreign 
trade is its processing trade arrangement, in addition to its normal trade regime. Under 
the processing trade regime, parts and components enter China duty free and are 
exported after being processed or assembled. While parts and components are mostly 
made in ASEAN, Korea and Japan, the major destination of the assembled products is 
the US and the EU. 
1 The authors thank Bernard Hoekman for helpful advice, and seminar participants at Nagoya University and participants 
at the 2015 China Trade Research Group annual meeting at the Dalian University of Technology for valuable comments. 
Jiansuo Pei gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Program for Young Excellent Talents, UIBE [No. 
2013YQ01]. All remaining errors are the authors’ own.
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China’s processing trade took off in the early 1990s. It was accelerated by the 1997 
Asian financial crisis as exporting firms in crisis-stricken countries sought safe haven 
in China. The country’s accession to the WTO in 2001 secured its access to the US 
market, so that more exported oriented FDI flowed into China. On the demand side, 
Chinese provinces were competing to attract FDI by offering various incentives. To 
avoid competition with local domestic firms, FDI in labour-intensive sectors has been 
encouraged to enter export businesses. As a result, processing trade is the natural choice 
of low-tech FDI.
After almost a quarter of a century of rapid growth, China’s processing trade regime is 
now under stress. Rising labour costs are driving foreign funded processing firms to move 
to other cheap developing countries or even return to home countries, as evidenced by 
the re-industrialisation in the US. Chinese policies encouraging indigenous innovation 
have helped domestic production of R&D-intensive parts and components, which are 
increasingly replacing imported intermediates.
This development has coincided with the 2008 Global Crisis, which not only depressed 
firm’s foreign outsourcing activities, but also slowed down normal international trade. 
However, the Crisis itself is a cyclical factor and its impact on trade will go away once 
the world economy is fully recovered. In fact, Constantinescu et al. (2014) attribute the 
recent slower trade growth to the slowdown of US foreign outsourcing to China. In the 
long run, structural factors, such as the processing trade adjustment and other structural 
reform measures, will have a permanent impact on trade. This chapter tries to shed light 
on this issue by employing an innovative China CGE model, which has a detailed trade 
structure, to make a quantitative assessment of China’s transition to the ‘new normal’.
2 DPN GEM: Data and model 
Conventional CGE models for Chinese trade policy analysis do not differentiate 
processing export and the rest of the Chinese economy. Examples include the model 
developed by China’s Development Research Center (the DRC model), which focuses 
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on the Chinese regions, and the standard GTAP model (Hertel and Tsigas 1997). 
Economists have attempted to separate normal and processing trade in a CGE model 
for China (Ianchovichina et al. 2000, Wang 2003, Ianchovichina 2004, Ianchovichina 
and Martin 2004). The split, however, is largely based on assumptions on key input-
output coefficients and does not further differentiate the normal export and domestic 
production sectors.
Our proposed modelling work is an improvement along this line and is made possible 
through the construction of an innovative Chinese input-output table (IOT) that 
differentiates the production for domestic use (D), the production for processing 
trade (P) and the production for normal trade and other production of foreign-
invested enterprises for domestic use (N) and is known as DPN IOT. This work has 
been significantly enhanced since China’s participation in the WTO/OECD “Made in 
the World Initiative” in early 2012. With the support of various Chinese government 
agencies, DPN IOT is the best source of economy-wide data for China’s foreign trade 
and constitutes the backbone of the database for the China trade CGE model used in 
this chapter, known as DPN GEM.
The tripartite feature of the DPN IOT is shown in Table 1 in the Appendix. There are 
three types of heterogeneous production technologies: type D gives the production for 
domestic use, type P represents the production of processing trade, and type N the 
production for normal trade and other production of foreign-invested enterprises for 
domestic use. This classification of three production technologies is justified by the 
theory of, and Chinese empirical evidence on, firm heterogeneity (Melitz 2003, Yao et 
al., 2015), and was pioneered by Chen et al. (2001) and Chen et al. (2012). 
The key parameters of the DPN IOT are given in Table 2 in the Appendix. The last row 
in the right-hand panel of the numerical table gives one more indicator: the capital-
to-labour ratio. It suggests that the production type P is labour-intensive, whereas the 
production type N is capital-intensive. The model structure and behavioral parameters 
are drawn from a miniature ORANI (Dixon et al. 1982)
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3 Policy scenarios and simulation results
Baseline scenario: Normal growth
Our baseline (‘normal’) scenario is normal annual growth based on the 2010 data. As 
shown in Table 3 in the Appendix, under the ‘normal’ scenario, the economy maintains 
high growth rates for investment, normal and processing exports (10% each), but low 
growth rates for domestic consumption (4%) and a low level of innovation (1% Hicks-
neutral productivity gain). The DPN GEM does not explicitly model FDI, an important 
source of growth. Instead, we use capital-saving technological progress to model the 
effects of FDI inflows. In the baseline case, the effect of FDI is represented by a 4.5% 
capital-saving productivity gain. 
As shown in the left-hand panel of Table 4 in the Appendix, the ‘normal’ economic 
growth produces a high GDP growth rate – 9.66% for nominal GDP and 6.75% for real 
GDP. The share of imports in GDP rises at 1.32% and 4.08% per year for nominal and 
real term measures, respectively. 
Against this baseline, the processing trade adjustment and economic rebalancing are 
modelled to reflect (i) slower growth in foreign outsourcing, and (ii) less reliance on 
investment and exports, and more reliance on domestic consumption and innovation. 
We set up three scenarios for each of the two types of structural changes – minor, 
moderate and major reforms. Counter factual growth rates for all indicators under 
various scenarios are listed in Table 3, and simulation results are reported in Table 4.
Foreign outsourcing slowdown
The middle panel of Table 4 reports the simulation results for foreign outsourcing 
slowdown. Processing export growth is slowed from the normal 10% to 8%, 6% and 
4%, respectively, under the minor, moderate and major reforms. All other things being 
the same as in the ‘normal’ scenario, growth rates for both imports and exports in both 
real and nominal terms are also reduced compared to the normal scenario. In particular, 
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nominal import to nominal GDP ratio grows at 0.98%, 0.62% and 0.27% under the 
minor, moderate and major adjustment scenarios, respectively, compared to 1.32% 
under normal scenario. The numbers for the same scenarios for the real import to real 
GDP ratio are 3.46% (minor), 2.81% (moderate), 2.19% (major) and 4.08% (normal). 
In both measures, trade slows down as a result of foreign outsourcing adjustment.
Economic rebalancing: Transition to the ‘new normal’
China’s ongoing economic reforms involve more than just a processing trade adjustment. 
Most of the discussions on China’s economic rebalancing imply a slower growth rate, 
and the annual growth rate itself was a closely watched figure in the prime minister’s 
annual work report to the National People’s Congress in March 2015. However, the 
growth rate is not a policy tool but the result of a set of economic policies used to make 
the transition to the ‘new normal’, including domestic investment, consumption, net 
FDI and innovation.
Policy shocks for the transition to the ‘new normal’ scenarios are listed in the right-
hand panel of Table 3. Except for normal exports, all other economic indicators will 
be changed under the minor, moderate and major reforms. While the processing trade 
adjustments remain the same, investment growth is slowed from 10% to 8%, 6% and 
4%, respectively, while consumption growth is raised from a low 4% to 6%, 8% and 
10%, respectively. In our model, the consumption variable C includes both private and 
government consumption.
Growth of net FDI inflows is slowed not only because FDI inflows are associated with 
processing trade, but also because China is increasing its overseas investment. For this, 
we factor in slower growth rates for capital-saving technology progress, which are 
3.5%, 2.5% and 1.5%, respectively, for the three scenarios.
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Growth by indigenous innovation is a core element of the ‘new normal’ growth model. 
We set higher growth rates for the Hicks-neutral technology progress of 2%, 3% and 
4% to represent minor, moderate and major innovations, respectively.
We do not change the growth rate for normal exports. As a policy matter, there is less 
emphasis on export promotion and the growth engine is shifting from external demand 
to internal demand. This tends to lower the growth prospects for normal exports. 
However, China is also strengthening its trade relations with low-income developing 
countries. There has been evidence that Chinese trade patterns are evolving in 
contrasting directions with high-income and low-income ASEAN members since 
1997. High-income ASEAN countries are specialising in the production of R&D-
intensive parts, with China as an assembly centre. At the same time, the low-income 
ASEAN countries are becoming assembly centres for Chinese-made parts (Yao et al. 
2014). When South Asia and Africa start to integrate into global value chains, they 
will become the assembly centres for Chinese-made parts and components. This is a 
realistic development, particularly for India, where the Modi administration is trying 
to revitalise its manufacturing sector to create jobs for unskilled workers, a strategy 
endorsed by prominent free trade economists (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2013). The 
external developments in South Asia and Africa are coinciding with China’s R&D push, 
which will stimulate the production of knowledge-intensive parts and components. 
Therefore, the integration of South Asia and Africa into global value chains provides 
an opportunity for China to expand its exports of parts and components, which fall into 
the category of normal exports. For our modelling exercise, we assume the internal and 
external factors are cancelled out so that normal export growth rate remains ‘normal’.
The right-hand panel of Table 4 reports the simulation results. The consumption 
impacts are very straightforward, as the nominal investment and consumption ratio 
(I/C) grows at a much smaller rate (1.89%) under minor reform, and turns to negative 
growth (-1.85%) under moderate reform. For major economic rebalancing measures, 
the ratio declines at the largest rate (-5.45%).
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The decline of the consumption share in GDP, all in nominal terms, is contained at 
-1.51% when minor reform is introduced. Its decline is reversed to a positive growth 
rate (0.68%) if moderate reform measures are taken. For bold reform, the growth rate 
of the consumption share stands at 2.86%.
With the nominal consumption growing at a rate of between 7.31% and 10.35%, 
household utility could grow between 10.90% and 18.16% annually, depending on how 
drastic the reform measures are.
Compared to consumption, the trade impacts are less straightforward, as some reform 
measures tend to slow down imports (e.g. reduced growth of investment), while 
others stimulate imports (e.g. growing consumption). As a result, the question of how 
economic rebalancing will impact China’s foreign trade is an empirical issue. However, 
our simulation results suggest that rebalancing will tend to slow trade, for both imports 
and exports in both nominal and real terms. Deeper reform is uniformly associated with 
slower trade growth, as shown in the right-middle block of Table 4.
In the debate over China’s reform strategy, the GDP growth rate is the most talked about 
number. It is believed that a slower GDP growth rate is generally associated with more 
radical reform, while a faster one reflects the continuation of the current growth model. 
Does reform necessarily depress growth? It depends. As shown in the first two lines in 
the lower-right block of Table 4, nominal GDP indeed grows at a slower rate if reform 
is more drastic, but the opposite is true for real GDP.
The last two lines in the lower-right block of Table 4 reports the growth rates of the 
trade share, measured as the share of imports in GDP, under the ‘new normal’ scenarios. 
In terms of the import value over nominal GDP ratio, trade growth becomes slower as 
reform goes deeper. This pattern also holds if the trade share is measured by the ratio 
of import volume over real GDP. For both measures, trade growth turns negative under 
the ‘major’ reform scenario.
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4 Conclusion
Processing trade accounts for about 30%-50% of China’s total trade. In our DPN GEM 
database, with core data from China’s 2010 DPN IOT, the proportion is no less than 
34%, which is significant. It is intuitive that adjustment in China processing trade as a 
result of the stagnation of production fragmentation in the US will slow down China’s 
overall trade; it is not quite straightforward to see how the ‘new normal’ growth model 
will impact trade, as several adjustments are taking place. When considering a package 
of reform measures, our modelling exercise shows China’s transition to the ‘new normal’ 
is also contractionary in terms of trade. The new growth model unambiguously raises 
household welfare with more domestic consumption. It generates a higher growth rate 
for real GDP, but a lower one for nominal GDP.
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Appendix
Table 1 The structure of China’s DPN input-output table
Intermediate use Final use
D P N DFD EXP TOT
D ZDD ZDP ZDN fD 0 xD
P 0 0 0 0 eP xP
N ZND ZNP ZNN fN eN xN
IMP MD MP MN fM 0 xM
VA (vD)' (vP)' (vN)'
TOT (xD)' (xP)' (xN)'
Notes: D = the production for domestic use; P = the production for processing trade; N = the production for normal trade 
and other production of foreign-invested enterprises for domestic use; DFD = domestic final demands; EXP = exports; TOT 
= gross outputs (and total imports in the column TOT); IMP = imports; and VA = value added. The input-output table is 
expressed in monetary units (of 10,000 Yuan).
Table 2 Key parameters for China’s DPN IO table, 2010
Input structures (2010 billion yuan)  Input structures (shares)
D P N D P N
D 50889 1033 12621 0.52 0.21 0.54
P 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 8835 306 2979 0.09 0.06 0.13
IMP 3681 2819 2375 0.04 0.56 0.10
VA 33984 854 5528 0.35 0.17 0.24
TOT / K-L* 97389 5011 23503 0.77* 0.67* 1.04*
Note: K-L gives the capital-to-labour ratio (last row in right panel), an indication of capital-intensive or labour-intensive 
nature of specific production class, e.g. 0.67 means the type P production is labour-intensive.
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Table 3 Annual growth rates under different reform scenarios (%)
  
Foreign outsourcing 
slowdown
Transition to 
‘new normal’
Indicators Normal Minor Moderate Major Minor Moderate Major
Demand in volume   
normal exp 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
processing exp 10 8 6 4 8 6 4
investment 10 10 10 10 8 6 4
consumption 4 4 4 4 6 8 10
FDI/Innovation   
FDI (K-saving tech) 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 1.5
Innov (Hicks-
neutral)
1 1 1 1 2 3 4
Table 4 Simulation results for different reform scenarios (%)
  Foreign Outsourcing Slowdown Transition to ‘new normal’
Indicators Normal Minor Moderate Major Minor Moderate Major
Consumption   
I/C 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 1.89 -1.85 -5.45 
C/GDP -3.71 -3.58 -3.46 -3.34 -1.51 0.68 2.86 
HH utility 7.27 7.27 7.27 7.27 10.90 14.53 18.16 
Nominal C 5.59 5.39 5.19 4.99 7.31 8.89 10.35 
Trade   
imp val 11.11 10.38 9.64 8.91 9.39 7.61 5.80 
imp vol 11.11 10.38 9.64 8.91 9.39 7.61 5.80 
exp val 12.65 11.42 10.21 9.02 10.88 9.07 7.22 
exp vol 10.00 9.16 8.32 7.48 9.16 8.31 7.47 
GDP   
Nominal GDP 9.66 9.31 8.96 8.62 8.95 8.16 7.28 
Real GDP 6.75 6.69 6.64 6.58 6.95 7.18 7.43 
imp val/Ngdp 1.32 0.98 0.62 0.27 0.40 -0.51 -1.38 
imp vol/Rgdp 4.08 3.46 2.81 2.19 2.28 0.40 -1.52 
Note: I, C and GDP under “Consumption” are all in nominal terms.
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LDC export growth by 5.5% per 
annum
Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz
University of St. Gallen and CEPR; University of St. Gallen
Introduction
Conventional wisdom has it that the multilateral trading system was tested during the 
Global Crisis and passed with flying colours. No 1930s-style raising of import barriers 
occurred, ergo trade distortions were kept under control, or so the argument goes. This 
rosy view has been called into question as more data on global trade dynamics have 
come to light. Some have contested that the era of rising ratios of world trade to income 
is over, a phenomenon referred to as ‘peak trade’ (Constantinescu et al. 2014).
Why does this matter? Export-led growth is said to have been particularly important 
for many developing countries. Anything that throws sand into the wheels of a nation’s 
export machine can limit its economy’s growth prospects and the potential to create 
employment, raise wages, and lift individuals and families out of poverty. While some 
contest the contribution of higher exports to poverty alleviation and growth, arguments 
are rarely advanced that lower national exports or foreign trade distortions that limit 
such exports enhance development. Peak trade implies that one important development 
engine may have stalled.
Figure 1 provides some evidence to support of the contention that world trade growth 
has not regained its pre-Crisis momentum. The average export elasticities for several 
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groups of countries were calculated for the periods 1990-2000, 2000-2008, 2008-2010 
(the most acute years for world trade), and 2010-2013. These average export elasticities 
are crude estimates of the responsiveness of exports to world GDP, as they take the 
percentage change in the former for a given time period divided by the percentage 
change in the latter over the same time period. Ratios equal to or below 1 imply the 
export-to-world GDP ratio for a particular group of countries may have peaked.
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) had the largest average export elasticity in 
the years immediately before the Global Crisis. Indeed, their average export elasticity 
held up well during 2000-2008 as compared to 1990-2000, in contrast to other 
developing countries, the lower middle-income countries (LMICs) and upper middle-
income countries (UMICs). Once world trade began growing again, the average export 
elasticities for each group of developing countries were markedly below that of the 
pre-Crisis era. While the changes in these average elasticities were less pronounced 
for the OECD (in particular, when comparing 2000-2008 to 2010-2013), a post-Crisis 
reduction in the responsive of exports occurred. World trade dynamics, then, appear 
to have changed. Attention naturally turns to why, and whether the source of export 
growth slowdown is reversible.
The purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to summarise the findings of a study 
of the determinants of LDC export growth since the onset of the Global Crisis 
commissioned by the Government of Sweden and conducted by us (Evenett and Fritz 
2015).1 Unlike Constantinescu et al. 2014, who consider only the effects of a narrow 
class of import restrictions, our study breaks new ground by employing data on the 
trade potentially covered by trade-distorting domestic subsidies and export incentives. 
The impact on LDC exports of different classes of trade distortions was estimated and 
the total reduction in LDC export growth due to foreign trade distortions was computed 
for each of the years 2009-2013. 
1 Copies of this study are available upon request.
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Our study, therefore, sheds light on the degree to which the LDC export growth 
slowdown is due to trade distortions imposed during the Crisis era. Not only are the 
development prospects of the LDCs at stake, so is the reputation of a rules-based trading 
system during the greatest ‘stress test’ since its creation.
Figure 1 Developing country average export elasticities have fallen sharply since 
the Crisis
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Source: UN COMTRADE database (data on exports) and World Development Indicators (data on GDP measured in 2005 
US dollars).
Trade distortions faced by Least Developed Countries during 
the Crisis era
Using data collected by the Global Trade Alert team, of which both of us are members, 
first we identified the policy instruments implemented by the trading partners of 
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LDCs that have plausibly harmed the latter’s commercial interests.2 The methodology 
employed by the GTA team here is particularly conservative, so the data reported in 
Figure 2 on the incidence of different types of protectionism almost certainly understate 
the true picture. Still, in the absence of reports by the international organisations on 
measures that harm LDCs, this is the most comprehensive picture available to analysts 
and policymakers. In terms of numbers of measures implemented – but not trade 
affected – tariff increases harmed LDC commercial interests most often (117 times 
since November 2008). In second place came state aids and bailouts to firms that were 
not export subsidies. This was followed closely by hits to LDC commercial interests 
from export taxes and other export restrictions. Taken together, tariff increases, state 
aids, and export taxes and restrictions account for half of the incidence of protectionism 
faced by LDCs. Interestingly, such protectionism affects both the imports and the 
exports of LDCs.
2 To be clear, the following data refer to policy measures implemented since November 2008 that are likely to have harmed 
the commercial interests of LDCs, defined to include exporters, investors, migrant workers, and owners of intellectual 
property. It is possible that a measure harms LDC and non-LDCs. To provide a comprehensive picture we do not confine 
ourselves to foreign measures that only target one or more LDC’s commercial interests.
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Figure 2 Foreign protectionism harming LDC commercial interests, by type of 
policy instrument
Tariff increase, 
117, 21% 
Non-export 
subsidies (state 
aids), 84, 15% 
Export tax or 
restriction, 82, 
14% Export subsidy, 
53, 9% 
Local content 
requirement, 41, 
7% 
Migration limit, 37, 
7% 
Other non-tariff 
barrier, 36, 6% 
Quota, 
26, 5% 
Procurement 
favouritism, 19, 
3% 
Import ban, 
14, 3% 
FDI limit, 14, 2% Trade defence 
measure, 8, 1% 
Other, 38, 
7% 
Source: Global Trade Alert website, data extracted 28 December 2014.
Figure 2 highlights the wide range of trade distortions affecting LDCs. Trade defence 
measures – the principal form of import restriction considered by Constantinescu et 
al. (2014) and in the WTO reporting on Crisis-era protectionism – rarely affected the 
commercial interests of LDCs. If there is significant harm done to LDC exports, it must 
come from other sources.
An important difference between the GTA’s reporting on trade restrictions and that of 
international organisations is the more comprehensive approach taken by the former, 
including in particular consideration of potentially trade-distorting subsidies. An LDC 
exporter may find their sales in a trading partner reduced for at least two subsidy-related 
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reasons. First, the LDC exporter may compete against a domestic firm in the trading 
partner that has received a bailout or is being kept afloat by public subsidies. Second, 
the LDC exporter may compete in the trading partner’s markets against another exporter 
from a third country that has received an export subsidy or tax-related export incentive. 
Figure 3 Trade coverage ratios affecting LDC exports vary markedly across classes 
of trade policy instrument
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Source: Computed from Global Trade Alert reports and trade weighted using 4-digit trade flow data obtained from the 
COMTRADE database.
Figure 3 reports for each of the years 2009-2013 the trade-weighted average of the 
share of LDC exports that (a) did not face a foreign import restriction, (b) did not 
compete in product lines where there was a bailed out domestic competitor, (c) did 
not compete in product lines where there was an unsubsidised exporter from a third 
party that sold to the same foreign market, and (d) benefited from some form of trade 
liberalisation. In each case only changes in policy stance taken since November 2008 
were taken into account, hence the shares reveal the policy-induced changes in export 
market conditions facing LDCs since the onset of the Global Crisis. The higher each 
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of these shares is, the more favourable the global trading environment facing LDC 
exporters. Growth in these shares over time represents good news for LDC exporters. 
Analysts may be used to trade coverage ratios, principally for import-restricting non-
tariff barriers. The shares reported in Figure 3 are a form of trade coverage ratio but for 
a class of countries and for a wider range of policy changes, including the liberalisation 
of imports.
Figure 3 reveals that relatively few LDC exporters compete in foreign markets with 
a subsidised or bailed out domestic firm located in that foreign market (see the thick 
line with triangles at the top of the figure.) A growing share of LDC exports benefited 
from foreign trade reforms, highlighting the importance of controlling for this factor 
when estimating the determinants of LDC export growth. By 2013 over 40% of LDC 
exports were in product lines and to export destinations where some form of import 
liberalisation had occurred since 2008. The year 2010 saw a big fall in the share of 
LDC exports not affected by foreign import restrictions and, given that share has not 
changed much since 2010, it suggests that many Crisis-era import restrictions facing 
LDC exporters have yet to be unwound.
The most striking finding in Figure 3 is the very low share (around 0.1) of LDC 
exports that compete in product lines in third markets where no foreign supplier has 
been the beneficiary of an export subsidy or, as is more often the case, a tax-related 
export incentive. For sure that share rises a little in 2013, which is good news for 
LDC exporters. Nevertheless, the share is always low, suggesting that competition in 
many markets where LDC firms export is not on the merits. Indeed, to the extent that 
LDC governments cannot afford export incentives, they may be of the opinion that 
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their exporters are at a structural disadvantage.3 The amount of LDC trade potentially 
affected by foreign export incentives call into question the results of prior studies that 
have not controlled for the impact of these policies.
What factors caused the LDC export growth slowdown?
To estimate the contribution of different determinants of LDC exports, we collected the 
largest possible sample of bilateral exports from LDCs to their trading partners for the 
years 2009 to 2013. Once limits on data availability were taken into account a sample 
of 6,393 observations on such bilateral trade, accounting for over 90% of total LDC 
exports, was assembled. A standard gravity equation approach was taken, augmented 
with data on the bilateral shares of exports that benefit from trade liberalisation and 
that were not harmed by foreign import restrictions, domestic bailouts, and export 
incentives to firms based in third countries. A wide range of econometric specifications 
were employed and despite the well-known noisiness of bilateral trade data, a consistent 
pattern of econometric estimates was found.4 It is important to stress that there is 
considerable cross-sectional and intertemporal variation across the policy variables 
in our sample diminishing, in principle, concerns about spurious correlation between 
trending variables.
3 An example of a country with a wide range of fiscal incentives to export is China. See Evenett et al. (2012) for an account 
of the form and scale of China’s rebates on value added taxes available to exporters. Unlike most countries, China has 
actively expanded the products covered by these rebates as well as adjusting the magnitude of these rebates during the 
global economic crisis. Chinese policies in this regard amount to nothing less than active export management. It is 
important to note that China is not the only large trading nation to have altered fiscal incentives to export since the onset 
of the global economic crisis, as perusal of the Global Trade Alert database will reveal.
4 See Table 3 of Evenett and Fritz (2015). A barrage of robustness checks was conducted and did not alter the pattern of 
results reported here. In particular, controlling from the commodity composition of exports did not change the overall 
findings. Controlling for differences across LDCs in time to export –a factor influenced by poor infrastructure, red tape, 
etc. – if anything heightened the sensitivity of LDC exports to foreign trade distortions.
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Table 1 Conservative estimates of total annual LDC gains and losses from foreign 
policies imposed since 2009
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total for 
2009-2013
Estimated LDC export 
benefit due to foreign 
liberalisation (US$ billion)
0.33 1.91 2.75 4.54 20.6 30.12
(as a % of total observed 
LDC exports)
0.28% 1.27% 1.43% 2.43% 10.56% 3.58%
Estimated LDC export 
loss due to foreign trade 
distortions (US$ billion)
37.02 46.84 57.87 61.56 61.73 265.03
(as a % of total observed 
LDC exports)
31.86% 31.18% 30.13% 32.99% 31.63% 31.54%
Ratio of LDC trade loss to 
trade benefit
113.4 24.6 21.1 13.6 3.0 8.8
Source:  Evenett and Fritz (2015).
As in most gravity equation studies, changes in the GDP of the trading partners 
influenced LDC exports in a statistically significant manner. Interestingly, of the policy-
related variables, the share of LDC exports unaffected by foreign import restrictions 
performed worst of all. Meanwhile, foreign trade liberalisation, bailouts of domestic 
firms by trading partners, and third-party export incentives were found consistently to 
be statistically significant determinants of changes in LDC exports during the Crisis-
era. The fact that data on the former variables are much more readily available than data 
on the latter variables has probably skewed other analyses of Crisis-era trade flows.
Our most conservative econometric estimates were used to forecast the impact of 
foreign trade reforms and statistically significant foreign trade distortions on LDC 
export growth for each year from 2009 to 2013. The results are reported in Table 1. 
Foreign trade distortions are estimated to have held back LDC exports by 31.5% during 
the period 2009 to 2013, or by an amount in excess of a quarter of a trillion US dollars. 
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The beneficial impact of foreign trade liberalisation pales in contrast, accounting for at 
most one-eighth of the scale of the harm done to LDC exports. Further computations 
reveal that by far the largest contributor of harm to LDC exports comes from export 
incentives offered by third parties.
Figure 4 Trade distortions reduced total LDC export growth by 5.5% per annum 
	  
Source:  Obtained from econometric estimates reported in Evenett and Fritz (2015) and using COMTRADE data.
To appreciate the extent of the harm done by foreign trade distortions to LDC exports 
see Figure 4. Between 2000 to 2008, LDC exports grew in nominal terms at 20.6% 
per annum. Since 2008, the annual rate of growth of LDC exports has collapsed to 
an average of 5.7%. LDC exports have not peaked, but the export growth machine 
has certainly slowed down. In the absence of Crisis-era foreign trade distortions, LDC 
exports would on our estimates have grown by 11.2% per annum, suggesting that these 
distortions have cut LDC export growth on average by 5.5% per annum. Foreign trade 
distortions have thrown sand into the wheels of the LDC export growth engine.
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Policy implications: Is the export growth slowdown 
reversible?
Over time, it is becoming evident that world trade dynamics shifted after the Global 
Crisis. Fortunately, unlike the 1930s, world trade didn’t spiral downwards. However, 
export growth has slowed down and it is important to establish why. Public policy 
might be able to remedy any technological or market failure, if either were found to 
be a principal source of the problem. But analysts and officials ought to be open to the 
possibility that public policy could itself be the cause of the export growth slowdown.
In this chapter, we have summarised the findings of an extensive study of the 
determinants of the export patterns of the poorest countries on Earth – the Least 
Developed Countries. That study has shown that foreign trade distortions, principally 
in the form of state-provided export incentives, are responsible for cutting LDC exports 
by on average 5.5% per annum. This retrograde step has occurred despite WTO rules on 
subsidies, calling into question the faith that should be placed in the rules-based trading 
system. That such trade distortions are frequently buried in the minutiae of national tax 
systems is a further example of murky protectionism and the tendency of governments 
to substitute transparent for more opaque policy instruments. 
References
Constantinescu, C, A Mattoo and M Ruta (2014). “Global Trade Slowdown: Cyclical 
or Structural?”, presentation to the Third IMF-World Bank-World Trade Organization 
Trade Workshop, 6 November.
Evenett, S J, J Fritz, and Y C Jing, “Beyond Dollar Exchange Rate Targeting: China’s 
Crisis-Era Export Management Regime,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28(2), pp. 
284-300.
The Global Trade Slowdown: A New Normal?
278
Evenett S J and J Fritz (2015) Throwing Sand In the Wheels: How Foreign Trade 
Distortions Slowed LDC Export-Led Growth, report commissioned by the Government 
of Sweden.
279
16 Trade growth prospects:  
An African perspective
Ottavia Pesce, Stephen Karingi and Isabelle Gebretensaye
Economic Commission for Africa
The global trade landscape is changing fast and these changes have profound implications 
for Africa. Emerging powers are gaining a larger share of global exports, implying 
greater competition for African exporters of manufactures. The global recession has 
affected the developed world more severely than most of the developing world: signs 
of recovery in Europe, still one of Africa’s major trading partners, are weak. Emerging 
markets such as China have been a key source of demand for African commodities, 
but the fast growth that has characterised the BRICs over the past decade appears to be 
slowing down. Africa’s export growth over the past decade and a half was driven mostly 
by price effects, and prospects for a resurgence in prices for commodities are likely to 
be limited in the near to medium term, given slower growth in China and the rest of the 
world. Looking forward, trade growth prospects for Africa depend on the realisation of 
Africa’s regional integration objectives and on the impact of the trade agreements being 
negotiated with and among global economic powers. What follows discusses some of 
the potential implications of the changing trading landscape for Africa and prospects 
for trade growth. 
1 Trends in trade and GDP growth before and after 2008
Africa’s trade grew much faster than real GDP between 2002 and 2008, even more 
than what was observed at the global level, driven mostly by strong commodity prices 
(Figure 1). Differences in the growth rate of trade and of GDP tend to move together 
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with the growth rate of crude petroleum prices, both for Africa and for the world. The 
correlation between the two is strong, at 0.74 for Africa and 0.72 for the world. 
Figure 1 Difference between growth in trade and real GDP plotted against growth 
rate of crude petroleum prices 
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Source: ECA analysis of UNCTAD data. 
After the Global Crisis, the growth rate of trade plummeted more than the growth rate 
of real GDP, with the drop more marked for Africa. Trade growth exceeded that of real 
GDP in 2010-2011, but data for 2012-2013 seem to point towards another period of 
lagging trade growth. The drop in the growth rate of export volumes after the Global 
Crisis was more marked for Africa than for most other regions (Figure 2). This likely 
reflects the dominance of commodities in Africa’s exports: the concentration index of 
African exports, at 0.4, is much higher than the 0.1 average for the developing world.1 
1 ECA analysis of UNCTAD data. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index is a measure of the degree of market concentration. 
It has been normalised to obtain values from 0 to 1. An index value close to 1 indicates a very concentrated market 
(maximum concentration).
Does the post-Crisis weakness of global trade solely reflect weak demand?
Ottavia Pesce, Stephen Karingi and Isabelle Gebretensaye
281
Given the continuing low commodity prices, addressing this drop in exports will require 
Africa to diversify its production beyond commodities and tap into global value chains. 
Figure 2 Growth rate of exports, 2000-2008 versus 2009-2013 
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In value terms, Africa’s exports increased by 13% on average in the period 2000-2013, 
compared to just 2% in volume terms, i.e. the growth in the value of African exports was 
primarily driven by high commodity prices. Primary commodities represented 77% of 
Africa’s exports over 2000-2013, and fuels alone 57%.  The value index experienced a 
drop during the Crisis, then recovered until 2012. Data for 2013, however, show another 
drop, probably driven by lower commodity prices.  
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Figure 3 Volume and value indexes of Africa’s global merchandise exports
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Africa’s trade with the BRICS has grown faster than the continent’s trade with any 
other region in the world, doubling to US$340 billion between 2007 and 2012, and is 
expected to reach US$500 billion in 2015 (ECA 2013a). Over the past two decades, the 
shares of Africa’s exports to its traditional trading partners – the EU and the US – have 
declined. The EU bought 50% of Africa’s exports in 1995 and 36% in 2013, while for 
the US this percentage dropped from 15% to 9%. China, in the meantime, has become 
Africa’s main single trading partner, absorbing 16% of Africa’s exports in 2013. India 
has also emerged as an important destination (6% of Africa’s exports in 2013). These 
percentages have been growing fast over the past ten years, at 15% per year on average 
for China and 13% for India. 
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Figure 4 Destination of Africa’s exports, 1995-2013.
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In 2006, China overtook the US and the EU as the leading export destination for 
African LDCs and, since 2010, the value of African LDCs’ exports to China has on 
average been greater than that to the EU and US combined (ECA 2015). However, over 
the coming years, China is expected to switch from an export-led model of growth to 
one led by internal demand (Ramanauskan 2014), and its GDP growth rate has slowed 
(7.4% growth expected in 2015, compared to 14.2% in 2007).2 The growth in Chinese 
demand for commodities is slowing and prices for many raw materials are falling. That 
said, China’s hunger for agricultural goods, and perhaps for farm land, may grow as 
China’s population expands and the middle class becomes richer. This would present an 
opportunity for Africa, provided that it can supply China with competitive agricultural 
and non-agricultural goods (Economist 2015).
African trade with India is projected to reach US$100 billion this year and is growing 
faster than Chinese trade with Africa (Economist 2015). India’s rate of GDP growth, 
2 World Bank data. 
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however, has slowed from 10.3% in 2010 to 5% in 2013. If this trend continues, it may 
lead to lower demand for African exports. 
India is not the only emerging market experiencing a growth slowdown. Recent data 
show that growth is receding across the BRICS: emerging markets slumped in the first 
quarter of 2015 to their weakest performance since the Global Crisis (Financial Times 
2015). China’s appetite for commodities is slowing, Russia is entangled in a political 
crisis, and Brazil’s economy is in a recession. If the slowdown across the BRICS 
continues, Africa will need to further differentiate its trading partners and export 
products and to develop its internal trade in order to maintain export growth.
As mentioned, Africa’s main trading partners, both from the developed world and from 
the ‘global South’, buy mostly its commodities. Fuels accounted for between 64% 
and 76% of Africa’s exports to partners such as China, India, the US and the EU28 
(Table 1). Developed regions such as the US and Europe buy more manufactured goods 
from Africa than China or India do. These are not all high-value-added manufactured 
goods, but, in 2013, the majority of them (56% for the US and 57% for the EU28) were 
medium-to-high skill-intensive and technology-intensive. 
The fact that fuels account for the overwhelming majority of Africa’s exports to China 
and India suggests that, by deepening its trade with these countries, Africa is also 
deepening its dependency on primary commodities. Africa currently accounts for less 
than 2% of global manufacturing exports. The continent needs to find ways to increase 
the share of manufactured and higher value added goods in its commerce. This might 
be more difficult to achieve as the ‘Southern’ partners grow and develop their own 
manufacturing. On the other hand, manufactured goods represented 40% of intra-
African trade in 2013. This shows that the continental market can greatly help Africa to 
step up its value addition. 
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Table 1 Composition of Africa’s exports by partner, 2013
Good as percentage of Africa’s 
exports/trading partner 
China India US EU28
Africa with 
itself
Primary products excluding 
fuels
31% 11% 10% 16% 23%
Fuels 64% 74% 76% 65% 32%
Manufactured goods 3% 5% 12% 16% 40%
Source: ECA analysis of UNCTAD data. 
With the exception of Brazil, Africa’s main trading partners mostly export manufactured 
goods to Africa. Chinese exports to Africa, for example, were 95% manufactured 
products in 2013, compared to 60-70% for the EU, India and the US. These imports of 
manufactured goods create increased pressure for African manufacturers, which might 
find it hard to compete. 
2 Africa has the opportunity to ride on some favourable 
mega-trends
Africa currently benefits from some underlining trends that have the potential 
to accelerate its economic transformation. Africa is attracting increasing foreign 
investment flows; by the end of 2014, the continent had received more than US$80 
billion (Manson 2014a). In 2011, the rate of return on inward FDI in Africa was 9.3%, 
the highest among all regions and well above the 7.2% world average (ECA 2014a). 
Foreign investors are primarily attracted by Africa’s commodities, but are also tapping 
into other sectors, such as consumer products, business services and hospitality. By the 
end of 2014, private equity firms were estimated to have assets worth US$25 billion 
in Africa (Financial Times 2014). In 2012, the four most popular sectors for private 
equity in Africa were business services, information technology, industrial products 
and telecoms, media and communications. 
For Africa to reap the benefits of these new sources of finance, adequate policy measures 
need to be in place. For instance, FDI policies aiming at linking foreign investors to 
local businesses and promoting learning exchanges between the two can benefit 
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the local industry. Foreign investments in extractive industries need to be balanced 
with greenfield and joint venture investments in other areas of the economy, where 
knowledge exchanges, employment opportunities and local entrepreneurship can be 
created (UNCTAD 2014). Also, African governments need to support the emerging 
African-owned private equity firms so that a larger share of profits can stay in the 
continent (ECA 2014b).
State-owned sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, global banks and multinationals are 
also significant and growing sources of finance for Africa. Addressing challenges such 
as underdeveloped financial and banking systems is essential to unlock their potential.
The perception of Africa as a risky geopolitical environment is becoming less and 
less of an obstacle to investments. As an example of how reality differs from popular 
perception, Africa has experienced a consistent decline in the number of conflicts 
over the past decade and had, as of 2014, fewer conflicts than Asia (ECA 2014c). 
The continent has also made significant progress in social indicators and business 
environments over the past decade. Moreover, evidence shows that global investors 
are often willing to overlook high risks to pursue profits in Africa. The IMF expects 
investments in Africa’s frontier markets to grow at 6% a year by 2016, outpacing even 
frontier Asia as the fastest expanding region in the world (Manson 2014b).
Africa also has a high potential to raise more resources domestically through various 
channels such as taxes (Nnadozie 2010), public pension funds, well-managed resource-
revenues and sovereign wealth funds, diaspora remittances, banking revenues and stock 
market capitalisation (ECA and NPCA 2014). In 2013, the MSCI African Frontier 
Market (equity) index was up 28.5% and $10.7 billion of sovereign bonds were issued 
by capital markets in Africa. There are now five times more sovereign ratings in Africa 
than there were in 2000 (Sy 2014).
Africa’s demographic dividend is set to give a huge comparative advantage to the 
continent in the coming years. More than half of Africa’s population is under 20. 
Africa’s workforce was 460 million in 2010 and is expected to reach almost 800 
Does the post-Crisis weakness of global trade solely reflect weak demand?
Ottavia Pesce, Stephen Karingi and Isabelle Gebretensaye
287
million by 2030. Labour costs are rising fast in China (by 20% from 2007 to 2011 
alone) (Callan and Pan 2014), due to its shrinking young labour force, and Africa 
has the potential to replace China as a global manufacturing hub. In 2013, education 
levels in Africa excluding North Africa were on a par with Turkey and Mexico in the 
early 1980s, suggesting that the continent has the human capital it needs to replicate 
their success (Robertson 2013). However, Africa’s growing population also creates 
significant challenges. Rapid urbanisation requires adequate infrastructure capacity, 
healthcare and education provision, food security and environmental measures, or risks 
increasing inequality and social conflict. 
A growing African middle class is set to alter domestic markets and redraw consumption 
patterns. Africa is second only to Asia-Pacific in terms of the rate of growth of consumer 
markets, albeit starting from a low base (Deloitte 2014). The continent’s middle class 
has grown by 3.1% per year over the last three decades, reaching 350 million people, or 
34% of Africa’s total population, in 2010. If this trend continues, the growing middle 
class will drive private sector development and increase consumer spending, which is 
expected to reach US$ 1.4 trillion in 2020 (McKinsey 2010). A larger middle class with 
significant economic power is also likely to expect more political transparency and 
accountability from governments.
Africa needs to make the most of these trends to foster economic transformation, 
but benefits will not accrue automatically.  Regionally, Africa needs to consolidate 
internal markets by strengthening infrastructural capacities, for example through the 
steps envisaged by the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) 
and by Africa’s Accelerated Industrial Development Action Plan (AIDA), which aim 
to promote infrastructure development, regional integration and trade in the continent. 
Africa’s Agenda 2063 can also guide countries’ priorities.  Nationally, African 
governments need to address inequality issues, create formal sector jobs, improve 
health care and education, as well as promote sound political and macroeconomic 
governance. Additionally, improving the management of oil revenues and mining rents 
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will be important for governments to finance development plans and make sure that 
these resources are invested in Africa’s future.
3 Africa can take advantage of the changing global 
landscape
In order to benefit from the changing global landscape, Africa needs to face various 
challenges. First, Africa needs to diversify its exports, in particular to emerging 
economies, beyond primary commodities and fuel. This can be done by mapping 
opportunities for African goods in partner countries, strategically invest in upgrading 
productive capacity and skills to meet the standard required in export markets and 
reducing costs of production linked to infrastructure gaps, lack of skills and access 
to finance, bureaucratic barriers, corruption and geopolitical insecurity. Governments 
can help in addressing these barriers and in providing private sector participants with 
information about export opportunities. 
Second, Africa needs to upgrade the capabilities of its trade negotiators and strategically 
target trade agreements that not only lower barriers for Africa’s traditional products, but 
that also open up opportunities for Africa to expand beyond low value added goods. 
Moreover, the rules contained in these agreements need to be accessible to African 
firms. 
Third, Africa should pursue regional integration before, or in parallel to, bilateral, 
regional and multilateral trade arrangements with external partners. Regional markets 
provide more opportunities for Africa’s manufactured goods and can be a stepping-
stone in building global competitiveness. Creating a strong and integrated bloc would 
change Africa’s position at the negotiating table, and this is likely to bring cascading 
positive effects for Africa in all future trade agreements. Moreover, growing internal 
trade can counterbalance a slowdown in external trade caused by a prolonged downturn 
in the developed world and in emerging markets.
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4 Africa has an ambitious agenda to grow intra-
continental trade
In 2013, just over 14% of Africa’s formal imports came from fellow African countries. 
As shown in Figure 5, this compares poorly with most other regions of the world. Some 
estimates indicate that Africa’s informal internal trade is around 12% of total trade, based 
on actual payments (Mupotola 2013). Adding this percentage raises the continent’s 
internal trade significantly, but, as the same could be done for other developing regions, 
the comparison is unlikely to change and the conclusion remains that Africa’s internal 
trade is below potential.  Intra-African trade matters; through regional integration, 
African countries can reap economies of scale, expand markets and collectively benefit 
from their resources, thus gradually raising their competitiveness in the global economy 
(Ancharaz et al. 2011).
Figure 5 Intra-regional imports as a percentage of total imports, 2013 
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Despite Africa’s abundance of agricultural goods, the continent imported 89% of 
agricultural raw materials and 83% of food items from outside in 2013. For manufactured 
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goods, especially those requiring higher skills and technology, these percentages were 
even higher, as shown in Figure 6. 
Intra-African trade includes more manufactured goods than trade from Africa to the 
rest of the world. For example, while Kenya exports mostly tea, flowers, coffee and 
vegetables to Europe, it exports mainly processed goods such as cement, medical 
products and refined fuel oil to African countries (Mutiga 2014). This suggests that the 
continental market offers greater opportunities for African countries to focus on value 
added products.3  
Figure 6 Percentage of goods imported from Africa and from outside the continent 
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Despite the fact that Africa’s internal trade is more diversified than its trade with the 
outside world, it is important to note that manufactures as a share of intra-African 
exports declined from 59% in 1995 to 40% in 2013. The share of high skill-intensive 
and technology-intensive manufactures in intra-African trade declined by 23% between 
3 http://ti.au.int/en/sites/default/files/REVISED%20QA%20-%20Final%20_3_%20underlined.pdf.
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1995 and 2013. The drop was even more marked for labour-intensive and resource-
intensive manufactures (-34%).4 
Figure 7 Intra-African trade of manufactured goods and other products over time 
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The low performance of intra-African trade is despite Africa having eight Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs), each with a different degree of economic integration 
and trade liberalisation. A total of 28 African countries currently belong to three or more 
RECs5 and there is a simultaneous challenge in managing external trade relationships 
4 ECA analysis based on UNCTAD data. 
5 http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/downloads/publications/2014/2014-facts-&-figures-regional-integration-uniting-
to-compete.pdf.
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such as economic partnership agreements (EPAs)6 with the EU, trade with the emerging 
powers and multilateral negotiations under the WTO. Economic motivations are not 
always the only reasons for African countries to join RECs. A survey conducted by 
ECA in 2006 found that half of the countries surveyed cited political and strategic 
reasons as the main determinants for joining RECs (ECA 2006). Political moves might 
have contributed to creating an intricate RECs environment on the continent. As shown 
in Figure 8, Africa’s RECs have different performances in terms of internal trade: while 
20% of the exports from EAC countries stayed within the bloc, only 1% of ECCAS 
exports were traded within the community. As shown in Figure 8, only the most 
successful African RECs, such as the EAC and the SADC, compare favourably to the 
performance of trading communities from other regions of the world, such as ASEAN.
Figure 8 Percentage of exports directed within the trading community, 2013 
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6 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are free trade agreements between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States (ACP) countries, with negotiations beginning in 2002. In Africa, EPAs only concern non-North Africa 
countries. They aim to make ACP trade regimes reciprocal, phasing out previous trade preferences and barriers. EPAs 
require African countries to liberalise 80% of their markets before October 2014. In return, African countries maintain 
preferential access to EU markets.
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In what follows, we explore some of the reasons that seem to undermine the effectiveness 
of Africa’s RECs in promoting intra-Africa trade. 
Despite some progress, commitments made at the regional level have often not been 
implemented by member states (AfDB, OECD and UNDP 2014). Trading across 
borders in Africa remains more expensive than in other regions of the world. The cost of 
exporting a container from an African country overseas is US$2,000, more than double 
the cost estimated for Asia (US$900) (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014).
Significant tariffs still remain among RECs. In 2013, average protection within Africa 
was about 8.7%, versus 2.5% towards the rest of the world. For strictly industrial 
products the difference was even starker: 9.0% versus 2.3% (Mevel and Karingi 2013). 
Therefore, trade within Africa remains more limited by protectionism than trade outside 
of Africa. Moreover, the eight RECs are very different starting blocks: their size varies 
from 92 to 551 million people and their GDP from US$98 billion to US$974 billion. 
For example, in the SADC, the income of a person living in the Seychelles is 49 times 
higher than that of someone living in fellow SADC member D.R. Congo. Levels of 
human development, human rights, safety and rule of law also differ widely not only 
among RECs but among their members (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014).
Trans-national threats such as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and protracted conflicts 
in areas such as South Sudan, Somalia and the Great Lakes region still undermine 
some integration efforts. Free movement of people within the continent is also lagging 
behind – only five African countries (Seychelles, Mozambique, Rwanda, Comoros and 
Madagascar) offer visa-free access or visas on arrival to other African citizens. Despite 
the efforts made through agreements such as the Yamoussoukro decision, which aims 
to progressively liberalise aviation in Africa, the sector remains a weak support to the 
continent’s integration – there are only a handful of intercontinental carriers in Africa, 
flying in the continent remains extremely expensive (Economist 2013) and non-African 
airlines account for 80% of the intercontinental market share.
The Global Trade Slowdown: A New Normal?
294
5 The CFTA can deliver large benefits for Africa’s trade 
In December 2010, African trade ministers meeting in Kigali, Rwanda, agreed on a fast 
track agenda for the CFTA, aiming to address Africa’s low internal trade performance. 
The CFTA would eliminate tariffs and quotas on most goods and services among 54 
African countries with a combined population of more than 1 billion people and a 
combined GDP of more than US$1.2 trillion. The CFTA could help African economies 
become more competitive internationally, since regional markets are easier to penetrate 
and have less restrictive standards than foreign markets.
A computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis by Karingi and Mevel in Cheong et 
al. (2013) estimated that the CFTA could stimulate intra-African trade by up to US$35 
billion per year, or 52% above the baseline by 2022. It could also lead to a US$10 billion 
decrease in imports from outside the continent, while boosting agriculture and industrial 
exports by up to US$4 billion (7%) and US$21 billion (5%), respectively. Gains in 
real income and employment could be even higher if the CFTA is complemented by 
trade facilitation reforms, reductions of non-tariff barriers, improved infrastructure and 
measures to counter-balance some of the negative effects associated with liberalisation 
reforms, such as a loss of tariff revenue (AfDB 2014).
If progresses in facilitating trade (specifically, reducing costs to trade across borders)7 
are made in parallel with eliminating tariff barriers on goods within Africa, the share 
of formal intra-African trade could more than double by 2022, from 14% to 22% 
(Mevel and Karingi 2012). The gain could be larger still if informal traders were better 
integrated into the formal system, as statistics on intra-African trade do not include 
informal cross-border trade (likely to be extremely high). Most of the benefits would 
be felt in industry, which is unsurprising as intra-African trade already tends to be more 
diversified and to have relatively higher industrial content than Africa’s trade with the 
7 Assuming that customs procedures are made twice as efficient and the time goods spend in African ports is halved.
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rest of the world. Deepening regional integration could also make African nations less 
dependent on outside partners for their industrial needs (ECA 2015).
The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), which is currently 
being negotiated and should come into effect by the end of 2015, is a large stepping-
stone towards the CFTA. The TFTA will span the whole of East Africa, from the Cape 
to the North African coast, creating Africa’s largest free trade area. It would cover 26 
countries,8 with a combined population of 625 million people and a total GDP of US$1 
trillion, or 58% of the continent’s economic activity (de Melo 2014).
6 Services should form an integral part of Africa’s trade 
reform agenda
In 2013, all African countries for which data were available exported services. Africa’s 
exports of services increased from US$32.7 billion in 2002 to US$94.9 billion in 
2013,9 a remarkable rise. In 2013, services accounted for the largest contribution to 
GDP in 35 out of 54 African countries and data show that, over the past decade, the 
movement of workers in Africa has been out of agriculture and into services, rather than 
manufacturing (World Bank 2014).
Given the potential of services to support Africa’s economic transformation, the 
sector should form an integral part of the ongoing CFTA. The SADC is by far the 
most advanced REC in services liberalisation. In August 2012, SADC members signed 
the Protocol on Trade in Services, with a mandate to progressively remove barriers 
to the free movement of services. In April 2012, negotiations on the liberalisation of 
six priority sectors (communication services, construction services, energy-related 
services, financial services, tourism services, and transport services) were launched, 
8 Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
9 International Trade Centre data. 
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and are foreseen to be completed by the end of 2015. These negotiations are expected 
to result in market access commitments that will provide a predictable legal environment 
for trade and investment in the sector within the region.10 Other RECs should follow 
this pattern. The CFTA is expected to lead to deep regulatory reforms that will promote 
and accelerate trade in services across the continent. African countries, especially those 
with a large share of services in their economy, should push forward the intra-African 
reform agenda for the sector, especially as part of the CFTA.  
Reducing barriers to trade in services would allow countries to benefit from the 
competitive advantage of their neighbours – sourcing, for example, good business 
support services in their region – and at the same time support the growth of domestic 
manufacturing and other sectors of the economy. 
7 Conclusions: Prospects for Africa’s trade 
In order to benefit from the changing global trading landscape, where the emphasis 
is shifting more and more towards bilateral economic agreements among the largest 
world powers and blocs, Africa needs to act and negotiate as a united entity. The 
implementation of the CFTA and other agreements aiming to deepen integration 
in Africa should be the major focus for the continent, taking precedence over the 
negotiation of trade agreements with the rest of the world. Studies have shown that the 
CFTA is likely to bring large benefits to Africa. Where possible, the timing of trade 
agreements with the rest of the world should be altered in order for Africa to have the 
CFTA in place before signing them. 
At the same time, Africa needs to negotiate or renew trade agreements strategically, 
with an eye to making them a strategic support for its industrialisation, value addition, 
economic diversification and private sector development. This implies carefully 
10  http://www.sadc.int/themes/economic-development/trade-services/.
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negotiating details, such as rules of origin and quality requirements, which can allow 
African firms to compete on an equal basis and benefit from trade preferences. In order 
to achieve this, African negotiators need to be well trained and equipped with adequate 
know-how. 
In parallel to negotiating trade agreements more strategically, Africa should tackle 
structural impediments to the competitiveness of its firms by improving access to 
finance, reducing infrastructure barriers, raising technical and business skills, improving 
links with foreign investors and among various sectors of the economy, and building 
regional value chains that would allow the continent to export more finished products 
(Pesce et al. 2015). Africa is increasingly substituting its traditional trading partners 
with emerging economies such as India and China. While the diversification of trade 
partners might bring some benefits for the continent, Africa needs to ensure that it does 
not lose out, in terms of export variety and value addition, in this exchange. 
Most of the increase in Africa’s exports seen over the past decade has been driven 
by price effects, and more specifically by the high prices of commodities. In a future 
where such prices are likely to be ever more volatile, Africa urgently needs to reduce 
the dependence of its trade on primary commodities. The intra-African market can be 
an important stepping-stone for Africa to develop its global competitiveness, and it is 
already more diversified than Africa’s trade with the outside world.  However, intra-
African trade in manufactured goods has gone down in recent years and the integration 
agenda for the continent should aim to boost it. Also, dependence on external markets 
for basic commodities such as agricultural products, in which Africa abounds, should 
be reduced.  In the framework of increasing intra-African trade, services are an 
important area that should not be neglected. A better integrated market for services can 
support economic transformation in the continent and offer opportunities to countries, 
such as landlocked countries and island states, which are struggling to develop through 
manufacturing (ECA 2013b). 
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Africa is entering an exciting era for trade. The next decade is likely to see the 
implementation of major trade agreements (most notably the CFTA), increased 
integration and wider liberalisation policies through regional and international forums, 
and possibly the introduction of an African common monetary union (or at least of 
regional monetary unions). These changes offer the chance to minimise tariff and 
monetary barriers to trade on the continent.
Moreover, Africa has recently seen growth in a number of non-traditional sectors, 
such as services (notably I.T., financial and insurance services, tourism, transport 
and construction). These services are increasingly traded within and from Africa. The 
progressive diversification of trade and sources of growth away from just commodities 
will help reduce the volatility of Africa’s exports’ value and economic growth and their 
dependence on commodity prices.  
On the infrastructure side, accelerated investments from an increasingly diversified 
array of financial sources (private equity, sovereign bond, foreign investments among 
others) are expected to reduce physical barriers to trade on the continent. 
On the supply side, Africa’s industrialisation agenda and the creation of regional value 
chains are expected to lead to a shift to higher value added products, and therefore 
to higher-value exports.  If Africa gets those steps right, trade within and outside the 
continent has the potential to multiply in the years ahead. 
Africa’s economic growth is also likely to continue, and at a sustained rate as African 
countries graduate from LDC status and the emerging middle class drives demand. 
Despite the expected stagnation in commodity prices and the forecast reduction in 
demand from China and other emerging markets, the abundance of natural resources 
is likely to continue sustaining Africa’s growth over the coming years. According to 
British Petroleum (2015), Africa will account for 10% of global oil and 9% of natural 
gas production in 2035. Nonetheless, Africa has much to gain from further diversifying 
its exports beyond commodities. 
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Along with its natural resource endowments, Africa has the potential to benefit from 
the positive mega-trends discussed above, such as a younger and more educated labour 
force, better macroeconomic and political stability, urbanisation driving consumer 
demand and increased and more varied sources of finance. If African governments put 
in place the right policies to harness these opportunities – taking strategic actions to 
create jobs and enhance education, infrastructure, business environment, transparency 
and predictability, economic and political stability, the continent has the chance to 
accelerate its growth over the coming decade. 
Given the significant improvements expected to advance the trading environment 
in and from Africa, it is likely that trade growth will again surpass output growth in 
the continent over the coming years. But whether this trend will be sustained or will 
only be a short-term effect of trade liberalisation depends on the effectiveness of the 
trade agreements and accompanying policies needed to make ‘made in Africa’ more 
diversified and more competitive in the global arena. 
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17 ‘Peak trade’ in the steel sector
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Introduction
Worldwide the steel sector directly employs two million people plus another six 
million in supporting sectors (World Steel Association 2014) As such, it is a major 
manufacturing sector and one that receives considerable attention from policymakers. 
Changes appear to be afoot in this sector. During the boom years of 2000-2008, the 
total value of global trade in steel grew in nominal terms by 18% per year.1 In contrast, 
between 2008 and 2013 global steel trade fell by 5% per year. By 2013, global steel 
trade had fallen to levels not seen since before 2007 (Figure 1).2 The steel sector, then, 
may be an example of a leading sector where trade has peaked.
While many factors – not least economic developments in the larger emerging markets – 
may influence the total amount of steel exported worldwide, changes in public policies 
that treat domestic and foreign suppliers differently may have also played a part. For 
example, recent press reports point to a new wave of EU anti-dumping actions against 
steel imported from China and Russia.3 
1 In the preparation of this chapter data on steel trade was taken from the UN COMTRADE database for the following four 
digit product categories: 7206-7229, 7301, 7302, 7304-7307, 7325, 7326, and 8607.
2 World Steel Association (2014) reports on the volume of global steel trade. Measured in terms of millions of tonnes of 
finished steel that peaked in 2007. So-called “quantum indices” are also presented and these show that the volume of 
global trade has not recovered to 2008 levels. 
3 See Financial Times (2015). More generally, the OECD (2015) shows that there was a sharp rise in anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty actions taken against steel imports in the years 2012 to 2014, exceeding in total 20 cases per year. 
Six (non-OECD) nations resorted to safeguard measures and four to tariff increases in steel. 
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Using data contained in the independent Global Trade Alert database,4 the purpose of 
this chapter is to demonstrate the scale of different types of policy interventions that 
have confronted firms trading in this prominent sector of the world economy. While 
much commentary and research on this sector focuses on import restrictions, these 
are hardly new and may not easily account for the observed shifts in trade patterns. 
Our focus here will be on a broader range of policy changes implemented between 
November 20085 and the end of 2014 that could affect cross-border trade in steel.6 
Our approach is also balanced, taking account of trade reforms as well as government 
measures that discriminate against foreign commercial interests. 
Figure 1 Global steel exports have fallen back to levels seen before 2007
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Source: UN COMTRADE. See footnote 3 for the 4-digit product lines used to compute these totals.
4 A description of this database can be found in Section 3 of Evenett (2011).
5 In this month G20 leaders first came together in crisis mode in Washington, DC and declared, amongst other matters, that 
they would refrain from protectionism. 
6 A comparison between the information collected by the Global Trade Alert team and by the WTO can be found in 
Chapter 4 of Evenett (2014). 
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Number of new trade distortions and reforms introduced 
since November 2008
It has long been recognised that policies other than traditional import restrictions –such 
as tariffs, quotas, and trade defence measures – can influence international trade. With 
that in mind, the Global Trade Alert team collects information on any public policy 
measure that alters the relative treatment of domestic suppliers vis-à-vis their foreign 
rivals. The information on such measures taken since November 2008 that relate to steel 
products was extracted from the Global Trade Alert database.
Figure 2 presents the total number of new7 trade distortions and trade reforms affecting 
the steel sector implemented since November 2008. Bearing in mind that the data 
collected for 2008 relates only to measures implemented in November and December 
of that year, and given the desire to compare totals across years, the totals for 2008 
reported here are annualised totals. It should be immediately apparent that in every year 
from 2008 to 2013, the total number of new policy interventions that discriminate in 
one way or the other against foreign suppliers are multiples of the total number of new 
trade reforms and measures that treat domestic and foreign firms neutrally.
Since the onset of the Global Crisis, the total number of implemented trade distortions 
that affect the steel sector broadly has followed the worldwide totals. Compared to 
2008, more new trade distortions were implemented in 2009, when fears about a 
possible resurgence of protectionism were at their peak. The total number of new trade 
distortions affecting the steel sector fell in 2010 and then began rising, so much so that 
the total for 2013 almost reached the level witnessed in 2009. Given reporting lags, the 
totals for 2013 and 2014 are likely to be revised upwards. Crisis-era trade distortions to 
the global steel trade were not confined to a burst of protectionism in 2009. As global 
7 Therefore, the Global Trade Alert database does not include information on the stock of protectionism inherited from 
before November 2008. 
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economic growth prospects have faded, resort to new trade distortions in the steel sector 
has grown.8
Figure 2 Annual totals of new trade distortions and reform measures introduced 
during the crisis era that directly implicate steel products
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Source: Global Trade Alert. 
The steel sector has seen numerous trade defence and safeguard measures implemented 
over the years. This has continued since the onset of the Crisis (see Figure 2). Of the 
trade measures that discriminate against foreign suppliers in the Global Trade Alert 
database and that implicate the steel sector, 49% are trade defence and safeguard 
actions (Figure 3). Tariff increases on steel products account for another 14% of Crisis-
era measures taken in this sector. Of course, these percentages refer to the total counts 
of measures implemented and not to the amounts of trade potentially affected.
8 The dip in the total number of discriminatory instruments implemented in 2014 is, if prior experience of the Global Trade 
Alert team is anything to go on, almost entirely due to reporting lags. 
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However, governments have resorted to other public policy measures that tilt the playing 
field in favour of local firms. Figure 3 also reveals that 35 local content requirements, 
27 export incentives and favourable trade finance measures, 20 ‘buy national’ public 
procurement measures, and 13 other non-tariff measures have been implemented that 
are likely to have distorted steel trade. 
Figure 3 The mix of policy instruments imposed during the Crisis era that 
discriminate against foreign suppliers of steel
Trade defence and 
safeguard, 181, 38% 
Tariff increases, 124, 
26% 
Local content 
requirement, 37, 
8% 
Export incentives and 
trade finance, 27, 6% 
Non tariff barrier (not 
otherwise specified), 
23, 5% 
Public procurement, 
20, 4% 
Bail out / state aid 
measure, 13, 3% 
Import quota, 12, 3% 
Export taxes or 
restriction, 11, 2% 
Other trade 
distortions, 23, 5% 
Source: Global Trade Alert.
Trade policy interventions can be temporary or longer lasting. Table 1 provides 
information on how many discriminatory and trade-reforming measures implemented 
in a given year were still in effect at the end of subsequent years. In all but one year, 
the percentage of trade reforms that were still longer in force at the end of 2014 was 
less than or equal to the percentage of trade distortions still in effect. Thus, during the 
Crisis era reform measures in the steel sector trade have tended to be phased out sooner 
than trade distortions; including trade defence and safeguard measures strengthens this 
conclusion. 
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Steel trade in product lines affected by selected trade 
distortions
For public policy interventions that affect cross-border trade in goods, the reports 
from the Global Trade Alert database identify the associated 4-digit tariff lines 
(product categories). With the UN COMTRADE database, therefore, it is possible to 
compute the total value of steel trade that is in the 4-digit tariff lines implicated by 
the implementation of a public policy measure. Furthermore, information on the date 
a measure came into force and, where necessary, was withdrawn allows for the total 
amount of steel trade affected by Crisis-era policy interventions to be tracked over time.
In the case of a tariff increase on a certain steel product implemented on a most favoured 
nation (MFN) basis, the steel trade affected is the total value of steel imports in the 
relevant 4-digit product line by the jurisdiction implementing the tariff increase. For 
policy interventions that are not applied on an MFN basis, the bilateral nature of the 
COMTRADE database can be exploited to identify the relevant trade flow.
Data on the total value of steel products potentially affected by new tariff increases, new 
local content requirements, and new trade defence and safeguard actions taken since 
November 2008 are reported in Table 2 for the years 2009 to 2013. The data reported 
for a given year and policy instrument refer to the total amount of steel trade potentially 
affected by policy instruments of that year that are still in effect at the end of the year 
in question. Therefore, if no or few measures are unwound or withdrawn over time, the 
reported totals will almost certainly rise as new measures are introduced. 
Despite the frequency of trade defence and safeguard actions, they cover less steel 
trade than tariff increases and new local content requirements. In fact, over the years 
2009-2013 nearly 19% more steel trade was affected by tariff increases than by trade 
defence measures and safeguard actions. Over the same time frame, the total amount 
of steel trade potentially affected by new local content requirements ($172 billion) 
was double the amount affected by trade defence actions and safeguards ($82 billion). 
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These findings give some sense of the relative importance of different threats to the 
flow of steel trade.
Table 2 Total steel trade potentially covered by different Crisis-era policy 
interventions
Policy change
Total value of steel exports in 4-digit product lines  
affected by policy instrument 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
New tariff increases 16.08 17.19 14.69 23.63 26.07
New local content 
requirements
18.44 29.89 39.66 44.47 39.76
New trade defence 
measures
6.46 8.24 16.11 24.56 26.96
New export incentives: 
beneficiary
30.00 38.47 49.16 51.10 55.10
New export incentives: 
unsubsidised rivals 
competing with beneficiary
228.06 277.99 338.19 309.81 317.85
Notes: 4-digit HS code data were used to compute these totals. Different levels of aggregation may well produce different 
estimates of potential trade affected.
Source: Global Trade Alert and UN COMTRADE. 
Some governments offer tax-related incentives for exporting products, including steel 
products.9 Others offer generous trade finance schemes for goods, for which steel 
products are eligible. Table 2 reports the total amount of steel exports that are in tariff 
lines eligible for such export incentives. The relevant totals rise over time from $30 
billion in 2009 to over $55 billion in 2013.
9 An example is Brazil (see http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/brazil-tax-refund-all-companies-exporting-
manufactured-goods).
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Table 3 Total value of exports eligible for export incentives, by year and 
implementing jurisdiction
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total steel trade eligible for 
export incentives
30.00 38.47 49.16 51.10 55.10
Export incentives provided by 
Brazil
4.28 4.94 7.70 6.99 5.10
Export incentives provided by 
China
25.72 33.52 41.46 43.51 44.37
Export incentives provided by 
India
n.a. 0.01 0.00 0.53 5.55
Export incentives provided by 
Uruguay
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.07 0.07
Notes: 4-digit HS code data were used to compute these totals. Different levels of aggregation may well produce different 
estimates of potential trade affected.
Source: Global Trade Alert and UN COMTRADE. 
The growth of such subsidised steel exports is likely to have affected conditions of 
competition in third markets. Table 2 includes calculations of the total amount of steel 
trade that is shipped from jurisdictions not offering export incentives to third markets 
where at least one subsidised steel exporter also ships the same type of steel product. 
From 2009 to 2013, in total over $300 billion of unsubsidised steel exports faced direct 
competition in third markets from one or more subsidised rivals.
For each year from 2009 to 2013, Figure 4 breaks down the global total of steel exported 
into three parts: total value of steel exports that are eligible for some kind of export 
incentive, total value of unsubsidised steel exports that compete with rivals that are 
eligible for export incentives, and the total value of unsubsidised steel exports that are 
shipped to foreign markets where no unsubsidised rival competes. Our calculations 
imply that only a fifth of global steel trade is neither subsidised nor competes directly 
against a subsidised rival in third markets.
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Figure 4 Only a fifth of global steel trade is neither subsidised nor competes directly 
with exporters from jurisdictions offering export incentives
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That so many export incentives have been offered for steel products may help account 
for the recorded falls in hot rolled and cold rolled steel prices. The price per tonne of 
Chinese hot rolled coil has fallen from over $700 in 2011 to nearly $350 in the first 
quarter of 2015 (Financial Times 2015). 
Since the Global Trade Alert database includes information on the implementing 
jurisdiction, it is also possible to identify which countries are responsible for the export 
incentives in the steel sector. Moreover, it is possible to calculate the total amount of 
steel exports from those countries that are eligible for these incentives in a given year, 
see Table 3. It is important to stress here that data on the actual use of these incentives 
are not available – hence the approach taken here is to compute the total value of exports 
in product lines known to be eligible for export incentives.10 By 2013, over $5 billion 
of steel exports from Brazil and India were in product lines eligible for such incentives. 
The comparable total for China is nine times larger, at just under $45 billion.11
Concluding remarks
This chapter has demonstrated that in the steel sector since the onset of the Global 
Crisis:
• Cross-border trade in steel has peaked with volumes stagnant (at best).
• A focus on traditional trade policy interventions would provide a misleading picture 
of developments in the global market for steel. 
• Measures to liberalise trade in steel are being phased out faster than measures that 
discriminate against foreign suppliers of steel.
10 It is also worth noting that subsidiaries of foreign steel companies operating in these countries may be eligible for export 
incentives too.
11 On 1 January 2015, China altered its VAT rebates on steel products. May (2014) is typical of the commentary on the 
likely impact of such policy changes on the world price of steel. 
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• In terms of likely steel trade affected, the impact of various state-provided incentives 
to export is far greater than steps to raise tariffs, impose local content requirements, 
and implement trade defence measures.
• Only a fifth of global steel trade is shipped to markets where there is no subsidised 
foreign supplier. 
‘Peak trade’ in steel has occurred at a time when certain governments have scaled up 
different types of export incentives. Further research will have to ascertain the extent to 
which such incentives merely reshuffled market shares across suppliers and resulted in 
greater risk premia for investments in new capacity and the like.
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18 Supporting the micro-
multinationals to help achieve 
peak trade1
Usman Ahmed, Brian Bieron and Hanne Melin
eBay Public Policy Lab
The prototypical model for trade has involved a large domestic company setting up 
overseas operations and eventually establishing a multinational supply chain with 
vendors and consumers located around the world.  This model continues to be the 
dominant one for trade, and as this eBook suggests, is stagnating a bit.  Interestingly, 
there is an emerging model for trade that could help to fill the gap.  
In 2005, former University of California, Berkley economist Hal Varian wrote a 
groundbreaking piece in the New York Times about a new trend whereby small 
businesses were leveraging technology, particularly the internet, to locate employees 
and access customers around the world (Varian 2005). Varian coined the term ‘micro-
multinationals’ to describe this new phenomenon.  But, notably, Varian’s article did not 
have much data to back it up and instead relied upon case studies, describing a future 
where this emerging trend would become commonplace.  
The data analysis contained in this chapter is the realisation of Varian’s 2005 
prediction.  Micro-multinational exporters are now a widespread phenomenon.  The 
internet has created a truly global digital network.  When the internet is combined 
with commercial services and efficient logistics, small businesses can connect with 
1 This article has been adapted from a recently released eBay Marketplaces Report entitled 2015 US Small Business 
Global Growth Report.
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consumers and establish trust across national and cultural borders. We use the term the 
‘global empowerment network’ to describe this model.  It runs alongside the traditional 
internationalisation archetype for participation in trade, described above, known as the 
global value chain model. 
At the eBay Public Policy Lab, we have spent the last four years examining the impact 
of globalisation and technology on small business commerce around the world.  This 
chapter utilises newly released data analysis from eBay Marketplaces looking at small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from across the US.  We argue that the eBay 
Marketplace provides an illustration of a new model for technology-enabled trade that 
is taking shape.  Importantly, we believe our findings to be applicable generally to the 
nexus of trade and technology. 
A team of economists at Sidley Austin LLP supported our efforts by conducting the 
economic research contained in this chapter, which is based on a global dataset of eBay 
Marketplace transactions from 2004 to 2014.  The piece compares findings from eBay 
Marketplaces with ‘traditional’ trade flows between the US and other countries that 
have been gleaned from US Department of Commerce and US Census data, as well as 
from World Bank data.   
This chapter will walk through the major findings that have come to light from our 
research.  The first finding is that small businesses leveraging technology export 
around the world at unprecedented rates compared to traditional SMEs.  Second, this 
exporting leads to better survival and growth outcomes.  Third, technology is helping 
to create a more inclusive economic model by bringing small businesses into the tent 
of beneficiaries from global trade.  Fourth, technology can help reduce the effect of 
traditional barriers to trade.  
If micro-multinational trade is so widespread and beneficial, why has trade slowed 
down over the last few years?  We believe that the reasons for this are three-fold: 1) 
this is still an emerging trend and many more micro-multinationals will be born over 
the coming decade; 2) trade statistics are not well suited to capture the impact that the 
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internet is having on global trade; and 3) trade barriers have a disproportionate effect 
on micro-multinationals, and policy solutions have yet to be put in place to help these 
SMEs.  
This chapter will describe key policy actions that, if taken, would enhance the 
ability of micro-multinationals to reach world markets more effectively.  Legal rules 
and administrative procedures have a key role to play in ensuring that the global 
empowerment network provides increasing opportunities for technology-enabled SMEs 
to directly participate in global commerce.  If we want to achieve ‘peak trade’, we need 
to create a new initiative within the global trade regime that is designed specifically to 
facilitate the new type of trade – micro-multinational trade.  
Exploring the world as global traders
Traditionally, SMEs have been limited by distance in terms of their ability to explore 
foreign markets, since most customers had to physically enter a business to transact. 
Reaching a customer in a different state, let alone in a different country, seemed like an 
impossible task for most SMEs.  The internet has changed the calculus.  
eBay Marketplaces data demonstrate that 95% of US-based SMEs on the eBay platform 
sell to customers in foreign countries.  In short, they export.  This is in stark contrast to 
traditional businesses in the US, of which only about 4% engage in exporting (Bernard 
et al. 2007) (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 Share of firms exporting
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
Micro-multinationals Traditional businesses 
In many cases these are truly global businesses, exporting to nearly every corner of the 
world. In 2014, SMBs on eBay exported to 215 markets around the world.  Moreover, 
this is not a niche trend, but rather a growing phenomenon.  To demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of the unprecedented geographic reach and scale of these technology-
enabled SMEs, we have placed them into three categories:   ‘International’ = exports 
to two continents; ‘Multinational’ = exports to three continents; ‘Global’ = export to 
four or more continents (Figure 2).  In 2014, there were 32,649 US SMEs that sold to 
two continents and 56,373 US SMEs that sold to three continents.  Most notably, over 
190,000 US SMEs had global reach, exporting to four or more continents in 2014.  
Figure 2 Number of SMEs reaching two, three and four+ continents
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Surviving and thriving
The idea that trade leads to firm growth is one that most economists hold almost as 
self-evident.  The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Jason Furman stated, 
“[T]he ability to sell to a larger world market allows firms to take better advantage of 
increasing returns to scale” (Furman 2015). But, the complexities involved in exporting 
can often lead to high failure rates (i.e. ceasing to export) among firms.  The World 
Bank collects data on exporting firms from around the world.  This database does not 
contain information on the US, but the three-year export survival rates in representative 
developed European countries (Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Estonia, Bulgaria, and 
Belgium)  is  just 15.7%.2  In stark contrast is 2014 data from eBay Marketplaces, 
which demonstrates that 74% of micro-multinationals are still exporting after three 
years (Figure 3).
Figure 3 Survival rate for exporters
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Exports on the eBay platform increased nearly 300% between 2004 and 2014, while 
overall exports in the US increased by less than 100% over the same time frame.3  It 
is also useful to track the growth of export-oriented firms to demonstrate the economic 
principle that exporting firms grow because of increasing returns to scale.  We looked 
at SMEs on eBay from 2010 to 2014 and found that domestic-focused firms (those 
2 Average of similarly situated markets in World Bank Exporter Dynamics Database.
3 International Trade Centre, Trade Map database. 
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with less than 50% of sales going to international consumers) grew 58% over that time 
frame, whereas export-oriented firms [those with greater than 50% of sales going to 
international consumers) grew 91% (Figure 4).  Export-oriented firms grew 57% faster 
than their domestic-focused counterparts.
Figure 4 Growth of export-oriented firms
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
Export-oriented Domestic-focused 
Creating a more inclusive model for global commerce
The benefits of global trade have traditionally been captured almost entirely by large 
established firms.  Small businesses could not afford the large infrastructure, marketing, 
and capital costs required to engage in global trade.  The internet now enables an SME 
to ‘go global’ instantly.  This explains why start-up (newcomer) businesses on the eBay 
Marketplace are able to capture 12.7% of the export market in just one year, whereas, 
globally, new enterprises make up only 5% of the traditional export market4 (Figure 5).
The reciprocal factor of start-ups struggling to gain market share in the traditional 
economy is that the largest traditional entities maintain much of the market share. 
Globally, the top 5% of exporters account for 82% of the export market.5  This is not 
the case for SMEs using the eBay Marketplace.  The top 5% of micro-multinationals 
only account for 55% of the exports on the eBay platform, underscoring how the online 
marketplace is a more inclusive venue for SMEs (Figure 6).
4  Average of similarly situated markets in World Bank Exporter Dynamics Database
5  See footnote 8.
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Figure 5 Market share of newcomers
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Figure 6 Market share of top 5% of businesses
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Breaking down the barriers to economic opportunity
Small businesses continue to face disproportionate barriers to trade, despite the positive 
effect that the internet has had in reducing marketing and communication costs.  One 
of the major barriers that has inhibited micro-multinationals has been language.  This 
has been an area of focus for eBay; the company has created machine translation 
technology that can help reduce the challenges associated with language.  Over the 
past decade, language as a barrier to trade by US-based micro-multinationals has been 
reduced by more than two-thirds on the eBay platform.  In 2004, trading with a buyer 
from a country with English as the official language used to boost exports of US-based 
sellers by 150%, but in 2014 it ‘only’ increased exports by 44% – that’s a two-thirds 
reduction within a decade (Figure 7)
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Figure 7 Reduction in language as a barrier to trade
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There are several other barriers to trade that continue to inhibit micro-multinationals. 
Customs, in particular, is noted by micro-multinationals as a particularly onerous 
barrier to trade.   Trade agreements are one of the most effective methods for improving 
customs processes and reducing feeds and paperwork.  eBay has served as a platform 
for micro-multinationals to organise and demonstrate their support for policy issues 
that would reduce business frictions.  In early 2015, micro-multinationals using eBay 
sent over 50,000 emails to members of the United States Congress expressing support 
for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Hattem and Trujillo 2015). The TPP is a trade 
agreement between the US and 11 other markets that represents more than 35% of the 
exports from US-based micro-multinationals on eBay.
Micro-multinationals have struggled to present a voice on policies that limit their ability 
to access international markets.  But, their issues are of tremendous importance as they 
represent an entrepreneurial exporting class of business that governments should seek 
to promote.  
The final section of this chapter will lay out specific policy recommendations for 
governments around the world to consider in order to facilitate the continued growth of 
micro-multinationals.   
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Policy Recommendations
Poor government policies can have a particularly powerful effect on SMEs.  The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development finds that proportionate 
compliance costs can be 10 to 30 times greater for small firms than for larger firms 
(OECD 2014). Moreover, micro-multinationals are a relatively new segment of trader, 
which means they have never before been a meaningful part of trade negotiations and 
the policy solutions needed to facilitate micro-multinational trade have therefore not 
been proposed, let alone implemented, within the traditional trade regime.  This section 
will highlight four policy recommendations that would enhance the ability of US micro-
multinationals to access the global market.  
• Raise de minimis levels: The de minimis threshold is the monetary level below 
which an importer of physical goods is exempted from customs duty and paperwork 
requirements. Returns are an essential part of the retail experience.  In the current 
environment, providing cross-border returns is difficult for micro-multinationals 
because if a good is valued at a level above the de minimis threshold, then upon 
its return it may be subject to customs duty and paperwork requirements, with the 
burden falling on the seller.  De minimis levels around the world are varied, with 
some countries setting them as high as $1,000 and others with no de minimis level 
(GEA 2013). Raising de minimis thresholds through trade agreements would reduce 
customs barriers for micro-multinationals and facilitate trade.
• Modernise and harmonise postal regimes: Harmonisation and simplification of 
policy and regulation, as well as increased technological investment and development 
of postal services, are extremely beneficial for micro-multinationals that utilise the 
postal service to move their goods around the world.  Multilateral harmonisation 
is the most effective method for improving the global postal system, agreement 
on addressing mechanisms, customs clearance policies, and tracking would make 
cross-border technology-enabled trade much more efficient.  
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• Protect intermediaries against third-party liability: A balanced regime for 
internet intermediary liability has been instrumental in developing internet-
enabled economic activity.  The balanced notice-and-takedown regime achieved 
in the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) protects IP while enabling 
platforms to grow.  The blanket immunity for speech violations provided by the 
US Communications and Decency Act (CDA) Section 230 enables free speech to 
flourish online.  Unfortunately, very few nations have adopted a similarly balanced 
regime for governing intermediary liability.  This creates a great deal of uncertainty 
for micro-multinationals.  Trade agreements should seek to harmonise intermediary 
liability regimes in a manner that encourages countries to adopt balanced, pro-
innovation liability regimes.  
• Tailor government programmes to fit the needs of micro-multinationals: 
Several governments have created trade-promotion programmes designed to help 
educate, finance, and facilitate export-oriented businesses.  Unfortunately, many 
of these programmes are tailored to fit the needs of larger manufacturing and 
agricultural businesses. Micro-multinational businesses face divergent barriers from 
the traditional exporter.  Governments should revisit export promotion programmes 
and tailor them to meet the needs of the micro-multinational.  
Conclusion
Pierre Omidyar, eBay’s founder, frequently says, “[e]veryone is born equally capable, 
but lacks equal opportunity” (Goldberg 2011). The internet has opened up a world of 
opportunity for businesses of all sizes around the world.  We believe that the micro-
multinational trend is still nascent and is only going to grow.  The growth of micro-
multinationals will bring more wealth creation and will spread that wealth to entities 
that have traditionally been left out.  This trend will help to push trade to new peaks, but 
the proper policies must be put in place in order to achieve this future.  
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19 Bold political leadership and 
vision can unlock global trade 
growth
Amgad Shehata
UPS
Global trade volumes have slowed dramatically after a period of steady growth, with 
financial flows hovering at levels almost 70% below their peak, according to the IMF . 
The slowdown in growth has broad consequences for domestic economies. Less trade 
means weaker job growth. Declining trade is also quite damaging to global economies 
that have invested in infrastructure for manufacturing or services exports. 
Some of the sluggish growth is attributable to normal cyclical factors such as 
fluctuations in currency and commodity prices. But other causes, such as a troubling 
stasis in global trade policy, are reason for concern. Trade policy sets the stage for many 
of the derivative benefits that economies receive.
Addressing these factors and returning global trade volumes to their pre-recession 
levels require strong political leadership capable of connecting bold new policies with 
modern technologies that facilitate communication and connectivity between countries. 
Together, these moves will ensure a future in which trade is easier, less expensive and 
more democratic. When trade operates in that kind of friendly environment, everyone 
has the potential to win by participating in global value chains.
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The rise and fall of trade growth
From 2000 to 2013, soaring commodity prices caused trade to grow unusually fast. To 
some extent, the 13-year rally reflected existing market conditions. More bulk carriers 
and tankers were moving more commodities such as copper ore and crude oil around the 
world, and these goods sold at higher prices. But slumping commodity prices in the last 
two years have cut overall export growth. This is of obvious concern to the industries 
involved and to their customers. But it doesn’t really affect the world economy as a 
whole. The condition will correct itself as economies adjust.  
The Global Crisis of 2008 was another contributor to sluggish trade growth.  This 
historic downturn caused a temporary trade collapse as consumer demand shrank and 
construction industries wilted. It also led to longer-term questions of business strategy. 
Though many of the global value chains and joint manufacturing platforms developed 
in the last decade are still in place, output has decreased in many cases due to slowing 
consumer demand. 
This brings us to the third cause of the growth slowdown: the halt to the broad-based 
reduction of global trade barriers. This reduction virtually stopped around 2010 and has 
not got back on track. From the early 1990s to 2010, the world economy was steadily 
reducing tariffs and other barriers through major multilateral and regional agreements. 
Examples include the Uruguay Round, a trade negotiation that created the WTO in 
1995, and the series of accession agreements that brought China, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, 
Vietnam, Ukraine, Russia and others into the WTO. These agreements brought world 
trade barriers to their lowest levels on record and nearly eliminated world tariffs on 
exports such as medical devices, computers, smartphones and tropical farm goods.
Liberalisation of trade policy helped make the era from 1990 to the Global Crisis 
the most productive for growth and poverty reduction in world history. Deep poverty 
rates worldwide fell by half, and American households gained almost $4,000 a year in 
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purchasing power as supply chains made food, clothes and home goods more cheaply 
and readily available.
Unfortunately, supportive policy and other favourable trends have slowed or ended 
entirely. The Uruguay Round agreements have long since been implemented, and the 
WTO’s Doha Round remains deadlocked. Aside from Iran, no large countries remain 
outside the WTO. 
Free trade agreements (FTAs) are only a partial substitute for liberalised policy. Until 
very recently, the big economies and largest traders – the US, the EU, China and Japan – 
had been negotiating around one another rather than with one another. Trade, therefore, 
has been proceeding under a policy system that is essentially static rather than dynamic. 
Express delivery, the internet and the rise of small-business 
trade
As governments plan their next steps, our experience at UPS suggests a possible 
large new area of potential trade growth: a trade boom among smaller businesses 
and individuals who leverage the established global express delivery and technology 
networks to tap new customers. 
The internet now reaches 3 billion people, up from 1.5 billion a decade ago and 360 
million in 2000. This, combined with the further expansion of global express delivery 
networks that were forged on the backs of multinational value chains, has made 
exporting and importing possible for smaller businesses that previously could not 
engage directly in international trade. 
Before these developments, the cost of finding customers and suppliers abroad was 
prohibitive for many companies. So were the costs of small shipments and returns. And 
the mountains of trade-related paperwork were so high that few small businesses had 
the manpower or the patience to participate in trade. 
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Today, the internet helps companies reach countless potential customers and suppliers. 
With express delivery enabling small package shipping, a world of new opportunity has 
opened. Statistics show this clearly. In 2003, the US had 119,000 exporting companies 
with fewer than 100 employees. Today that number has jumped to more than 280,000.
Trade policymakers now have the chance to build momentum with policies that can 
revive trade growth. For that to happen, broad-based liberalisation must resume. The 
ambitious set of regional and multilateral trade negotiations now underway can help. 
So can the international regulatory cooperation agreements being negotiated. Specific 
agreements include the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), as well as 
Europe-Asia, Asia-Asia cooperation efforts. 
Small businesses should be enthusiastic supporters of these agreements, which reflect 
many of the unique challenges companies face. They also help address new issues 
arising from internet access and data flows. Such policy innovation – and the fact that 
almost all of the world’s largest trading economies are participating – gives them great 
promise for growth.  
As the negotiations continue, the Obama administration and Congress are set to consider 
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Many regard the bill, which would modernise the 
US trade ambition in the 21st century, as essential to the US’s ability to conclude TPP, 
TTIP and TiSA. At the same time, a raft of trade legislation has expired in recent years 
and will need to be addressed. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which 
provides duty-free access for many goods from developing and least developed 
countries, expired at the end of July 2013. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), which provides benefits for countries in Africa, will expire in September 
2015. A Customs Modernization bill, including a UPS-led provision to raise the de 
minimis threshold, has been under consideration for a number of years. And Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) legislation expired in December 2014. Clearly, the US 
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has at its doorstep a path that accelerates economic growth and trade in a significantly 
robust and inclusive way for businesses of all sizes. 
To jumpstart trade growth, policymakers must support the boom in small-business and 
specialised, individualised trade. The WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, which 
was completed in 2014, would enable a world trading economy that is friendlier to 
smaller businesses and entrepreneurs than ever before. The challenge now is to ensure 
full and effective implementation among the 160 countries that signed the agreement, 
especially the smaller and poorer economies that need the most help building capacity 
to implement technologies and processes for inclusion in high-velocity global supply 
and value chains. These developing economies, if they ambitiously embrace the 
opportunities to modernise their trade regimes, stand to gain the most.
Strong trade growth could resume
The long stalemate in the Doha Round suggests some of these negotiations may 
be difficult. And we know, trade liberalisation often faces increased scepticism and 
opposition during periods of economic hardship. 
But last year’s approval of the WTO’s highly pragmatic and valuable Trade Facilitation 
Agreement suggests that determined and creative policymakers can win uphill battles. 
The record of the last generation is strong. Trade liberalisation launched an era of falling 
poverty and rising growth in the developing world, raised living standards worldwide 
and ensured access to markets that enabled the US to recover from the Global Crisis 
through exports. 
The current stasis in trade policy should not continue. We see new opportunities, a 
future of higher participation and broader benefits for businesses of all sizes as well 
as a re-invigoration of global production and services trade that can deliver significant 
benefits for those who get it right. All this takes is bold vision and courageous leadership, 
because the more trade barriers that we remove, the more trade happens.
